Structural and computational aspects of simple and influence games by Riquelme Csori, Fabián
Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya
Barcelona TECH
Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informatics
PhD. in Computing
Structural and Computational
Aspects of Simple and Influence Games
Fabia´n Riquelme Csori
PhD. Thesis
A dissertation submitted to the Departament de Llenguatges i
Sistemes Informatics of Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science
Advisors:
Dr. Xavier Molinero Albareda Dr. Mar´ıa Jose´ Serna Iglesias
Barcelona, June 2014

Contents
Acknowledgements XIII
Abbreviations and Symbols XV
Abstract 1
I Preliminaries 5
1 Introduction 7
1.1 Results Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Mathematical Preliminaries 19
2.1 Graphs and Hypergraphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Computational Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Simple Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.1 Properties and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.3 Regular and Weighted Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3.4 Counting and Enumerating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
II Simple Games 51
3 Representation and Conversion Problems 53
3.1 Representations for Simple Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.1.1 Explicit Set Families and Incidence Vectors . . . . . . 57
3.1.2 Binary Tree Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.1.3 Representation Sizes and Conversion Problems . . . . 69
3.2 Representations for Regular Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
III
IV – Contents
3.2.1 Conversion Problems for Regular Games . . . . . . . . 73
3.3 Representations for Weighted Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.1 Conversion Problems for Weighted Games . . . . . . . 79
4 Computational Problems 85
4.1 Known Complexity Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1.1 Properties and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1.2 Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 Decisiveness and Strongness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.1 Decisiveness for Simple Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2.2 Decisiveness and Strongness for Weighted Games . . . 101
4.2.3 Decisiveness and Strongness for Regular Games . . . . 103
4.3 Other Parameters and Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.3.1 The Width of a Simple Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.3.2 Dummy Players in Regular Games . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4 Counting and Enumerating Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.1 Known Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.2 Enumerating Decisive Regular Games . . . . . . . . . 115
III Influence games 125
5 Influence Games 127
5.1 Definitions and Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2 Expressiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3 Problems and Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.4 Subclasses of Influence Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.4.1 Maximum Influence Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.4.2 Minimum Influence Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6 Collective Choice Models 157
6.1 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.1.1 OLF Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.1.2 OLFM Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.1.3 Mediation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.1.4 Influence Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.2 Computational problems of mediation systems . . . . . . . . 169
6.3 Computing Satisfaction or Rae Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.3.1 Hardness Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.3.2 Polynomially Results for Bipartite Influence Graphs . 179
6.4 OLFM systems: Axiomatization of Rae index . . . . . . . . . 189
Contents – V
7 Centrality in Social Networks 197
7.1 Centrality Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.2 Cases of Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.2.1 Monkeys’ Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.2.2 Dining-Table Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.2.3 Student Government Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.2.4 Facebook interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
IV Conclusions 219
Concluding remarks 221
V Appendices 227
Appendix A List of decisive regular games 229
Appendix B List of Influence Games 233
Bibliography 239
Index 258
VI – Contents
List of Tables
2.1 A list of complexity classes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Forms of representation considered in this chapter. . . . . . . 54
3.2 Computational complexity of the conversion problem from
the row form to the column form, for representations of simple
games based on explicit descriptions of set families. . . . . . . 55
3.3 Computational complexity of the conversion problem from
the row form to the column form, for representations of simple
games based on variants of binary trees. . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Computational complexity of the conversion problem from
the row form to the column form for representations of regular
games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Computational complexity of the conversion problem from
the row form to the column form for representations of weighted
games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Exponential growth of a class of weighted games in MWF, in
terms of n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1 Known complexity results for properties and parameters of
simple games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Known complexity results for solution concepts on simple
games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 New complexity results for decisiveness of simple games. . . . 98
4.4 New complexity results for properties of players and param-
eters of simple games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.5 Results of counting the number of members for subclasses of
simple games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.6 Time results for enumerating decisive regular games. . . . . . 124
5.1 New results of complexity for properties and parameters of
influence games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
VII
VIII – List of Tables
5.2 New results of complexity for solution concepts of influence
games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.1 Collective decision function for an OLFM system. . . . . . . . 164
7.1 Comparison of centrality measures for the Monkeys’ interac-
tion network. The three more central values of some measures
are highlighted in bold. For influence games we consider a
quota q = 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.2 Comparison of centrality measures for the influence game ver-
sion of the Dining-table partners network. The three more
central values of some measures are highlighted in bold. For
influence games we consider a quota q = 14. . . . . . . . . . . 211
7.3 Comparison of centrality measures for the adapted version
of the Student Government discussion network. The more
central values of the measures are highlighted. We consider
for influence games a quota q = 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
A.1 List of decisive regular games in SWF from n = 1 until n = 7. 232
B.1 Digraphs without loops with 3 nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
B.2 The minimal unweighted influence games corresponding to
the 10 simple games up to isomorphism for n = 3. . . . . . . 234
B.3 The minimal unweighted influence games corresponding to
the 30 simple games up to isomorphism for n = 4. . . . . . . 238
List of Figures
2.1 Inclusion relationship between subclasses of simple games. . . 48
3.1 Backtrack tree for {1, 2, 4} and backtrack tree for the enumer-
ation without repetitions of all the winning coalitions that
contain 00101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 Computing MWF EWF for the simple game of Example 3.1. 62
3.3 Complete binary tree Bc(W) representing the winning coali-
tions for the simple game Γ = (N,W) of Example 3.1. The
labels in the last level of edges can be deduced from the other
levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Binary tree B(W) representing the winning coalitions for the
simple game Γ = (N,W) of Example 3.1. . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 B(Γ) (left) and PCB(Γ) (right) representing the simple game
Γ of Example 3.1. PCB(Γ) is obtained from B(Γ), by remov-
ing the marked nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 BDD(Γ) obtained from the given binary tree B(Γ) for the
game Γ of Example 3.1. Marked nodes are merged or removed
in the next step. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 FCB(Γ) obtained from PCB(Γ) for the game Γ of Exam-
ple 3.1. Nodes between dashed edges on the first tree are
merged in the second one. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.8 Computing SWF MWF for the simple game of Example 3.1. 77
5.1 The spread of influence starting from the initial activation of
X = {a} on an unweighted influence graph. . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2 An unweighted influence graph associated to the simple game
({1, 2, 3, 4}, {{1, 2, 4}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.3 An influence graph (G,w, f) associated to the weighted game
[q;w1, . . . , wn]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4 An unweighted influence graph (G, f) associated to the weighted
game [q;w1, . . . , wn]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
IX
X – List of Figures
5.5 The influence graph (G′, w′, f ′) associated to the influence
game (G,w, f, q,N). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.6 The influence graph associated to the intersection (x = 2)
or the union (x = 1) of two influence games with influence
graphs (G1, w1, f1) and (G2, w2, f2) and quotas q1 and q2 re-
spectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.7 Influence graphs associated to [q1;w
1
1, . . . , w
1
n] ∩ [q2;w21, . . . , w2n]
(x = 2), and [q1;w
1
1, . . . , w
1
n] ∪ [q2;w21, . . . , w2n] (x = 1). . . . . 135
5.8 The simple game whose set of players N = {1, . . . , n} ad-
mits a partition N1, . . . , Nm in such a way that W = {S ⊆
N ; ∃Ni with Ni ⊆ S} has exponential dimension, n1 · . . . ·
nm−1 [94], but this game admits a polynomial unweighted in-
fluence graph (G, f) with respect to n for the corresponding
unweighted influence game (G, f, n+ 1, N). . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.9 Influence graph (G1, f1) of the game ∆1(G, k). . . . . . . . . 143
5.10 Influence graph (G2, f2) used in the definition of the game
∆2(G, k). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.11 Graph Gˆ used to prove that Half vertex cover is NP-hard. 145
5.12 Influence graph (G3, f3) of the game ∆3(G, k). . . . . . . . . 147
6.1 Example of an opinion leader-follower system. . . . . . . . . . 161
6.2 An OLFM system with one layer of mediation. . . . . . . . . 163
6.3 The spread of influence starting from the initial activation of
X = {a} on an unweighted influence graph. . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.4 When followers have an even number of predecessors, the sat-
isfaction in each model produces different results. . . . . . . . 169
6.5 A strong influence graph with two layers of mediation. . . . . 185
6.6 A star influence system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.1 Influence game representing a small social network. . . . . . . 201
7.2 Social network of monkeys’ interaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.3 Comparisons between Bz, SS and CS measures for every case
in Monkeys’ interaction network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
7.4 Comparisons between Bz, F2 and F3 measures for every case
in Monkeys’ interaction network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
7.5 Comparisons between new and traditional centrality measures.207
7.6 Original network for dining-table partners. . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.7 Influence graph from the original dining-table partners network.209
7.8 Comparisons between Bz, SS and CS measures for every case
in Dining-table partners network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
7.9 Comparisons between SS, F2 and F3 measures for every case
in Dining-table partners network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7.10 Comparisons between SS, F2 and some traditional measures. . 213
List of Figures – XI
7.11 Student Government discussion network (up) and the adap-
tation to influence graph (down). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.12 Comparisons between both new and traditional centrality
measures for Student Government discussion network. . . . . 216
7.13 Centrality scores for the Facebook interactions network, by
considering the F2 measure with p = 0.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
7.14 Centrality scores for the Facebook interactions network, by
considering the F2 measure with p = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
XII – List of Figures
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my wife for being a wonderful partner in these five years of
adventure. I thank my family for their love and trust, and specially to my
parents and my sister, which endured me all the remaining years, in other
adventures.
I want to express my gratitude to my mentor, Andreas Polyme´ris, who
introduced me into the discrete mathematics and its relationship with soci-
ety. I am also thankful to my advisors, Maria Serna and Xavier Molinero,
for their constant assistance during this project. I also want to thank Ste-
fan Bolus and Sascha Kurz for answering my emails and for his kindness to
answer my questions. I want to extend my gratitude to the thesis tribunal,
for their interest in my work, as well as to the anonymous revisers, by their
valuable commentaries.
This research was funded by the “National Commission for Scientific and
Technological Research of Chile” (CONICYT), and also supported by the
ALBCOM Research Group of the Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes
Informatics, Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya. Without their financial
support this thesis could not have been realized.
Thank you very much.
Farisori,
Barcelona, June 2014.
XIII
XIV – Acknowledgements
Abbreviations and Symbols
| “Such that” in set definitions.
| • | Cardinality of •.
d•e Ceiling function.
b•c Floor function.
\ Set subtraction.
¬• Negation or complement of •.
,≺ Shift-order relationship.
α(X) Immediate successors of coalition X.
B(Γ) Bargaining set of game Γ.
βi(Γ) Banzhaf index of player i in game Γ.
β′i(Γ) Probabilistic Banzhaf index of player i in game Γ.
BDD Binary decision diagram.
BDDF Binary decision diagram form.
c Collective decision vector; constant.
C Collective decision function.
C(Γ) Core of game Γ.
C(Γ) -core of game Γ.
C1(Γ) Least core of game Γ.
d(p, X) Deficit of coalition X under payoff p.
d Deficit vector.
δ−(i) Indegree of node i.
δ+(i) Outdegree of node i.
e(p, X) Excess of coalition X under payoff p.
e Excess vector.
XV
XVI – Abbreviations and Symbols
E Set of edges of a graph.
 Parameter small enough.
ELF Explicit losing form.
EWF Explicit winning form.
f Labeling function;
Generic measure on a collective decision model.
F (X) Spread of influence from a team or coalition X.
Fk(X) Spread of influence from X at step k.
F k(X) Family of teams whose influence spreads to k agents.
F Set of followers.
Φi(Γ) Shapley-Shubik index of player i in game Γ.
FCB Fully condensed binary tree.
FCBF Fully condensed binary tree form.
G Graph.
G[X] Graph induced by X.
G Family of simple games.
Γ Simple game.
Γd Dual of simple game Γ.
ηi(Γ) Banzhaf value of player i; number of swings in i of a game.
i, j, h Players of simple game; nodes of graph; actors of system.
I(Γ) Set of imputations of game Γ.
I∗(Γ) Set of preimputations of game Γ.
I Set of independent actors.
iff “If and only if”.
Im(f) Image of function f .
Kr,s Bipartite graph.
K(Γ) Kernel of game Γ.
κi(Γ) Shapley-Shubik value of player i.
L Set of opinion leaders.
L Set of losing coalitions.
LM Set of maximal losing coalitions.
LS Set of shift-maximal losing coalitions.
λ(H) Minimal transversals or slices of hypergraph H.
MLF Maximal losing form.
MWF Minimal winning form.
MWC Minimal winning coalition.
Abbreviations and Symbols – XVII
M Set of mediators.
M Collective decision making model.
µ(H) Minimal kernel of hypergraph H.
n Number of players of a game; number of nodes of a graph;
number of actors of a system.
N Set of players of a simple game.
N (Γ) Nucleolus of game Γ.
N Set of natural numbers, including the number zero.
ν Characteristic function of a game.
ν(H) Clutter of hypergraph H.
p,q, r Payoff vectors.
pi Payoff of player i.
p(X) Payoff of coalition X.
PG(i) Predecessors of node i in graph G.
P(X) Power set of X.
Pk(X) Subsets of P(X) with cardinality k.
PK(Γ) Prekernel of game Γ.
PN (Γ) Prenucleolus of game Γ.
PCB Partially condensed binary tree.
PCBF Partially condensed binary tree form.
q Quota of either a weighted game or an influence game; frac-
tion value of an OLF system.
R Set of real numbers.
Si Set of swings for a player i.
SG(i) Successors of node i in graph G.
S OLF system.
S(Γ) A stable set of game Γ.
SX(Γ) A stable set of simple game Γ defined with MWC X.
SWF Shift-minimal winning form.
τ(H) Transversals or blocker of hypergraph H.
V Set of nodes of a graph; set of actors of a system.
VWRF Vector weighted representation form.
w Weight function.
W Set of winning coalitions.
Wm Set of minimal winning coalitions.
Ws Set of shift-minimal winning coalitions.
XVIII – Abbreviations and Symbols
ω, ωi Chow parameters.
WRF Weighted representation form.
X,Y, Z Coalitions of a simple game; subset of nodes of a graph;
subset of actors of a system.
Abstract
Thesis title : Structural and computational aspects of simple and
influence games
Author : Fabia´n Riquelme Csori
Place : Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya
Year : 2014
Advisors : Xavier Molinero and Maria Serna
Thesis committee : Josep Freixas, Joaquim Gabarro´, Jose´ Mar´ıa Alonso-
Meijide, Vito Fragnelli, Martin Olsen, Conrado Mart´ınez
and Nicolas M. Thie´ry
Simple games are a fundamental class of cooperative games. They have
a huge relevance in several areas of computer science, social sciences and dis-
crete applied mathematics. The algorithmic and computational complexity
aspects of simple games have been gaining interest to the computer science
community in the recent years.
In this thesis we consider different computational problems related to
properties, parameters, and solution concepts of simple games. We analyze
the computational complexity of these problems under different forms of
representation of simple games, regular games and weighted games. We also
analyze the complexity required to transform a game from one representa-
tion to another. In this scenario, we study the decisive problem, which is
associated to the duality problem of hypergraphs and monotone Boolean
functions. We prove that the problem of deciding whether a simple game
in minimal winning form is decisive can be solved in quasi-polynomial time.
We also show that this decisive problem can be polynomially reduced to the
same problem but restricted to regular games in shift-minimal winning form.
1
2 – Abstract
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Game theory arises in the first half of the 20th century from the need to study
formally situations of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational
decision-makers [257, 258]. It is closely related with other disciplines such
as decision theory, voting theory and social choice theory. Decision theory
is devoted to identifying the values, uncertainties, rationality, optimality
and other issues relevant in an individual decision making; voting theory
studies the voting systems, i.e., methods by which voters make a choice
between different options; and social choice theory studies how the individual
preferences can be combined to reach a collective decision.
From the beginning, a relevant branch of game theory has been coop-
erative game theory [155], which addresses the study of cooperative games,
also called coalitional games or characteristic function games. A cooperative
game is a mathematical structure formed by a set of players that by forming
coalitions can achieve a common benefit, enforcing a cooperative behavior.
Unlike non-cooperative games, where individual players compete to obtain
the highest payoffs for themselves, here the players form coalitions, so that
the problem is how to divide the payoffs or the utility, trying to obtain to-
gether the highest benefits as posible. Cooperative games have been widely
studied by the scientific community [258, 236, 65, 201, 212, 44].
A well known subclass of cooperative games is the class of simples games,
also called simple coalitional games, simple voting games or cooperative sim-
ple games, in which the benefit that a coalition may have is always binary,
i.e., a coalition may be winning or losing, depending on whether the players
in the coalition are able to benefit themselves from the game by achiev-
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ing together some goal. Simple games were introduced in the seminal work
of game theory in 1944 [258], as an extensive class of cooperative games1,
whose study
“yields a body of information which is of value for a deeper un-
derstanding of the general theory”.
Furthermore, in the preface of [251] we can read:
“Few structures in mathematics arise in more contexts and lend
themselves to more diverse interpretations than do hypergraphs
or simple games.”
Simple games have a huge relevance in mathematics, computer science
and social sciences, being used to solve and represent problems arising in
voting theory, decision theory and social choice theory, logic and thresh-
old logic, circuit complexity, computational complexity theory, artificial
intelligence, geometry, linear programming, Sperner theory, order theory,
etc. [251, 71, 75] They are closely related with other mathematical and
computational structures, such as dual hypergraphs, Sperner families, an-
tichains, monotone Boolean functions, free distributive lattices, monotone
collective decision making systems and multi-agent systems, among oth-
ers [251, 71, 75].
A lot of effort has been devoted to understand which conditions a simple
game should have in order to meet some properties [251]. The development
of computer science as a scientific discipline in the 1950s and early 1960s,
helped to deal with these problems from a computational point of view.
Recently computer scientists have begun to question what is the computa-
tional complexity of deciding properties in simple games [10, 92]. Several of
these questions have been satisfactorily classified in complexity classes, and
the others remain still open. The way in which the game is represented is
crucial for this complexity analysis.
Nowadays, cooperation towards task execution when tasks cannot be
performed by a single agent is one of the fundamental problems in both social
1However, they considered a more restricted class of games, which nowadays are known
as strong games, i.e., simple games such that the complement of every losing coalition is
a winning coalition. According to Isbell [124], the definition that nowadays is used was
given by Gillies in 1953 [97] under the name of pseudogames.
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and multi-agent systems. There has been a lot of research understanding
collective tasks allocation under different models coming from cooperative
game theory. Under such framework, in general, cooperation is achieved
by splitting the agents into teams so that each team performs a particular
task and the payoff of the team is split among the team members. Thus,
cooperative game theory provides the fundamental tools to analyze this
context [272, 273, 44, 184, 12, 54]. In this vein, it is relevant to mention the
effort of some authors to make explicit the relationship or agreements among
some players or actors in a game before the conformation of coalitions. This
is the case of the communication structures of Myerson [191] and the a priori
unions or coalition structures of Owen [205], that help to deal with additional
real-world decision-making situations.
On the other hand, the ways in which people influence each other through
their interactions in a social network has received a lot of attention in the
last decade. Social networks have become a huge interdisciplinary research
area with important links to sociology, economics, epidemiology, computer
science, and mathematics [5, 127, 67, 116]. In the last decades the field
has grown extensively with the development of Internet and the emergence
of online social networks. A social network can be represented by a graph
where each node is an agent and each edge represents the degree of influence
of one agent over another one. Several “germs”—ideas, trends, fashions,
ambitions, rules, etc.—can be initiated by one or more agents and eventually
be adopted by the system. The mechanism defining how these motivations
are propagated within the network, from the influence of a small set of
initially “motivated” nodes, is called a model for influence spread.
Motivated by viral marketing and other applications, the problem that
has been usually studied is the influence maximization problem, initially
introduced by Domingos and Richardson [64, 226] and further developed
in [136, 76]. This problem addresses the question of finding a set with at most
k players having maximum influence, and it is NP-hard [64], unless additional
restrictions are considered, in which case some generality of the problem is
lost [226]. In social network analysis, the spread of influence is also related
with other interesting concepts, like the homophily phenomenon [171, 247].
Two general models for spread of influence were defined in [136]: the linear
threshold model, based in the first ideas of [108, 230], and the independent
cascade model, created in the context of marketing by [100, 101]. Models
10 – Chapter 1. Introduction
for influence spread in the presence of multiple competing products has also
been proposed and analyzed [23, 33, 5]. In such a setting there is also
work done towards analyzing the problem from the point of view of non-
cooperative game theory. Non-cooperative influence games were defined in
2011 by Irfan and Ortiz [122]. Those games, however, analyze the strategic
aspects of two firms competing on the social network and differ from the
context of this thesis.
Besides the spread of influence phenomenon, one of the most studied
concepts in social network analysis is the notion of centrality and the de-
velopment of mechanisms to measure how structurally important is an ac-
tor within a social network [85, 32, 247]. There are many centrality mea-
sures that provide different relevance criteria for the vertices within the
network [261, 150]. However, one of the major challenges for a successful
implementation of network management activities, such as viral marketing,
is the identification of key persons with a central structural position within
the network. For this purpose, social network analysis provides a lot of
measures for quantifying a member’s interconnectedness within social net-
works, providing strongly differing results with respect to the quality of the
different centrality measures [148].
The main goals of this thesis are two. Firstly, increase the number
of known complexity results for computational problems related to simple
games and subclasses of simple games. Secondly, to establish a relationship
between the spread of influence phenomenon on social networks and binary
decisions in voting systems. This can be done through the definition of
influence games, a new family of simple games based on the linear threshold
model. We determine for this new construction the complexity of the above
computational problems. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of these games,
we also find for them some applications in other areas, such as multi-agent
systems, decision theory, social choice and social network analysis.
1.1 Results Overview
Although this thesis is focused on simple games, the research topic is mul-
tidisciplinary. On one hand, we can mention game theory, voting theory,
social choice theory and decision theory, that arise from economy and pol-
itics. On the other hand, we have the computational complexity theory, as
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part of theoretical computer science, that arises from computer sciences and
discrete applied mathematics. Furthermore, we use several tools from other
fields of discrete mathematics, such as graph theory, hypergraph theory and
order theory, among others. We also need to mention social network analy-
sis, that comes from an intersection between mathematics and sociology.
The approach of the thesis is theoretical and algorithmic. We study
the computational aspects of problems of simple games. We show the com-
putational complexity of well known properties of traditional subclasses of
simple games. For some problems that can not be solved in polynomial time,
we present enumeration algorithms with polynomial-delay, when the output
size is exponential in terms of the size of the input.
We attempt to use standard notation, indicating in each case the refer-
ences in which they are used. For any question about nonstandard mathe-
matical symbols, see the chapter Abbreviations and Symbols at the begin-
ning of the thesis.
In order to present our computational results, we classify the properties
of simple games into three types: those that represent features of simple
games, players, or coalitions. About the first ones, we focus on the proper,
strong and decisive properties. Those properties have applications in several
areas such as interactive decision making, distributed computing, logic and
linear programming, category theory, social science, hypergraph theory and
reliability theory [151, 129, 18, 251, 157, 71]. We consider several properties
of players, such as the dummy, passer, vetoer, and dictator properties, among
others, closely related to the computation of solution concepts. In the same
vein, regarding the properties of coalitions, we consider the blocking and the
swing, which are useful to compute solution concepts, as well as to represent
simple games in a more succinct way [258, 16, 164, 251].
From the point of view of parameters, we study quantities that give inter-
esting information about simple games. We study the width and the length,
also used in decision making [221], among others. We also study solution
concepts, that come from cooperative game theory as a way to measure profit
allocations of players, by considering the profit of each coalition [10, 44].
Given a subclass of simple games, some problems of interest in simple
game theory are: Given a simple game, does it belongs to that class? Could
you give me one after another all the simple games in the class? How many
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simple games belong to that class?
The first of these problems is related to the conversion problem, which
is the problem of computing a representation of a game given in another
representation. It is relevant to ask which forms of representation are the
more appropriate when we face a computational problem [129]. Both the
feasibility of the representation and the computational complexity of the
problem are aspects that must be considered; and the first of these aspects
has direct implications about the second one. For instance, the decisive
property can be decided in polynomial time when the game is given in
extensive winning form; in quasi-polynomial time if the game is given in
minimal winning form [84, 229], and the problem is coNP-complete if the
game can be given in weighted representation form [92].
The second problem is the enumeration problem, that attempts to list
without repetitions every game belonging to a class of simple games. Fi-
nally, the third one is the counting problem, which refers to find the number
of elements of those classes. Note that every subclass of simple games is
finite whether it is restricted to a given number of players. However, the
subclasses of interest are typically huge, so the storage of their elements in
memory is not feasible at all. In this scenario, the enumeration algorithms
allow us to recover all the elements of a given subclass. The enumeration
algorithms are especially useful in benchmarking, because through complex
combinatorial operations, they may provide specific subfamilies of simple
games for experiments, that would be difficult to achieve manually.
In general, we consider these problems for simple games, but also for
the main subclasses of simple games, such as regular games, weighted games
and homogeneous games, one of the most studied subclasses of weighted
games [246].
In the context of both social and multi-agent systems, we propose to
analyze cooperation based on a model for influence among the agents in
their established network of trust and influence. Social influence is relevant
to determine the global behavior of a social network and thus it can be used
to enforce cooperation by targeting an adequate initial set of agents. From
this point of view, we consider a simple and altruistic multi-agent system in
which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real
engagement depends on the perception of the willingness to perform the task
of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a
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cooperative simple game in which a team of agents—or coalition—succeeds
if it is able to convince enough number of agents to participate in the task.
We take the deterministic linear threshold model [45, 5] as the mechanism
for influence spread in the subjacent social network.
In the considered scenario we adopt the natural point of view of decision
or voting systems, mathematically modeled as simple games [258]. This
approach brings into the analysis all the parameters, properties and solution
concepts for simple games previously mentioned.
1.2 Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first one reviews the preliminary
aspects of simple game theory; the second part presents the different forms
of representation, and analyzes aspects of several problems on simple games;
and the last one is devoted to influence games and their applications. In
turn, each part is subdivided into chapters.
In Chapter 2 we establish basic definitions and notation related with
graph theory and computational complexity. Here we also define simple
games, their main properties, parameters, solution concepts and subfamilies.
In Chapter 3 we provide an easy way to access information about the dif-
ferent forms of representation of simple games, together with an analysis of
their relationships from a computational point of view. We study the most
classical forms of representation, such as the extended winning (losing) form
and the minimal winning (maximal losing) form, but also representations de-
rived from the binary trees and binary decision diagrams. For regular games
we consider the shift-minimal winning form and the fully condensed binary
trees. For weighted games we consider the usual weighted representation.
In this sense, the chapter behaves like a survey. Moreover, we also analyze
the complexity of the conversion problem in each case, i.e., the problem
of transforming a game from one form of representation to another. Some
of these results consider new algorithms which run with polynomial-delay.
This chapter correspond to the following paper:
[181] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Forms of representation
for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences. Submitted to
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014.
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In Chapter 4 we study the properties, parameters and solution concepts
of simple games from a computational point of view. The known results are
summarized on Tables 4.1 and 4.2. We solve some open computational prob-
lems, and we give ideas about how to deal with problems that remain open.
The main results obtained in these issues are summarized on Tables 4.3
and 4.4. In particular, we show that the decisive problem for simple games
is equivalent to the duality problem of hypergraphs, so it can be solved in
quasi-polynomial time, instead of being coNP-complete, as was conjectured
in [92]. We also prove that the decisive problem for weighted games in min-
imal winning form is polynomial time solvable. These results are presented
in the following publication:
[229] F. Riquelme and A. Polyme´ris. On the complexity of the decisive
problem in simple and weighted games. Electronic Notes in Discrete
Mathematics, 37:21–26, 2011.
Moreover, we show that the decisive problem for regular games in shift-
minimal winning form can also be solved in quasi-polynomial time, but it
seems unlikely that there is a polynomial algorithm to solve it, as in the case
of regular games in minimal winning form. This result can be found in the
following document:
[216] A. Polyme´ris and F. Riquelme. On the complexity of the decisive
problem in simple, regular and weighted games. CoRR, abs/1303.7122,
2013.
Another interesting result is that the width parameter—as well as the length—
can be computed in polynomial time for simple games in either extended
or minimal winning form. This problem was posted as open in [10], and its
solution is presented in the following paper:
[177] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Cooperation through social
influence. Submitted to European Journal of Operational Research,
2013.
[175] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Social influence as a voting
system: A complexity analysis of parameters and properties. CoRR,
abs/1208.3751v3, 2012.
1.2. Thesis Outline – 15
The final part of the chapter is devoted to the enumeration and counting
problems. We provide the main existing results from different analogous re-
search areas, and we propose a novel procedure to enumerate subclasses of
decisive games. These results remain unpublished, but a list of explicit enu-
merated decisive regular games is presented in Appendix A. The algorithm
presented in this chapter was also used for counting decisive homogeneous
games, whose numbers where introduced in the Online Encyclopedia of In-
teger Sequences (OEIS) [238], assuming the code A189360. The main ideas
of the enumeration of decisive regular games were presented in the following
conference:
[174] X. Molinero, A. Polyme´ris, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Efficient enu-
meration of complete simple games. In The Fifth International Confer-
ence on Game Theory and Management (GTM 2011). St. Petersburg,
Russia, June 27-29, 2011.
In Chapter 5 we define the influence games based on both an influence
graph and the linear-threshold model of influence spread. We show its ex-
pressiveness, by proving that they are equivalent to the whole family of sim-
ple games. We also analyze several of the previous properties, parameters
and solution concepts for influence games. These results are summarized on
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. For many cases in which the complexity of the prob-
lems is hard, we study some extremal cases for which the hard problems
become polynomial time solvable. Most of these results form part of an
article mentioned above:
[177] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Cooperation through social
influence. Submitted to European Journal of Operational Research,
2013.
[175] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Social influence as a voting
system: A complexity analysis of parameters and properties. CoRR,
abs/1208.3751v3, 2012.
Additionally, some results regarding solution concepts for influence games
were presented in the following conference:
[183] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Solution concepts in influ-
ence games. In the 20th Conference of the International Federation
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of Operational Research Societies (IFORS). Barcelona, Spain, July
13-18, 2014.
The last two chapters of the third part consider several applications of
influence games in different topics of computer sciences.
In Chapter 6 we define some collective choice models, namely the opinion
leader-follower systems or OLF systems, mediation systems, and influence
systems. While the first one was defined in [255], the other two are new.
Mediation systems are influence games in which we consider a new kind of
actors called mediators, that are not part of the set of players. We prove
that several problems considered above for influence games, can be solved for
mediation systems in polynomial time. This model appears in the following
proceedings:
[180] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Star-shaped mediation in in-
fluence games. In K. Cornelissen, R. Hoeksma, J. Hurink, and B. Man-
they, editors, 12th Cologne-Twente Workshop on Graphs and Combi-
natorial Optimization, Enschede, Netherlands, May 21-23, 2013, vol-
ume WP 13-01 of CTIT Workshop Proceedings, pages 179–182, 2013.
For OLF systems and influence systems, we address the computational com-
plexity of the satisfaction measure introduced in [255], that we show is equiv-
alent to the Rae index of cooperative games [220]. We prove that comput-
ing the satisfaction measure is hard even for influence systems on bipartite
digraphs. We also introduce subfamilies of these systems for which the sat-
isfaction can be computed in polynomial time. These results are presented
in the following paper:
[178] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Measuring satisfaction in
societies with opinion leaders and mediators. Submitted to Discrete
Applied Mathematics, 2013.
We finish the chapter by proving the existence of an axiomatization of the
satisfaction measure for opinion leader-follower through mediators systems
or OLFM systems, a generalization of OLF systems that allows mediators in
the set of actors. It is a generalization of the axiomatization given by [256]
for the satisfaction measure in OLF systems. This results appear in the
following document:
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[228] F. Riquelme. Satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders and medi-
ators: properties and an axiomatization. CoRR, abs/1405.3460, 2014.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we propose and study new centrality measures for
social network analysis based on the spread of influence phenomenon. We
provide evidence that power indices can be applied as centrality measures,
and we also define the effort centrality and the satisfaction centrality. Ad-
ditionally, we define a family of centrality measures that can be computed
in polynomial time. We compare all these measures with some of the most
traditional ones in real social networks. Most of these results are presented
in the following publication:
[182] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Power indices of influence
games and new centrality measures for agent societies and social net-
works. In C. Ramos, P. Novais, C. E. Nihan, and J. M. Corchado,
editors, Ambient Intelligence - Software and Applications: 5th Inter-
national Symposium on Ambient Intelligence, volume 291 of Advances
in Intelligent Systems and Computing, pages 23-30. Springer Interna-
tional Publishing, 2014.
[179] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Power indices of influence
games and new centrality measures for agent societies and social net-
works. CoRR, abs/1306.6929, 2013.
Additionally, the use of power indices as centrality measures and some pre-
liminary validation were presented in the following conference:
[176] X. Molinero, F. Riquelme, and M. Serna. Centrality measures based on
power indices for social networks. In The 26th European Conference
on Operational Research (EURO2013). Rome, Italy, July 1-4, 2013.
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Chapter 2
Mathematical Preliminaries
In this chapter we describe the preliminary definitions concerning graph the-
ory, computational complexity and simple games. We assume basic knowl-
edge in computer sciences and discrete mathematics.
As usual, P(N) denotes the power set of N , and n its cardinality, i.e.,
n = |N |.
2.1 Graphs and Hypergraphs
In this thesis we use standard notation for graph theory [26], mainly used
in Chapters 3, 5 and 6. We also use hypergraphs, mainly in Section 4.2, for
which we use notation from [18, 214].
Definition 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph, where V (G) is the set of vertices
or nodes, and E(G) is the set of edges. Let n = |V (G)| be the number of
vertices. A directed graph is a graph whose edges have a direction associated
with them. The directed edges are also known as arcs. An undirected graph
is a graph without direction in the edges. An edge and a vertex on that edge
are called incident. Two edges are called adjacent if they share a common
vertex. Similarly, two vertices are called adjacent if they share a common
edge.
For each i ∈ V , SG(i) = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E} is the set of successors of i,
and PG(i) = {j ∈ V | (j, i) ∈ E} is the set of predecessors of i. We extend
this notation to vertex subsets, given X ⊆ V , so that SG(X) = {i ∈ V |
∃j ∈ X, i ∈ SG(j)} and PG(X) = {i ∈ V | ∃j ∈ X, i ∈ PG(j)}. Finally, let
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δ−(i) = |PG(i)| and δ+(i) = |SG(i)| be the indegree and the outdegree of
the node i, respectively. The size of a graph is its number of vertices, |V |.
We use simply V and E rather than V (G) and E(G), when there is no
risk of confusion. Let i, j ∈ V be a pair of nodes. If G is a directed graph,
an edge from node i to node j is denoted by a pair (i, j) ∈ E; otherwise, if
G is undirected, an edge between nodes i and j is denoted by {i, j} ∈ E.
All the graphs considered in this thesis are directed, unless otherwise
stated, without loops and multiple edges. When there is no risk of confusion,
an undirected edge between nodes i and j is also denoted by (i, j). For
the remaining definitions, we consider interchangeably either directed or
undirected graphs.
Usually nodes or edges need to be labeled.
Definition 2.2. A weighted graph is a graph (G,w) where w : E(G) → N
is a weight function. A labeled graph is a weighted graph (G,w, f) where
f : V (G)→ N is a labeling function. An unweighted labeled graph is a graph
(G, f) in which every edge has weight 1.
Sometimes, we just need to pay attention to some portion of an entirely
graph. For this cases it is necessary the notion of subgraph.
Definition 2.3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A subgraph G′ = (V ′, E′) of
G is a graph whose vertex set is a subset of that of G, i.e. V ′ ⊆ V , and
whose adjacency relation is a subset of that of G restricted to this subset,
i.e. E′ = {(i, j) ∈ E | i ∈ V ′ and j ∈ V ′}. A subgraph G′ of a graph G is
induced if for all i, j ∈ V ′, (i, j) ∈ E′ if and only if (i, j) ∈ E; i.e., G′ is an
induced subgraph of G if it has exactly the edges that appear in G over the
same vertex set. If the vertex set of G′ is the subset X of V (G), then G′
can be written as G[X] and is said to be induced by X.
Another issue in graph theory is the connectivity in graphs.
Definition 2.4. A path in a graph is a sequence of edges which connect
a sequence of vertices. Two vertices i and j are connected in a graph if it
contains a path from i to j. A graph is connected if every pair of vertices
in the graph is connected. A connected component is a maximal connected
subgraph of a graph.
Now we define some kind of graphs with interesting properties that we
use in the following chapters.
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Definition 2.5. Let G = (V,E) be a graph, then:
• G is isolated if it has no edges. It is denoted by In.
• G is a cycle if it is a path starting and ending at the same vertex, with
no repetitions of vertices or edges allowed, other than the repetition
of the starting and ending vertex.
• G is complete if every vertex is connected with the others.
• G is bipartite if V can be divided into two disjoint sets V1 and V2 such
that every edge connects a vertex in V1 to one in V2, i.e., so that V1
and V2 are independent sets. Equivalently, a bipartite graph is a graph
that does not contain odd-length cycles.
• G is a complete bipartite graph if it is complete and bipartite. It is
denoted by Kr,s, where r = |V1| and s = |V2|. We denote by ~Kr,s to
the complete bipartite graphs in which the edges are all oriented from
V1 to V2.
• G is a star graph if it is a bipartite graph K1,k formed by k+1 vertices.
• G is a triangle if it is the complete graph with three vertices that forms
a cycle.
• G is a tree if it is connected and has no cycles.
• G is a binary tree if it is a tree such that each vertex has at most two
child vertices. Vertices with children are called inner nodes. Vertices
without children are called terminal nodes, leaf nodes, outer nodes or
external nodes. The root node is the ancestor of all nodes. The null
tree is the tree which does not have any vertex other than the root.
Observe that a graph where all edges are incident is either a triangle or
a star.
In binary trees, child vertices are usually distinguished as “left” and
“right” or by labels 0/1 on the corresponding arc. Any vertex in the data
structure can be reached by starting at the root node and repeatedly follow-
ing pointers to either the left or right child. In a binary tree, the outdegree
of every vertex is at most two and it holds that |E| = |V |−1. In some cases
the terminal nodes are labeled.
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Sometimes it is useful to consider a generalization of graphs where the
edges can connect multiple vertices, in such a way that instead of a set of
edges we obtain a family of sets. This generalization is known as hypergraph.
Definition 2.6. Let N be a finite set known as ground set, a hypergraph is
a family H ⊆ P(N) of hyperedges X ⊆ N .
We may represent a hypergraph H as an incidence matrix, whose rows
represent the incidence vectors x : N → {0, 1} of the hyperedges X ∈ H.
Thus, given i ∈ N , x(i) = 1 if and only if i ∈ X. The size of a hypergraphH,
i.e., the amount of bits needed in order to write down the family of incidence
vectors that characterize the hypergraph, is n · |H| = n · |H| ∈ N.
The following operators define several properties of hypergraphs. They
come from [214].
Definition 2.7. Given a hypergraph H over a set N , then we define:
• ¬(H) = {N \X | X ∈ H} is the family of complementaries of H.
• µ(H) = {X ∈ H | for all Z ∈ H, Z 6⊂ X} is the minimal of H, or
the family of irredundant elements of H.
• ν(H) = {Z ⊆ N | exists X ∈ H, X ⊆ Z} is the clutter of H, or
the family of subsets of N that respond to H.
• τ(H) = {Z ⊆ N | for all X ∈ H, X ∩ Z 6= ∅} is the blocker of H, or
the family of subsets of N that are transversal to H.
• λ(H) = µ(τ(H)) are the slices of H, or
the family of irredundant elements that are transversal to H.
Let H,K ⊆ P(N) be two hypergraphs. Since H ⊆ K implies ν(H) ⊆
ν(K), the operator ν is monotone. On the other hand, since H ⊆ K implies
τ(K) ⊆ τ(H), the operator τ is antitone. The application of these operators
can be seen in the following example.
Example 2.1. Let be N = {1, 2, 3}, consider the hypergraph given by
H = {{1, 2}, {3}, {1, 2, 3}}. The families obtained from the operators defined
above are the following.
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N 123
H 001
110
111
N 123
¬(H) 000
001
110
N 123
µ(H) 001
110
N 123
ν(H) 001
011
101
110
111
N 123
τ(H) 011
101
111
N 123
λ(H) 011
101
where each row in the binary matrices represents a hyperedge.
Note that the operators ν and τ are closely related:
Lemma 2.1. [214] Given a hypergraph H ⊆ P(N), then it holds that:
• ν(µ(H)) = ν(H),
• τ(µ(H)) = τ(H),
• τ(ν(H)) = τ(H),
• τ(τ(H)) = ν(H), and
• P(N) \ ν(H) = ¬(τ(H)).
Finally, we define three properties for hypergraphs that will be helpful
in Section 4.2.
Definition 2.8. A pair of hypergraphs (H,K) over the same ground set is:
• coherent, if ν(H) ⊆ τ(K),
• complete, if ν(H) ⊇ τ(K), and
• dual, if it is both coherent and complete, i.e. ν(H) = τ(K).
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2.2 Computational Complexity
In this section we recall the basic definitions and tools from [51, 207].
The computational complexity theory is a branch of theoretical computer
science and mathematics focused on classifying computational problems ac-
cording to their inherent difficulty. Thus, the problems that can be solved
by algorithms within a given resource are collected together in a specific
complexity class.
We usually distinguish between two kinds of complexity: time complexity
and space complexity. More formally, a complexity class is a set of computa-
tional problems that can be solved by algorithms with times of execution—
for the case of time complexity—or memory storage spaces—for the case of
space complexity—upper bounded by a function family, usually in terms of
the input size of the algorithm. From now on we call the computational
problems just as “problems”.
A standard way to describe computational complexity in terms of an
upper bound is given by the big O notation.
Definition 2.9. Let g be a function defined on the natural numbers, we
say that O(g) is the set of functions {f(n) | there exists positive constants
c and n0 such that 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ cg(n) for all n ≥ n0}.
Unless we say otherwise, we refer always to the time complexity. The
most common time complexity classes refer to decision problems, i.e., prob-
lems that can be answered with a “yes” or “no”.
Definition 2.10. The class P contains all the decision problems that can
be solved in time which is polynomial in the size of the input. The class NP
contains all the decision problems for which membership has a polynomial-
time verifiable certificate. The class coNP contains all the decision problems
whose complements are in NP. The class EXP contains all the decision prob-
lems that can be solved in time which is exponential in the size of the input.
We denote sEXP as the strict exponential class, i.e., the class of all the deci-
sion problems which belong to EXP but cannot be solved in sub-exponential
time in the size of the input. We denote QP as the class of all the deci-
sion problems that can be solved in quasi-polynomial—sub-exponential but
super-polynomial—time, i.e., by functions like nlogO(n), where n is the size
of the input.
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To show that a decision problem belongs to the class P, it suffices to find
a polynomial time algorithm that solves the problem. On the other hand,
there exist other classes of decision problems known as “hard problems”, for
which we need to define before what is a polynomial-time reduction. It is
well known that a decision problem A can be encoded as a string of binary
numbers, so that A ⊆ {0, 1}∗.
Definition 2.11. A polynomial-time reduction from a decision problem A ⊆
{0, 1}∗ to a decision problem B ⊆ {0, 1}∗ is a polynomial-time computable
function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that, for every instance x ∈ {0, 1}∗,
x ∈ A if and only if f(x) ∈ B.
Consider two decision problems A and B, a polynomial-time reduction f
from A to B and an algorithm to solve B. If there exists a polynomial-time
reduction from A to B, then an instance x of A can be solved with the
algorithm that solves B, with the input given by the instance f(x).
Now we can define the remaining most common time complexity classes.
Definition 2.12. The class NP-hard—in short, NPH—contains all the de-
cision problems such that any problem in NP is polynomial time reducible
to them. The class NP-complete—in short, NPC—contains all the decision
problems that belong to NP and NP-hard.
Furthermore, the classes coNP, coNP-hard—in short, coNPH—and coNP-
complete—in short, coNPC—contain respectively all the decision problems
whose complements are in NP, NP-hard and NP-complete.
The NP-complete problem by antonomasia is the Satisfiability problem
(SAT), for which no one knows if there is an algorithm able to solve it in
polynomial time. The most accepted conjecture is that P 6= NP, so the
answer would be “no”. The membership of SAT in the class NP-complete
was established by Cook in 1971 [50]. All other NP-complete problems can
be polynomially reduced from SAT. Two lists of several NP-complete prob-
lems obtained through polynomial-time reductions from other NP-complete
problems are presented in [133, 95].
An additional interesting concept is given by the problems that can be
solved by an algorithm that runs in pseudo-polynomial time [95].
Definition 2.13. An algorithm runs in pseudo-polynomial time if its run-
ning time is polynomial in the numeric value of the input.
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Observe that this numeric value can be exponential in the length of the
input, that is given by the number of its digits. Further, there are several
computational problems that require a set of values to solve them, instead
of decision problems that just need a binary answer.
An enumeration problem is a problem which can be solved by an algo-
rithm that in the output set determines successively each one of the possible
solutions. The following definitions come from [129].
Definition 2.14. An enumeration problem can be solved with incremental
polynomial time if there exists an algorithm so that given an input and a set
of members of the output, find another member of the output, or determine
that none exists, can be done in time polynomial in the combined sizes of
the input and the given members of the output. Further, an enumeration
problem can be solved with polynomial-delay if there exists an algorithm
that returns the members of the output in some order, and such that the
delay between any two consecutive members is bounded by a polynomial in
the input size.
We denote Pd to the class of enumerating problems that can be solved
with polynomial-delay. Note that an algorithm that runs with polynomial-
delay implies that it runs in incremental polynomial time.
A counting problem refers to find the number of solutions of an enu-
merating problem. An algorithm that solves a counting problem returns a
natural number. The most representative complexity classes for this kind of
problems are the following.
Definition 2.15. The class #P or sharp-P contains all the counting prob-
lems such that the objects being counted can be verified in polynomial time.
The class #P-hard—in short, #PH—contains all the counting problems such
that any problem in #P is polynomial time reducible to them. The class #P-
complete—in short, #PC—contains all the counting problems that belong
to #P and #P-hard.
In Section 2.3.4 we introduce the enumeration and counting problems
specifically related to simple games.
Regarding space complexity, there are complexity classes which are anal-
ogous than for time complexity.
Definition 2.16. The class PSPACE contains all the decision problems that
can be solved by using a polynomial amount of space. The class EXPSPACE
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Complexity class Description
Decision problems
P Polynomial time solvable.
QP Quasi-polynomial time solvable.
EXP Exponential time solvable.
sEXP Exponential but not sub-exponential time
solvable.
NP Non-deterministic polynomial time solvable.
NP-hard (NPH) All NP problems are polynomial time
reducible to it.
NP-complete (NPC) In NP and NP-hard.
coNP Its complement is in NP.
coNP-complete (coNPC) Its complement is in NP-complete.
PSPACE Polynomial amount of space solvable.
EXPSPACE Exponential amount of space solvable.
Enumeration problems
Pd Polynomial-delay solvable.
Counting problems
#P Counting solutions of NP problems.
#P-hard (#PH) All #P problems are polynomial time
reducible to it.
#P-complete (#PC) In #P and #P-hard.
Table 2.1: A list of complexity classes.
contains all decision problems that can be solved by using an exponential
amount of space.
A succinct description of the previous complexity classes are summarize
on Table 2.1.
We finish this section with a list of NP-hard problems that we use in the
thesis for polynomial-time reductions [95].
Name: Vertex Cover
Input: Undirected graph G = (V,E) and an integer k.
Question: Is there a set X ⊆ V with |X| ≤ k such that
each edge in G has at least one vertex in X?
Name: Set Cover
Input: Finite set S, a collection of subsets C ⊆ S, and an integer k.
Question: Is there a subset C ′ ⊆ C with |C ′| ≤ k such that
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every element in S belongs to at least one member of C ′?
Name: Set Packing
Input: Collection C of finite sets, and an integer k.
Question: Is there a collection of disjoint sets C ′ ⊆ C with |C ′| ≥ k?
Name: Knapsack
Input: Finite set S of items i with weights wi, profits ni; an integer k.
Question: Is there a set C ⊆ S with ∑i∈C wi ≤ k such that
the value
∑
i∈C ni is maximized?
It is known that using dynamic programming the Knapsack problem
can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time [135].
2.3 Simple Games
Simple games can be defined by using the notion of hypergraph. We follow
definitions and notations from [251].
Definition 2.17. Let N be a finite set, a simple game is a monotone hy-
pergraph W over N , i.e., such that for all X ∈ W, if X ⊆ Z, then Z ∈ W.
The set N is known as the grand coalition. Let W be the set of all
winning coalitions and L = ¬W = {X ⊆ N | X /∈ W} be the set of all
losing coalitions, we usually denote a simple game as a pair Γ = (N,W).
As a subclass of cooperative games, the simple games satisfy another
classical definition. For cooperative games, we use notation from [44, 10].
Definition 2.18. A cooperative game is a pair (N, ν), where N is a set of
players and ν : P(N) → R is the characteristic/valuation function of the
game, that associates, for each coalition X ⊆ N , a payoff ν(X) which the
coalition members may distribute among themselves.
Note that the characteristic function ν should not be confused with the
operator ν(H) for a hypergraph H. The clutter of a hypergraph is only used
in this thesis in Section 4.2, and both concepts are clearly distinguished
depending on the context.
By using cooperative games, a simple game can also be defined as follows.
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Definition 2.19. A simple game is a cooperative game Γ = (N, ν) such
that ν : P(N)→ {0, 1}, ν(∅) = 0, ν(N) = 1 and ν is monotonic, i.e., so that
ν(X) ≤ ν(Y ) whenever X ⊆ Y . A coalition X ⊆ N is winning whether
ν(X) = 1 and losing whether ν(X) = 0.
We say that a simple game (N,W) is given in extended winning represen-
tation form. However, there are many other forms of representations, as we
shall see in Chapter 3. To study the complexity of a computational problem,
we need to specify the form of representation on which the simple game is
given. Nevertheless, for the most definitions regarding simple games, we use
this form of representation, assuming that it is a generic form, and also that
the form of representation is independent of what is being defined. We will
use simple games as a pair (N, ν) only in the context of solution concepts, as
in Section 2.3.2, because solution concepts comes from cooperative games.
It is clear that P(N) can be partitioned into W and L, so that X ∈ W
if and only if X /∈ L. Further, note that Definition 2.19 excludes the games
(N, ν) with ν(∅) = 1 or ν(N) = 0. Indeed, these games are considered trivial,
because by monotonicity, all the coalitions of the first one are winning, and
all the coalitions of the second one are losing. Several authors exclude these
trivial games to avoid further difficulties in some proofs. We maintain this
convention, although in most of the results there is no problem accepting
the trivial games.
Note that simple games can also be defined through cooperative games
by determining a threshold q ∈ R, so that a coalition X ⊆ N is winning
whenever ν(X) ≥ q, and losing whenever ν(X) < q. In this sense, the simple
games are also known as threshold games [10].
To finish this section we define three operations on simple games: duality,
union and intersection.
Like hypergraphs or Boolean functions, every simple game has a dual.
The dual of a simple game is another simple game—or sometimes even the
same—which is obtained by an involution operation. If we apply the same
operation again over the new game, we obtain the original one.
Definition 2.20. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game, its dual is the simple
game Γd = (N,Wd), where for all X ∈ Wd, N \X ∈ L.
Note that for every simple game Γ, it is clear that (Γd)d = Γ.
For the remaining definitions, we need the following result.
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Lemma 2.2. Let Γ1 = (N,W1) and Γ2 = (N,W2) be two simple games,
both (N,W1 ∪W2) and (N,W1 ∩W2) are also simple games.
Proof. Let be X ∈ W1 ∪W2, it means that X ∈ W1 or X ∈ W2. If X ⊆ Z,
then Z ∈ W1—by monotonicity of Γ1—or Z ∈ W2—by monotonicity of
Γ2— so then Z ∈ W1 ∪W2 and (N,W1 ∪W2) is a simple game.
Let be X ∈ W1 ∩W2, it means that X ∈ W1 and X ∈ W2. If X ⊆ Z,
then Z ∈ W1 and Z ∈ W2—by monotonicity of Γ1 and Γ2, respectively—
so then Z ∈ W1 ∩W2 and (N,W1 ∩W2) is a simple game.
From the above we can define the following.
Definition 2.21. The intersection of two simple games is the simple game
where a coalition wins if and only if it wins in both games. In a similar way,
the union of two simple games is the simple game where a coalition wins if
and only if it wins in at least one of the two games.
2.3.1 Properties and Parameters
Now we discuss several relevant properties and parameters of simple games.
We start with well known properties regarding to coalitions.
Definition 2.22. Let Γ be a simple game. A winning coalition is minimal if
removing any of its players we obtain a losing coalition. A losing coalition is
maximal if adding any player on it we obtain a winning coalition. A coalition
X ⊆ N is a blocking coalition if N \ X is losing, and it is a swing if there
exists a player i ∈ X such that i is critical, i.e., X ∈ W and X \ {i} ∈ L.
We denote as Wm = {X ∈ W | for all Z ∈ W, Z 6⊂ X} the set of
minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), and as LM = {Y ∈ L | for all Z ∈
L, Y 6⊂ Z} the set of maximal losing coalitions. We denote the set of swings
for a player i as Si = {X ∈ W | X \ {i} ∈ L}. Furthermore, we use W(Γ),
L(Γ), Wm(Γ) and LM (Γ) to denote the set of winning, losing, minimal
winning and maximal losing coalitions of a simple game Γ, and simply W,
L, Wm and LM when there is no risk of ambiguity.
The sets Wm and LM are useful to represent simple games in more
succinct ways [258]. The blocking property was firstly defined in 1956 by
Richardson [225], as a way to simplify the notation of simple games given
in 1953 by Gillies [97]. The swing is a property which emerged from the
definition of critical player, described at least since 1965 by Banzhaf [16].
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Regarding simple games as a whole, the main properties are as follows.
Definition 2.23. A simple game (N,W) is:
• proper, if for all X ⊆ N , X ∈ W implies N \X ∈ L, i.e., every winning
coalition is a blocking;
• strong, if for all X ⊆ N , X ∈ L implies N \X ∈ W;
• decisive, if it is both strong and proper, i.e., X ∈ W iff N \X ∈ L.
Further, a simple game is dual-comparable if it is either proper or strong,
improper if it is not proper, and weak if it is not strong.
Proper (simple) games are also known as supperaditive [204] or coher-
ent [214]; strong games [258, 225, 123] as complete [214]; and decisive games
as constant-sum [258], zero-sum [258] or self-dual [235]. The decisive prop-
erty has been considered for simple games from its origins. However, in
other topics such as Boolean functions and Boolean logic, the self-duality
is even older, being defined in 1921 by Post [217]. Dual-comparability was
firstly studied in 1961 by Muroga et al. [189].
These properties are closely related to many computational problems,
such as the dualization problem of conjunctive normal forms (CNF) in logic
and Boolean functions, the problem of computing the minimal transversals
or hitting sets of a given hypergraph [18], the problem of computing the max-
imal independent sets of a hypergraph [151, 129], among others [71]. They
are also of special interest for voting systems [251]. In particular, decisive
games have applications in several areas, such as interactive decision mak-
ing, distributed computing, logic and linear programming, category theory,
social science, hypergraph theory and reliability theory [157]. Furthermore,
in [251] we read:
“properness rules out the possibility of disjoint winning coali-
tions (. . .) while strongness rules out the possibility of two losing
coalitions whose union is N (. . .) Some authors who view simple
games as models of voting systems have little interest in sim-
ple games that are not proper. Their argument is that disjoint
winning coalitions can allow contradictory decisions to be made
by the voting body. (. . .) A less vigorous argument is sometimes
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raised against games that are not strong, and thus, the argument
goes, leave some issues unresolved. Ramamurthy (1990) refers
to ‘the paralysis that may result from allowing a losing coalition
to obstruct a decision.’”
Note that Γ is proper (strong) if and only if Γd is strong (proper), and
it is decisive if and only if Γ = Γd.
Following with the definitions, now we describe the main properties fo-
cused in players of simple games.
Definition 2.24. Let (N,W) be a simple game and i ∈ N a player:
• i is a dummy if i ∈ X implies X /∈ Wm;
• i is a passer if i ∈ X implies X ∈ W, i.e. {i} ∈ W;
• i is a vetoer if i /∈ X implies X /∈ W, i.e. N \ {i} ∈ L;
• i is a dictator if i ∈ X iff X ∈ W, i.e. i is both passer and vetoer.
• Given a coalition X ⊆ N , i is critical in X if X ∈ W and X \ {i} ∈ L.
• Given another player j ∈ N , i and j are symmetric if for all X ⊆
N \ {i, j}, X ∪ {i} ∈ W if and only if X ∪ {j} ∈ W.
Dummies were defined in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgenstern [258]
and the symmetry of players in 1966 by Maschler and Peleg [164]. Crit-
ical players, also known as swing players are used at least since 1965 by
Banzhaf [16] to describe his popular power index, used to measure the vot-
ing power of players in a simple game. Passers, vetoers or veto players and
dictators are usually used in problems related with solution concepts. To
read about the Banzhaf index and other solution concepts, see Section 2.3.2.
It is easy to see that when there is a passer, then no other player can be
a vetoer, and vice versa. Therefore, a simple game may have at most one
dictator, and simple games with more than one passer or vetoer do not have
a dictator. We can also relate these three kind of players with the properties
of Definition 2.23.
Proposition 2.1. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game. If a player i ∈ N is:
• vetoer but not dictator, then Γ is proper and weak;
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• passer but not dictator, then Γ is strong and improper;
• dictator, then Γ is decisive.
Proof. If i is a vetoer, then X = N \ {i} ∈ L, so for all Y ∈ W, it holds
i ∈ W, and the complement N \ Y ⊆ X. Therefore, by monotonicity,
N \ Y ∈ L, so the game is proper.
If i is a passer, then X = {i} ∈ W, so for all Y ∈ L, it holds i /∈ L, and
X ⊆ N \ Y . Therefore, by monotonicity, N \ Y ∈ W, so the game is strong.
If i is vetoer and passer, then for all X ∈ W it holds i ∈ X, and for
all Y ∈ L it holds i /∈ Y , which means that |W| = |L|, i.e., the game is
decisive.
Besides the properties, there are some parameters which give interesting
information about simple games. The parameters can be useful, for in-
stance, to measure the inputs of the algorithms and thus to deal with their
computational complexities.
Definition 2.25. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game:
• The size of Γ is |Γ| = |N | · |W| = n · |W| ∈ N.
• The length of Γ is length(Γ) = min{|X| | X ∈ W}.
• The width of Γ is width(Γ) = min{|X| | N \X ∈ L}.
• The Nakamura number of Γ is min{|W ′| | W ′ ⊆ W, ⋂W ′ = ∅}.
• The Coleman’s power of Γ is |W|/2n.
• The Chow parameters of Γ are the members of the vector
(ω1, . . . , ωn, ω), where for all i ∈ N , ωi = |Wi| = |{X ∈ W | i ∈ X}|
and ω = |W|.
The size of a simple game corresponds to a bound on the description
of the game. Therefore, it depends of how the game is represented. This
is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The length and the width were firstly
defined in 1990 by Ramamurthy [221] as indicators of efficiency for decision
making. The Nakamura number was used in 1979 by Nakamura [192] to
prove that the rationality of collective choice critically depends on the num-
ber of alternatives [131]. The Coleman’s power, also known as the “power
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of collectivity to act”, was introduced in 1971 by Coleman [49] as a way
to represent the ease with which a decision can be made. At last, Chow
parameters, also known as degree sequence [251], were introduced in 1961 by
Chow [46] in the context of threshold functions, and then used by Dubey
and Shapley [66] to study some properties of the Banzhaf index.
Given a simple game Γ, note that the width of Γ is equal to the length
of Γd, and the length of Γ is equal to the width of Γd [10].
Now we define isomorphism and equivalence for simple games.
Definition 2.26. Let Γ = (N,W) and Γ′ = (N ′,W ′) be two simple games
with the same number of players. Γ and Γ′ are isomorphic if and only if
there exists a bijective function ϕ : N → N ′, such that for every coalition
X ⊆ N , X ∈ W if and only if ϕ(X) ∈ W ′. Moreover, when N = N ′ and ϕ
is the identity function, then we say that both simple games are equivalent.
Finally, we include an example that explains some of the concepts de-
scribed in this section.
Example 2.2. Consider the simple game Γ = (N,W) withN = {a, b, c, d, e}
andW = {{a, b, c, d, e}, {a, b, c, d}, {a, b, c, e}, {a, b, d, e}, {a, b, e}, {a, c, d, e},
{a, c, d}, {a, c, e}, {a, d, e}, {b, c, d, e}, {b, c, d}, {b, c, e}, {b, d, e}, {c, d, e},
{c, e}, {d, e}}. Hence,
Wm = {{a, b, e}, {a, c, d}, {b, c, d}, {c, e}, {d, e}}
and
LM = {{a, b, c}, {a, b, d}, {a, e}, {b, e}, {c, d}}.
This game is decisive, and it doesn’t have any dummy, passer, vetoer or dic-
tator. By definition, each player is critical in the MWCs to which it belongs,
and therefore, every MWC is a swing. Players a and b are symmetric. The
size of the game can be given by n · |W| = 5 · 16 = 80, but it also could be
defined—as we show in Chapter 3—by n · |Wm| = 5 · 5 = 25. The length
is |{c, e}| = |{d, e}| = 2. Since every coalition X ⊆ N with |X| = n − 1 is
winning, the width cannot be equals 1, so it is equal to |{d, e}| = 2. For
the Nakamura number, note that the intersection of any pair of MWCs is
nonempty; but {d, e} ∩ {c, e} ∩ {b, c, d} = ∅, so the Nakamura number is 3.
The Coleman’s power is equal to 16/32 = 0.5, and the Chow parameters are
given by the vector (9, 9, 11, 11, 13, 16).
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2.3.2 Solution Concepts
Solution concepts come from cooperative game theory as a way to measure
profit allocations of players, by considering the profit of each coalition. A
solution concept assigns for each game a set of payoffs or allocations. Ac-
cording to [10], the biggest attention in the development of cooperative game
theory has been to devise solution concepts to explain equilibrium in differ-
ent systems, in the sense of the profit allocations of players vs. the profit
of each coalition in which they belong. Since simple games are a family
of cooperative games, the solution concepts can also be studied when the
profit of each coalition is binary. While there are some solution concepts
whose definition is simplified in the context of simple games, there are oth-
ers specifically created for simple games, like the Banzhaf index. In this
thesis we concentrate in solution concepts in the context of simple games.
In this section we use notation mainly from [44, 10].
Definition 2.27. Let (N, ν) be a simple game, a payoff is a vector of non-
negative numbers p = (p1, . . . , pn) such that for all i ∈ N , pi is the payoff
of player i. The payoff of a coalition X ⊆ N is given by p(X) = ∑i∈X pi.
The excess of X under p is e(p, X) = p(X)−ν(X) and the excess vector
of p is e(p) = (e(p, X1), . . . , e(p, X2n)), where X1, . . . , X2n is the list of all
coalitions over N ordered so that e(p, X1) ≤ . . . ≤ e(p, X2n).
The deficit of X under p is d(p, X) = ν(X)−p(X) and the deficit vector
of p is d(p) = (d(p, X1), . . . , d(p, X2n)) so that d(p, X1) ≥ . . . ≥ d(p, X2n).
A payoff is:
• efficient if p(N) = ν(N);
• individual rational if pi ≥ ν({i}), for all i ∈ N .
• homogeneous if each player receives either a payoff 0 or a fixed amount
1
r , where r is the number of players with payoff greater than zero.
A preimputation is an efficient payoff vector. An imputation is an indi-
vidual rational preimputation. The set of all preimputations of a game Γ is
denoted by I∗(Γ), and the set of all imputations is denoted by I(Γ).
For other properties of payoffs for solution concepts, see [10, 44]. Recall
that for simple games ν(N) = 1, hence the efficiency property implies that
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for these games every preimputation has p(N) = 1. Further, in simple games
the presence of imputations depends of the passer players [10].
Proposition 2.2. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a simple game, I(Γ) 6= ∅ if and only if
there is at most one passer in the game. Further, if there is only one passer
i ∈ N , then I(Γ) = {p} with pi = 1 and pj = 0, for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
Proof. If I(Γ) is nonempty, then there exists a payoff p with p(N) = 1 and
pi ≥ ν({i}) for all i ∈ N . This holds if either ν({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
or there exists a unique j ∈ N such that ν({j}) = 1, i.e., j is a passer. If
ν({j}) = 1, then an imputation p should have pi = 1 and also pj = 0 for all
j ∈ N \ {i}, because p(N) = 1. So this is the unique possible imputation.
Finally, if there is another passer h, then ν({h}) = 1; but if ph = 1, then
p(N) ≥ pi + ph > 1, so I(Γ) is empty.
According to [74, 44], two of the most relevant criteria to define a solu-
tion concept are the fairness, i.e., how well each player’s payoff reflects its
contribution, and the stability, i.e., what are the incentives for the players
to stay in a coalition.
The most common solution concepts based on the fairness criterion are
the power indices. The most classic and popular power indices are the
Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index. The first one comes from 1946
and it was firstly introduced by Penrose [213], being rediscovered in 1965 by
Banzhaf [16] and in 1971 by Coleman [49]. That is why the Banzhaf index
is also known as Penrose index, Penrose-Banzhaf index or Banzhaf-Coleman
index. Another name for the Banzhaf index is Dahlingham index, proposed
in [66] as a combination of results from Dahl [53] and Allingham [3].
The second one comes from 1953, when Shapley proposed the Shapley
value [232], a way to distribute the payoffs on the coalitions of a cooperative
game according to what would be the payoff for the grand coalition, em-
phasizing the fairness criterion. The power index restricted to simple games
was defined the following year by Shapley and Shubik [233].
Intuitively, the Banzhaf index is the proportion of coalitions in which a
player plays a critical role.
Definition 2.28. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a simple game and i ∈ N a player.
The Banzhaf value ηi(Γ) is the number of coalitions in which i is critical,
i.e., ηi(Γ) = |Si|. The probabilistic Banzhaf index of player i in Γ is the
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proportion of coalitions in which player i is critical, i.e.,
β′i(Γ) =
ηi(Γ)
2n−1
.
Some authors refer the probabilistic Banzhaf index just like Banzhaf in-
dex [167]. It also measures the probability that a player i turns a losing
coalition into a winning coalition when each one of the other players de-
cides independently with probability 12 whether to join the coalition or not.
However, note that the outcomes of the probabilistic Banzhaf index may
not be efficient. That is why we define the Banzhaf index, sometimes called
normalized Banzhaf index, starting from the probabilistic Banzhaf index:
βi(Γ) =
β′i(Γ)∑
i∈N β
′
i(Γ)
=
ηi(Γ)∑
i∈N ηi(Γ)
.
With these considerations, the Banzhaf index is efficient, in the sense
that
∑n
i=1 βi(Γ) = 1. Note that if player i is dummy, then βi(Γ) = 0.
To define the Shapley-Shubik index, first consider an ordered set of
players N and a permutation pi : N → N . We said that the pi(i)-th
player is a pivotal if the coalition {pi(1), . . . , pi(i − 1)} ∈ L and further
{pi(1), . . . , pi(i− 1), pi(i)} ∈ W.
Definition 2.29. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a simple game and i ∈ N a player.
The Shapley-Shubik value κi(Γ) is the number of permutations for which
the player i is a pivotal, i.e., κi(Γ) =
∑
X∈Si(n − |X|)! (|X| − 1)! The
Shapley-Shubik index of player i in Γ, denoted by Φi(Γ), is
Φi(Γ) =
κi(Γ)
n!
.
Intuitively, the Shapley-Shubik index is the proportion of permutations
for which the player i is pivotal. Thus, if the players join the coalition in
a random order, this power index measures the probability that a player i
turns a losing coalition into a winning coalition.
This solution concept is also efficient, because
∑n
i=1 Φi(Γ) = 1. Fur-
ther, if player i is dummy, then Φi(Γ) = 0, and if two players i and j are
symmetric, then Φi(Γ) = Φj(Γ).
There are many other power indices in the literature. For instance, both
the Deegan-Packel index [59] and the Holler index [119] are based on the
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MWCs. The second one is similar to Banzhaf index, but only considering
the swings that are MWCs. For an overview about them, see [81, 88, 4, 22].
Now we concentrate on the most common solution concepts based on
the stability criterion.
The first solution concept for cooperative games was defined considering
this criterion. It was introduced in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [258] and it is called stable set or von Neumann-Morgenstern solution.
Definition 2.30. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a cooperative game. An imputation
p dominates an imputation q, which we denote p >dom q, if there is a
nonempty coalition X ⊆ N such that pi > qi for all i ∈ X and p(X) ≤ ν(X).
Two imputations can dominate each other. A stable set S(Γ) of the game is
a set of imputations which satisfies the following two properties:
1. Internal stability: No imputation in the stable set is dominated by
another imputation in the set, i.e., for all p,q ∈ S(Γ), p 6>dom q.
2. External stability: All imputation outside the stable set are dominated
by at least one imputation in the set, i.e., for all q ∈ I(Γ)\S(Γ), there
exists some p ∈ S(Γ) with p >dom q.
Note that a stable set is formed by imputations that are “maximal”
with respect to the dominance relation. Thus, no stable set is a subset of
another stable set [10]. A stable set may or may not exist for cooperative
games [159, 160], and when exists it is typically neither a singleton nor
unique [158], so for the same game we could define several stable sets S1(Γ),
S2(Γ), etc.
In simple games there exist stable sets that can be characterized by
using the set of MWCs. There are no stable sets if and only if the set
of imputations is empty. Besides, if there is at least one imputation, the
number of stable sets of the simple game is greater or equal to its number
of MWCs.
Proposition 2.3. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a simple game and X ∈ Wm. Then
SX(Γ) = {p ∈ I(Γ) | p(X) = 1} is a stable set of the game.
Proof. Given X ∈ Wm, we start by showing that SX(Γ) is internal stable.
Note that for all p ∈ SX(Γ) and i ∈ N \X, it holds pi = 0. Now consider
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Y ⊆ N and p,q ∈ SX(Γ). If X ⊆ Y , there exist i, j ∈ X such that pi > qi
and pj < qj , so for this kind of Y , p does not dominates q. If Y ⊂ X, then
ν(Y ) = 0, so to dominate q the imputation p must be such that p(Y ) = 0;
but this means that pi 6> qi for some i ∈ Y , and hence p 6>dom q. Therefore,
SX(Γ) is internal stable.
For external stability, note that every q ∈ I(Γ) \ S(Γ) has q(N) = 1
and qi > 0 for some i ∈ N \ X. Therefore, there exists some p ∈ SX(Γ)
so that p(X) > q(X), and moreover, with pi > qi for all i ∈ X. Since
p(x) = ν(X) = 1, SX(Γ) is external stable. Thus, SX(Γ) is a stable set.
Note that this result is not a double implication, because there can be
losing coalitions that are not comparable with MWCs. For instance, in our
Example 2.2 the maximal losing coalition {a, b, c} is not comparable to any
MWC.
In 1959, Gillies [98] formalized in modern terms the notion of core of a
cooperative game. The concept was introduced in 1881 by Edgeworth [68],
and it was initially known in economics as contract curve [132]. Although
in 1944 von Neumann and Morgenstern [258] considered the core as an
interesting concept, their work was focused on games with empty core.
Definition 2.31. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a cooperative game, the core is
C(Γ) = {p ∈ I(Γ) | for all X ⊆ N, e(p, X) ≥ 0},
i.e., the set of all the imputations which have a non-negative excess over any
coalition.
The core is an appealing solution concept, since its imputations guar-
antee that each coalition obtains at least what it could gain on its own. It
is known that for any cooperative game, if the core is nonempty, then it is
contained in all the stable sets of the game [10]. Moreover, if the core is a
stable set then it is the unique stable set. [65]. However, the core is empty
for many games of interest. In particular, for simple games we have a well
known result [74, 44]:1
1In [44] the authors warn that the second part of this result is only valid for proper
games, but this is exactly the case when there is a veto player, as we saw in Proposition 2.1.
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Proposition 2.4. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a simple game, it has a nonempty core
if and only if at least one player is a vetoer. Moreover, if the core is nonempty
then C(Γ) = {p ∈ I(Γ) | p(X) = 1 and pi = 0, for all i ∈ N non-vetoer}.
From the above and Proposition 2.3, it is easy to deduce what follows.
Proposition 2.5. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a simple game. If |Wm| = 1 and the
core is nonempty, then the core is the only stable set.
The usual emptiness of the core leads to the definition of the -core in
1966 [234] and the least core in 1979 [166] as a way to ensure nonempty
outcomes. The idea is to relax the notion of the core by allowing a small
error in the inequalities.
Definition 2.32. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a cooperative game, the -core is
C(Γ) = {p ∈ I∗(Γ) | for all X ⊆ N, d(p, X) ≤ },
i.e., the set of all the preimputations which have a deficit at most equal to
a parameter  over any coalition. The least core of Γ, denoted by C1(Γ), is
the nonempty -core of the game with the smallest  value.
Note that for a least core imputation p, 1 represents the best deficit—or
the worst excess—of p. Note also that if  is large enough, e.g.,  ≥ 1, then
the -core is guaranteed to be nonempty. By definition, the least core is the
intersection of all the -cores; it is always nonempty [10], it is not unique
and it may contain many payoffs [74].
For monotone cooperative games, and hence also for simple games, it is
known that given a least core imputation, every player belongs to a coalition
which gets the worst excess for that imputation [10]. Further, for simple
games with no vetoers, i.e., with empty core, there is no player that belongs
to any coalition which gets the worst excess for the imputation [10]. The
least core is also related to the length of a simple game [10]:
Proposition 2.6. Let (N, ν) be a simple game, p ∈ C1 with p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pn
and 1(Γ) the best deficit of p. Then:
length(Γ) ≥ 1− 1(Γ)
p1
.
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Proof. Let X ⊆ N be such that |X| = length(Γ). Since for all Y ⊆ N ,
ν(Y )− p(Y ) ≤ 1(Γ), then 1− p(X) ≤ 1(Γ). The minimum possible value
of p1 is p(X)/|X|, so |X| · p1 ≥ 1 ≥ p(X) ≥ 1 − 1(Γ), and therefore
|X| ≥ (1− 1(Γ))/p1.
Note that for the simple game with W = P(N) \ ∅, it holds that
length(Γ) = 1−1(Γ)p1 = 1. Similarly, for the simple game with W = {N}, it
holds that length(Γ) = 1−1(Γ)p1 = n.
Shortly before the -core was defined, in 1964 Aumann and Maschler
introduced the bargaining set [6], a solution concept similar to the core.
There are several slightly different definition of this concept [7]. Here we use
a version based on [10].
Definition 2.33. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a cooperative game, p,q, r payoff
vectors, X,Y ⊆ N and i, j ∈ N . A pair (p, X) is an objection to q of i
against j if i ∈ X, j /∈ X, p(X) = ν(X) and ph > qh for all h ∈ X. A
pair (r, Y ) is a counter-objection to the objection (p, X) of j against i if
j ∈ Y , i /∈ Y , r(Y ) = ν(Y ), rh ≥ qh for all h ∈ Y \X and rh ≥ ph for all
h ∈ X ∩ Y . The bargaining set B(Γ) is the set of all the imputations r such
that for any objection (p, X) to r of any player i against player j, there is
a counter-objection to (p, X) of j against i.
For simple games, the bargaining set is equivalent to the core if it is
nonempty. However, in some cases the core may be empty but the bargaining
set nonempty [70].
One year later, in 1965 Davis and Maschler [55] introduced the kernel,
a solution concept that represents all the imputations where players cannot
demand a part of the payoffs of the other players. The kernel can be de-
fined by using similar concepts to objections and counter-objections of the
bargaining set.
Definition 2.34. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a cooperative game, p a payoff vector
and i, j ∈ N . A coalition X ⊆ N is a kernel-objection to p of i against
j if i ∈ X, j /∈ X and pj > ν({j}). A coalition Y ⊆ N is a kernel-
counter-objection to the objection X of i against j if j ∈ Y , i /∈ Y and
e(p, Y ) ≤ e(p, X). Thus, the kernel K(Γ) is the set of all the imputations
p such that for every kernel-objection X to p of any i against any other j,
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there is a kernel-counter-objection to X of j against i. Alternatively, the
kernel can also be defined as follows.
The maximum surplus sνij(p) of player i over player j with respect to a
payoff vector p is
sνij(p) = max{d(p, X) | X ⊆ N \ {j}, i ∈ X}.
Then the kernel of the game is the set of imputations p ∈ I(Γ) such that
(sνij(p)− sνji(p))(pj − ν({j})) ≤ 0
and
(sνji(p)− sνij(p))(pi − ν({i})) ≤ 0.
Intuitively, the surplus is a way to measure one player’s bargaining power
over another. It is known that the kernel is a subset of the bargaining set,
and it is also nonempty [55].
An auxiliary solution concept related to the kernel and introduced in
1972 is the prekernel [165].
Definition 2.35. Let Γ = (N, ν) be a cooperative game, the prekernel
PK(Γ) of the game is the set of preimputations p ∈ I∗(Γ) such that for all
i, j ∈ N ,
sνij(p) = s
ν
ji(p).
Note that for any cooperative game, the intersection among the prekernel
and the set of imputations of the game is a subset of the kernel. However,
the kernel is not a subset of the prekernel, and moreover, since the outcomes
of the prekernel do not need to be individually rational, the prekernel is not
a subset of the kernel [165]. Furthermore, both the prekernel preimputations
and the kernel imputations inside any C coincide [165], i.e., those prekernel
preimputations are imputations as well.
For simple games with no passers, symmetric players get both equal
prekernel and kernel payoffs [10].
The last solution concept that we comment is the nucleolus, defined in
1969 by Schmeidler [231]—see also [166]—as a way to find fairest payoffs
among the payoffs within the least core. In this sense, it can be thought as
a refinement of the least core [44]. In some sense, it is the most stable payoff
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allocation scheme, and it is particularly desirable when the stability of the
grand coalition is important [74, 231]. The nucleolus has also been used as
an alternative of the power indices to measure power in voting systems [37].
Definition 2.36. Let (N, ν) be a cooperative game. The nucleolus N (Γ) is
the imputation p ∈ I(Γ) with the lexicographically largest excess vector—or
minimal deficit vector—on the game.
It is known that if the game has imputations, then the kernel always
contains the nucleolus, and hence, it is guaranteed that is not empty. In
fact, when I(Γ) 6= ∅ the nucleolus always exists and it returns a unique
outcome for each game [231]. The nucleolus is in the least core, and if the
core is nonempty, the nucleolus is also in the core [10].
For simple games, it is known that if a player i is a dummy, the nucleolus
has a payoff pi = 0, and moreover, pi = 0 for all the kernel imputations [10].
Furthermore, if an imputation p is the nucleolus of a game and e(p, X) is
the first element of the excess vector e(p), then for any player i there exists
a coalition Y such that i ∈ Y and e(p, X) = e(p, Y ) [10].
Like the prekernel for the kernel, we can also define the prenucleolus,
which is also unique and it always exists [231].
Definition 2.37. Let (N, ν) be a cooperative game. The prenucleolus
PN (Γ) is the preimputation p ∈ I∗(Γ) with the lexicographically largest
excess vector on the game.
The prenucleolus always exists and it is unique while for every coalition
X ⊆ N with |X| = 1, ν(X) = 0 [231]. Further, the prenucleolus is always
contained in the least core [10].
To summarize, the inclusion relationships between the main solution
concepts based on the stability criterion, are as follows, where S(Γ) denotes
one of the many possible stable sets:
• N (Γ) ⊆ K(Γ) ⊆ B(Γ), N (Γ) ⊆ S(Γ) and N (Γ) ⊆ C1(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ).
• If C(Γ) 6= ∅, then N (Γ) ⊆ C(Γ) ⊆ S(Γ).
• If C(Γ) 6= ∅ and Γ is a simple game, then C(Γ) = B(Γ).
• PN (Γ) ⊆ C(Γ), PK(Γ) ∩ I(Γ) ⊆ K(Γ) and
PK(Γ) ∩ C(Γ) = K(Γ) ∩ C(Γ).
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Therefore, if the core is nonempty, for simple games we have:
• N (Γ) ⊆ K(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ) = B(Γ) ⊆ S(Γ) and N (Γ) ⊆ C1(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ).
For simple games with at least one imputation, S(Γ), C1(Γ), B(Γ), K(Γ),
PK(Γ), N (Γ) and PN (Γ) are always nonempty. In contrast, C(Γ) and C(Γ)
can be empty.
We finish this section by applying the previous solution concepts in a
specific simple game.
Example 2.3. Consider the same simple game of Example 2.2. The sets of
swings for each player are Sa = {{a, c, d}}, Sb = {{a, b, e}, {b, c, d}}, Sc =
{{a, b, c, d}, {a, c, d}, {a, c, e}, {b, c, d}, {b, c, e}, {c, e}}, Sd = {{a, b, c, d},
{a, c, d}, {a, d, e}, {b, c, d}, {b, d, e}, {d, e}} and Se = {{a, b, c, e}, {a, b, d, e},
{a, b, e}, {a, c, e}, {a, d, e}, {b, c, e}, {b, d, e}, {c, d, e}, {c, e}, {d, e}}. Thus,
the Banzhaf indices are given by βa(Γ) =
1
25 = 0.04, βb(Γ) =
2
25 = 0.08,
βc(Γ) = βd(Γ) =
6
25 = 0.24 and βe(Γ) =
10
25 = 0.4; and the Shapley-Shubik
indices are given by Φa(Γ) =
4
120 = 0.033, Φb(Γ) =
8
120 = 0.067, Φc(Γ) =
Φd(Γ) =
28
120 = 0.233 and Φe(Γ) =
48
120 = 0.4.
For the remaining solution concepts, first note that there are no vetoers
in the game, so the core is empty. Furthermore, since there are no passers
in the game, I(Γ) 6= ∅, so the nucleolus exists and it belongs to all the
remaining solution concepts.
By using for instance the MWC X1 = {a, b, e}, we can define a stable
set SX1(Γ) = {(pa, pb, 0, 0, pe) | pa + pb + pe = 1}, in such a way that some
valid imputations of the stable set are (0.3, 0.3, 0, 0, 0.4), (0.1, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.7),
(0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0.5), etc. Finally, it is possible to verify that the imputation
(19 ,
1
9 ,
2
9 ,
2
9 ,
1
3) is the lexicographically largest excess vector on the game, so
this is the nucleolus of the game. This is not obvious because it requires
to solve a linear program. In Section 4.1.2 we explain in detail how it is
computed the nucleolus in a simple game.
2.3.3 Regular and Weighted Games
There exist two particular subfamilies of simple games which are very im-
portant because of its many applications [258, 123, 187, 251], as well as the
possibility for them to be represented in succinct forms of representation.
That is why we introduce regular games and weighted games at the end of
2.3. Simple Games – 45
this chapter. Their succinct representations and the relationships between
them are stated in Chapter 3.
Definition 2.38. Let  be a desirability relation on a set of players N , that
linearly order the players by increasing power. Given X ⊆ N , an increasing-
shift on X, specified by a pair (i, j) ∈ N \ X × X such that j ≺ i, is an
operation which returns Z = X \ {j} ∪ {i}. Given two winning coalitions
Y, Z ∈ W, we said that Y  Z if and only if there exists a finite sequence
of increasing-shifts on Y which produces another coalition Y ′ ⊆ Z.
Note that the desirability relation on coalitions is not linear [251]. This
relation was firstly introduced for simple games in 1958 [124], and it is
also known as desirability order [251], dominance relation [82] or Winder
order [268] in threshold logic. The notion of desirability relation was gener-
alized to cooperative games in 1966 [164].
Depending on the order of the set players, the increasing-shift operation
is also known as right-shift or left-shift [202, 144, 43] This operation has
also been studied in other contexts such as non-cooperative games [35], fair
division [36] and Boolean functions [113].
Now we can define the regular games [209, 163].
Definition 2.39. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game where N is ordered by
a desirability relation , then Γ is a regular game with respect to  if for
all X ∈ W, every increasing-shift returns an element of W; i.e. if replacing
a member of a winning coalition X ∈ W by a more powerful one, always
yields a winning coalition.
Analogously to the sets Wm and LM , we denote Ws = {X ∈ W |
for all Z ∈ W, Z 6≺ X} as the set of shift-minimal winning coalitions, and
LS = {Y ∈ L | for all Z ∈ L, Y 6≺ Z} as the set of shift-maximal losing
coalitions.
Regular games have been used at least since 1966 to study the kernel of a
game [164]. In the context of monotone Boolean functions, they are known
as regular functions at least since 1969 [235], and have been sometimes also
called directed games [144]. Outside the game theory, they have been used
to solve other problems like the regular set-covering problem [209] and the
problem of separating hyperplanes [69]. In monotone Boolean functions, the
shift-minimal winning coalitions are related with the shelters [210].
Moreover, we have the following [251].
46 – Chapter 2. Mathematical Preliminaries
Definition 2.40. A simple game Γ = (N,W) is linear if there exists a linear
re-ordering of N , for which Γ becomes regular.
Linear games are also known as complete games [41], ordered games [246],
swap-robust games [251] or 2-monotone Boolean functions [268].
Now we introduce weighted games.
Definition 2.41. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game, then Γ is a weighted
game if there exists a weight function w : N → R and a real quota q ∈ R
such that for all X ⊆ N , X ∈ W if and only if w(X) ≥ q; where w(X) =
Σ{w(a) | a ∈ X}.
Weighted games are also called weighted voting games or weighted ma-
jority games. They were defined in the origins of game theory in 1944 [258],
but similar ideas were used one year before to define the Threshold Logic
Unit (TLU), the first artificial neuron [169]. Some years later, they were
deeply studied in 1956 [123] in the context of simple game theory, and since
then weighted games have also been studied in many different contexts under
different names: Linearly separated truth functions, to contact and to rec-
tifier nets [170]; linearly separable switching functions or threshold Boolean
functions, to separate circuits in switching circuit theory and analyze the
threshold synthesis problem [121]; trade robustness, for voting theory and
trade exchanges [249]; or threshold hypergraphs, to synchronizing parallel
processes [103, 224]. Sometimes, the inherent concept of weight function is
changed by the one of threshold criteria.
According to Hu [121]—see also [87, 90]—the weight function can be
replaced by integer non-negative weights with 0 ≤ q ≤ w(N).
Weighted games clearly are simple (monotone) games, and one can al-
ways linearly re-order the elements of N such that w : N → R becomes
monotone; i.e. for all i, j ∈ N with i ≺ j, w(i) ≤ w(j). And then clearly the
game becomes regular. So all weighted games are regular. The converse,
however, does not hold [187, 251].
Despite of the fact that weighted games are a strict subclass of simple
games, it is interesting to remark a well known result which says that every
simple game can be expressed as the intersection or the union of a finite
number of weighted games. This allow us to define the following [251].
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Definition 2.42. A vector-weighted game is a simple game formed by the
intersection of a finite number of weighted games. In a similar way, we say
that a co-vector-weighted game is a simple game formed by the union of a
finite number of weighted games.
Vector-weighted games are also called vector-weighted systems [250], mul-
tiple weighted games [10], weighted multiple majority games [2] or by some
other combinations of these words; in the context of hypergraphs, they are
known as threshold intersection dimensions [266, 162] and in switching func-
tions as canonical conjunctive forms [187].
This leads us to define the following.
Definition 2.43. The dimension (codimension) of a simple game is the
minimum number of weighted games whose intersection (union) is equivalent
to that simple game.
The expressiveness of vector-weighted games was firstly shown in [128]
for hypergraphs, and then expressed for simple games in [250]. The concept
of codimension and the equivalence between simple games and the union
of a finite number of weighted games was introduced in [89]. We highlight
these observations in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. [250, 89] Every simple game can be represented as a vector-
weighted game, an vice versa. Every simple game can be represented as a
co-vector-weighted game, an vice versa.
In the same vein, we shall see other expressiveness results for influence
games in Section 5.2.
Moreover, several subclasses of weighted games have been defined [258,
10, 251]. One of the most studied [246] is the class of homogeneous games,
which was firstly defined together with the class of weighted games [258].
Definition 2.44. An homogeneous game is a weighted game with weight
function w and quota q such that for all X ⊆ N , w(X) = q.
Due to the importance of the decisive problem of Definition 2.23, the
decisive weighted games have its own name [92].
Definition 2.45. A majority game is a decisive weighted game. We say
that a sub-majority game is a strong weighted game.
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simple games
decisive games
regular
weighted
homogeneous
Figure 2.1: Inclusion relationship between subclasses of simple games.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the main subclasses of simple games considered in
this chapter.
To finish with this section, note that every simple game that belongs to
any of the subclasses defined in this section requires that the grand coalition
be ordered. In most of this thesis we assume an increasing order given by
N = {1, . . . , n}; however, to simplify calculations we use in Sections 4.2.3
and 4.4.2 a decreasing order given by N = {n, . . . , 1}. Nevertheless, the
definitions and results apply to both orders.
2.3.4 Counting and Enumerating
In this section we introduce the problem of counting and enumerating sub-
classes of simple games.
In this thesis we concentrate especially on the subclasses presented in
Section 2.3.3, considering also the properties of simple games given by Def-
inition 2.23. We are not only interested in enumerating (and counting)
simple, regular, weighted and homogeneous games, but we also pretend to
enumerate (and count) these games that are decisive as well.
Both counting and enumeration algorithms of subclasses of simple games
have usually a high complexity. The subclasses of our interest grow expo-
nentially in function of n, so it is not possible to implement algorithms
which run in polynomial time. However, we do not even know whether
the considered counting problems are #P-hard, or if the enumeration prob-
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lems are polynomial-delay solvable. Regardless the above, as we shall see in
Section 4.4.1, some authors have designed algorithms that achieve a good
performance for the cases that reach to solve.
The interest in counting the number of simple games begins long before
the simple games were defined. According to [251], the first studies related to
simple games have to do with the enumeration of free distributive lattices,
started in 1897 by Dedekind [58]. It is well known that the number of
simple games available for a given set of players coincides with the so called
Dedekind number, and the problem of finding these numbers is called the
Dedekind’s Problem [274].
More than a half century later, in 1959 Isbell reactivated the interest on
counting, but focusing in the family of majority games, i.e., decisive weighted
games [125]. Since then, but especially with the rise of computer technology,
many authors have worked in the enumeration of different subclasses of
simple games, usually in the framework of monotone Boolean functions.
In particular, Muroga et al. in 1970 provided several counting results for
subclasses of monotone Boolean functions [190].
The known results for enumeration and counting are presented later
in Section 4.4. In that Section we also present some approaches to the
enumeration of decisive regular games.
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Simple Games
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Chapter 3
Representation and
Conversion Problems
In this chapter we survey several standard forms of representation for simple
games, regular games and weighted games. The forms of representation here
considered are summarized in Table 3.1. Furthermore, an overview of the
results of the conversion problem for these forms of representation is given in
Tables 3.2–3.5. Results in bold face are new and question marks correspond
to open problems. For subfamilies of simple games in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 the
results are restricted to simple games in the considered subfamily. For these
last two Tables, we shall see that the reversed conversion problems can be
solved trivially in polynomial time.
In Section 3.1 we survey the main standard forms of representation for
general simple games. Analogously, in Section 3.2 we present standard forms
of representation for regular games, and in Section 3.3 the standard form
of representation for weighted games. At the end of each section we show
computational complexity results about the conversion problems among the
different considered forms of representation.
3.1 Representations for Simple Games
First we turn our attention to the ways in which a simple game can be
represented as the input to a problem.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a class of simple games, a form of representation
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Simple games
EWF Extensive or explicit Winning Form
ELF Extensive or explicit Losing Form
MWF Extensive or explicit Minimal Winning Form
MLF Extensive or explicit Maximal Losing Form
PCBF Partially Condensed Binary Tree Form
BDDF Binary Decision Diagram Form
VWRF Vector Weighted Representation Form
coVWRF co-vector Weighted Representation Form
Regular games
FCBF Fully Condensed Binary Tree Form
SWF Shift-minimal Winning Form
Weighted games
WRF Weighted Representation Form
Table 3.1: Forms of representation considered in this chapter.
of G is a finite data structure which allows to represent each simple game
Γ ∈ G, as well as verifying in polynomial time if a given instance of the data
structure represents a simple game Γ in G or not.
We use the notation F (Γ) to denote a representation of simple game Γ
in form F . As usual, |F (Γ)| denotes the size of F (Γ) that is the amount of
bits needed to write down the data structure representing Γ.
Definition 3.2. Let F1 and F2 be two forms of representation for a class of
simple games G, the conversion problem from F1 to F2, denoted by F1  F2,
is the problem of computing F2(Γ) from F1(Γ), i.e.:
Name: F1  F2
Input: Simple game Γ in F1 form
Output: A representation of Γ in F2 form.
It is well known that simple games can be described by monotone Boolean
functions [251], also known as positive Boolean function [163], and therefore
by several kinds of logical formulas [71].
Definition 3.3. A monotone Boolean function is a binary function f :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that for all pair of vectors v, w ∈ {0, 1}n with v ≤ w,
it holds f(v) ≤ f(w). A vector x ∈ {0, 1}n is a true vector if f(x) = 1 and
it is a false vector if f(x) = 0.
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Output →
EWF MWF ELF MLF
Input ↓
EWF – P EXP P
MWF
sEXP
–
EXP EXP
Pd
ELF EXP EXP – P
MLF
sEXP sEXP sEXP
–
Pd
Table 3.2: Computational complexity of the conversion problem from the
row form to the column form, for representations of simple games based on
explicit descriptions of set families.
Output →
EWF MWF PCBF BDDF
Input ↓
EWF – P P P
MWF
sEXP
– P P
Pd
PCBF
sEXP
P – P
Pd
BDDF sEXP sEXP sEXP –
Table 3.3: Computational complexity of the conversion problem from the
row form to the column form, for representations of simple games based on
variants of binary trees.
Observe that the true (false) vectors represent the winning (losing) coali-
tions of the corresponding simple game. We do not consider this succinct
implicit representation and we refer to any of the references on Boolean
formulas [262, 52].
Furthermore, there exist some forms of representation based on graphs
that lead to the definition of subfamilies of simple games. These approaches
are usually introduced in contexts of trading, management and flow interac-
tions. Here we mention a few. Vertex connectivity games were motivated by
the context of network reliability: Given a graph in which the set of vertices
V is partitioned on three subsets (Vp, Vb, Vs), where Vs is the set of players
of the game, a coalition S ⊆ Vs is winning if and only if S ∪ Vb ∪ Vp fully
connects Vp, i.e., if for all vertices u, v ∈ Vp, there exists a path from u until
v [13]. A simplification of flow games—a model of cooperative games based
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Output →
EWF MWF PCBF BDDF FCBF SWF
Input ↓
FCBF
sEXP
P P P – P
Pd
SWF
sEXP sEXP sEXP sEXP? sEXP
–
Pd
Table 3.4: Computational complexity of the conversion problem from the
row form to the column form for representations of regular games.
Output →
EWF MWF PCBF BDDF FCBF SWF
Input ↓
WRF
sEXP sEXP sEXP sEXP sEXP sEXP
Pd Pd Pd
Table 3.5: Computational complexity of the conversion problem from the
row form to the column form for representations of weighted games.
on flow networks, which shortly are directed graphs with positive labels on
the edges [130]—called connectivity games is a model where every edge has
the same capacity 1, and the flow has a unitary value, in such a way that
winning coalitions correspond to paths from the source to the sink, and
losing coalitions are those subset of edges that do not induce a source-sink
path [14]. In spanning connectivity games the players are the edges of an
undirected weighted multigraph so that a coalition is winning if and only if
the edges in the coalition constitute a connected spanning subgraph [11]. A
threshold variant of shortest path games—given a flow network with various
“sources” and “sinks”, every shortest path P = (v1, . . . , vm) through the
edges (e1, . . . , em−1) is a coalition with value
∑m−1
i=1 wi −m if v1 is a source
and vm is a sink; or 0, otherwise [83, 259]—is a network with a threshold
T such that a coalition is winning if and only if
∑m−1
i=1 wi −m ≥ T [195].
Usually, these representations are related to cooperative games and do not
consider the whole class of simple games. In Chapter 5 we introduce influ-
ence games, and we show that this class capture the whole class of simple
games. It remains open to study the conversion problems related to these
forms of representations based on graphs.
We finish this section with the notion of reasonable representation, that
we use in the following chapters.
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Definition 3.4. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game, consider the game
Γ′ = (N ∪ {x},W ′), where x is a new player and W ′ = {S ∪ {x} | S ∈ W}.
A representation is reasonable if a representation of the game Γ′ can be com-
puted with only polynomial blow-up with respect to a given representation
of the game Γ.
3.1.1 Explicit Set Families and Incidence Vectors
In this section, we describe several usual forms of representation for sim-
ple games corresponding to standard explicit forms of representation of set
families [258]. We use matrix notation as an explicit representation of sets.
This form of representation is mostly used in the context of hypergraphs and
monotone Boolean functions [144, 71, 214]. Thus, each coalition X ∈ P(N)
is represented by its incidence vector x ∈ {0, 1}n. For each player i ∈ N ,
xi or x(i) is a component of x. If xi = 1 (resp. xi = 0), then xi is called a
1-component (resp. 0-component) of x. Given x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, recall that in
lexicographic order x ≤ y if and only if either x < y or x = y if and only if
xi ≤ yi, for each i ∈ N and considering as usual 0 < 1.
We start with the earliest forms of representation defined by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern [258].
Definition 3.5. A simple game Γ is given in:
• (Extensive or explicit) winning form (EWF) as a pair (N,W), where
N is its set of players, and W its set of winning coalitions.
• (Extensive or explicit) minimal winning form (MWF) as a pair
(N,Wm), where Wm is its set of MWCs.
Observe that both forms of representations are valid since, given a subset
family, we can check in polynomial time whether it is monotonic and whether
it is minimal. Indeed, to check minimality we can just test whether removing
one of the elements of the coalition leads to a winning coalition.
Assuming that each set is represented by its incidence vector, we can rep-
resent a simple game by an incidence matrix with one row for each winning
coalition (or each MWC) and a column for each player.
Example 3.1. Consider the simple game Γ = (N,W) of Example 2.2. In
matrix notation, (N,Wm) is the following:
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N abcde
00011
00101
Wm 01110
10110
11001
Assuming a matrix representation, we have that |EWF(Γ)| = |N | · |W| =
n · |W| ∈ N and |MWF(Γ)| = n · |Wm|. For any simple game Γ, Wm ⊆ W.
Therefore |EWF(Γ)| ≤ |MWF(Γ)|. Moreover, ifW 6= ∅ andW 6= {N}, then
we have a strict containmentWm ⊂ W. In the following example we provide
a simple game whose representation in MWF is exponentially smaller than
in EWF.
Example 3.2. Let Γ be a simple game which contains the empty coalition
as winning coalition, i.e., such that all players are dummies. Hence, ∅ is the
unique MWC, so that |Wm| = 1, but the number of winning coalitions will
be |W| = 2n, which is exponential in terms of n.
From the above we have the following known result.
Lemma 3.1 ([92]). The problem MWF EWF can be solved in exponen-
tial time but it can not be solved in sub-exponential time. The problem
EWF MWF can be solved in polynomial time.
Besides EWF and MWF, there are other two classical forms of extensive
representations based on losing coalitions. Those representation forms were
also defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern [258].
Definition 3.6. A simple game Γ is given in:
• (Extensive or explicit) losing form (ELF) as a pair (N,L), where N is
its set of players, and L its set of losing coalitions.
• (Extensive or explicit) maximal losing form (MLF) as a pair (N,LM ),
where LM is its set of maximal losing coalitions.
Given a simple game in ELF and a subset X ⊆ N , we can check whether
or not X belongs to L in polynomial time. Furthermore, when the game is
given in MLF, checking whether a given subset family is maximal can also
be done in polynomial time, since we can test whether adding one of the
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elements of the complement of the coalition leads to a losing coalition. These
conditions characterize the fact that a set family is the set of (maximal)
losing coalitions of a game. Thus, both forms of representations are valid.
The size of a simple game Γ in both representations is |ELF(Γ)| = n · |L|
and |MLF(Γ)| = n · |LM |, respectively.
The conversion problem among representations based on losing coali-
tions and those based on winning coalitions was studied in [92]. While the
polynomial results come from the monotonicity of simple games, the expo-
nential ones are related with the size of the representations, in the same way
than in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 ([92]). The problems EWF MLF, ELF MLF, ELF MWF
can be solved in polynomial time. The problems EWF ELF, MWF ELF,
MWF MLF, MLF EWF, MLF EWF and ELF ELF can be solved in
exponential time but can not be solved in sub-exponential time.
Moreover, based on a result of reliability functions from [15], Aziz proved
that the problem MWF EWF is #P-complete [9]. Since W ∪ L = P(N),
note that there are three possibilities for a given simple game which belongs
to a subclass:
1. Both |W| and |L| grow exponentially in terms of n.
2. |W| is polynomially bounded and |L| grows exponentially.
3. |W| grows exponentially and |L| is polynomially bounded.
When the first possibility holds, we need more accurate bounds to know
the differences between using EWF or ELF. When the second one holds,
then it is most useful to represent the game in EWF than ELF. Finally,
when the third condition holds, the dual game is one of the second type
and it can be represented in a most useful way in EWF. Remember by
Definition 2.20 that we can always get the original game using the dual of
the dual game with a potential increase in size.
Note that according to duality we have that |EWF(Γ)| = |ELF(Γd)|.
This allows to obtain a representation for a game from the representation
of its dual. Although this transformation might be useful to analyze the
computational complexity of some problems defined on simple games, it is
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Algorithm 1 GenerateEWFfromMWF
Input: A simple game Γ in MWF with Wm = {X1, . . . , Xm} sorted in
lexicographic order.
Output: Γ in EWF.
1: Generate(X,R, i)
2: for all j ∈ R in increasing order
3: X = X ∪ {j};
4: if for all k > i,Xk 6⊂ X
5: print X;
6: R = Nj \X;
7: Generate(X,R, i);
8: X = X \ {j};
9: {main}
10: for i = 1, . . . ,m do
11: print Xi;
12: R = N \Xi;
13: Generate(Xi, R, i);
not part of our objectives as we are interested in comparing representations
of the same game.
As we saw before, the sizes of the representations of simple games may
be a strong argument to prove that there is no polynomial time algorithm
for the conversion problem between some forms of representation. In these
cases we can study the complexity of the enumeration problem.
Lemma 3.3. MWF EWF can be solved with polynomial-delay.
Proof. First note that every MWC is a winning coalition, so they have to
be printed. Let (N,Wm) be a simple game, as usual we assume that N =
{1, . . . , n}, Ni = {i, . . . , n} andWm = {X1, . . . , Xm} according to increasing
lexicographical order.
See Algorithm 1. In order to enumerate all the winning coalitions with-
out repetitions, for each Xi ∈ Wm our algorithm enumerates only a subset
of the 2n−|X| − 1 winning coalitions that contain X. The algorithm is a
branch and cut algorithm that uses the usual backtrack tree providing an
enumeration of the subsets of a set without repetitions. Recall that in such
a tree a node has as children the superset obtained by adding one candidate
element. The set of candidates is formed by those elements that are not in
the current subset and that are posterior to all the elements in the current
subset. An example of the backtracking tree for a set with four elements
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{ }
{1}
{1, 2}
{1, 2, 4}
{1, 4}
{2}
{2.4}
{4}
00101
10101
11101
11111
10111
01101
01111
00111
Figure 3.1: Backtrack tree for {1, 2, 4} and backtrack tree for the enumera-
tion without repetitions of all the winning coalitions that contain 00101.
is given in Figure 3.1. We consider such a tree for every given winning
coalition.
We first sort the set of MWCs in increasing lexicographical order. Then,
for each MWC Xi, we perform a traversal of the backtrack tree correspond-
ing to all the subsets of N \ Xi as described before. On the traversal our
algorithm backtracks whenever it reaches a set X that is a superset of Xj ,
for some j > i. Thus our algorithm prints, for any MWC Xi, all the coali-
tion that are supersets of Xi but not supersets of any MWC Xj with i < j.
The first property guarantees that the winning coalitions are printed with-
out repetitions. Furthermore, monotonicity guarantees that the algorithm
prints all the winning coalitions.
Finally, take into account that in any of the backtracking trees con-
structed in an execution of Algorithm 1, the height is at most n, therefore
any backtrack path has length bounded by n. In consequence, the number
of steps between the printing of one winning coalition and the next one is
polynomial and the claim follows.
Example 3.3. Consider the simple game (N,Wm) of Example 3.1. Fig-
ure 3.2 shows the enumeration without repetition of all the winning coali-
tions of the game. They are printed in the following order: 00011, 10011,
01011, 00101, 10101, 01101, 00111, 01110, 01111, 10110, 11110, 10111,
11001, 11101, 11111, 11011.
For the case of forms of representations based in sets of losing coalitions
we get an equivalent result.
Lemma 3.4. MLF ELF can be solved with polynomial-delay.
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00011
10011
11011 10111
01011
01111
00111
00101
10101
11101 10111
01101
01111
00111
01110
11110 01111
10110
11110
11111
10111
11001
11101
11111
11011
Figure 3.2: Computing MWF EWF for the simple game of Example 3.1.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.3 and it corresponds to
Algorithm 2. Again our algorithm starts by sorting in lexicographic order
the set of maximal losing coalitions. Algorithm 2 backtracks over the family
of subsets associated to each maximal losing coalition. As before, to avoid
repetitions when we deal with a maximal losing coalition Xi, we backtrack
when the algorithm reaches a set that is also a subset of Xj , for some j > i.
Again, all the backtracking trees have height at most n and thus Algorithm 2
works with polynomial-delay.
It remains open to determine whether the conversions MWF ELF,
MWF MLF, MLF EWF and MLF MWF can be solved with polynomial-
delay.
3.1.2 Binary Tree Representations
In this section, we review several usual forms of representation for simple
games using different families of (extended) binary trees [163]. There are
several forms of representation based on directed binary trees [194].
As usual we assume a lexicographic order on the set N of players. Any
family of subsets F can be represented by a binary tree in different ways. The
simplest—and most costly—way of representation uses a complete binary
tree with height n.
Definition 3.7. A complete binary tree Bc with height n is a binary tree
such that for any node t ∈ Bc at depth j+1, the left edge (respectively, right
edge) from t represents that xn−j = 1 (respectively, xn−j = 0). Terminal
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Algorithm 2 GenerateELFfromMLF
Input: A simple game Γ in MLF with LM = {X1, . . . , Xm} sorted in lexi-
cographic order.
Output: Γ in ELF.
1: Generate(X,R, i)
2: for all j ∈ R
3: X = X \ {j};
4: if for all k > i,Xk 6⊃ X
5: print X;
6: R = X ∩Nj+1;
7: Generate(X,R, i);
8: X = X ∪ {j};
9:
10: {main}
11: for i = 1, . . . ,m do
12: print Xi;
13: R = Xi;
14: Generate(Xi, R).
nodes are labeled with labels from the set {0, 1}. Thus, a terminal node
t ∈ Bc at depth n represents a vector with n components corresponding to
the edge labels found in the path from the root to t. Those sets with vectors
corresponding to paths ending in a terminal node with label 1 belong to
the represented family. Sets whose vectors correspond to paths ending in a
terminal node with label 0 do not belong to the family.
Let us explain this construction with an example.
Example 3.4. Figure 3.3 illustrates the complete binary tree for the set of
winning coalitions of the simple game given in Example 3.1.
Note that every complete binary tree representing a subset family has 2n
terminal nodes and 2n − 1 inner nodes, including the root node. And thus
its size depends on n and not on the size of the represented set. Therefore,
complete binary trees are not the best form of tree representation. However,
we include them here in order to introduce other variants of binary trees.
A first variation could be to avoid the vector components represented by
the terminal nodes with label 0.
Example 3.5. Figure 3.4 represents a non-complete binary tree for the set
of winning coalitions of the simple game of Example 3.1.
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1
1
1
1
1 1
0
1
1 1
1
1 1
0
0
1
1 1
1
1 1
0
1
1 0
1
0 0
0
0
0
1
1 1
1
1 0
0
1
0 0
1
0 0
0
0
1
0 0
1
0 0
0
1
0 0
1
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
Figure 3.3: Complete binary tree Bc(W) representing the winning coalitions
for the simple game Γ = (N,W) of Example 3.1. The labels in the last level
of edges can be deduced from the other levels.
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1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
Figure 3.4: Binary tree B(W) representing the winning coalitions for the
simple game Γ = (N,W) of Example 3.1.
From the computational point of view, any binary tree representation of
one of the fundamental sets describing a simple game—W, L, Wm or LM—
is related to the corresponding representation form in the same way. In what
follows—as it has been done in the literature—we consider only binary tree
representations of the subset of MWCs. We continue considering binary
trees that are not necessarily complete.
We keep the edge labels, with the same meaning, i.e., an edge from a
node at depth j to a node at depth j + 1 labeled l ∈ {0, 1} represents the
case xn−j = l. Terminal nodes—at depth n—do not have assigned labels.
Furthermore, all terminal nodes are at depth n. As before, a terminal node
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0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
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Figure 3.5: B(Γ) (left) and PCB(Γ) (right) representing the simple game Γ
of Example 3.1. PCB(Γ) is obtained from B(Γ), by removing the marked
nodes.
t ∈ B at depth n represents a vector with components resulting by the edge
labels in the path from the root to t. Those sets with vectors corresponding
to paths ending in a terminal node belong to the subset family represented
by the set. Observe that now the size of B(F) is polynomially related to
|F|. This binary tree data structure has been used in relation with simple
games in the context of monotone Boolean functions as a representation of
the set of MWCs [163].
Definition 3.8. A simple game Γ is given in binary tree form (BF) when
it is given by a binary tree representing the set Wm(Γ).
We use the notation B(Γ) to denote a simple game Γ given in binary tree
form. Observe that we can check in polynomial time whether a set belongs
or not to the set represented by a binary tree. Therefore, we can check in
polynomial time the minimality of the represented set. Thus, the binary
tree form is a valid representation for simple games.
Example 3.6. Figure 3.5 at left depicts the binary tree B(Γ) for the game
Γ = (N,Wm) given in Example 3.1.
In the following we introduce two other forms of representation based
on binary trees. Whereas the first one reduces the size of the binary trees,
the second one, based on binary decision diagrams, reduces the size of a
complete binary tree representation. In both cases the data structure allows
to check in polynomial time if a given set belongs to the represented family.
Therefore, both data structure are valid representation forms for simple
games.
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The first data structure is due to Makino [163].
Definition 3.9. A partially condensed binary tree (PCB) for a set family
F is the subgraph of B(F) which is obtained after removing recursively all
the leaves whose parent has no edge labeled 1, i.e., whose parent has no
left-child.
From the above definition we are able to define the following represen-
tation form.
Definition 3.10. A simple game Γ is given in partially condensed binary
tree form (PCBF) if it is given by the PCB obtained from B(Γ).
We denote by PCB(Γ) the partially condensed binary tree representa-
tion of Γ. Recall that the tree provides a representation of Wm(Γ).
Example 3.7. The right tree in Figure 3.5 represents PCB(Γ) for the simple
game given in Example 3.1. This tree is obtained from B(Γ), given as the
left tree in the same figure.
Our last representation form in this section is based on binary decision
diagrams.
Definition 3.11. A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a directed, acyclic
and labeled graph with decision nodes and two terminal nodes called 0-
terminal and 1-terminal. A BDD is ordered (OBDD) if the players appear
in the same order on all paths from the root; and it is reduced (RBDD) if
all its isomorphic subgraphs are merged and it does not have any node with
two isomorphic children. A binary decision diagram represents the set family
formed by all the vectors extracted from paths ending in the 1-terminal.
BDDs are also called branching programs [263, 172]. They were intro-
duced in the context of monotonic functions by Lee [153] and studied in
depth by Akers [1] and Boute [34]. For each given ordering on N , there is a
unique reduced and ordered BDD (ROBDD) representing the family [39, 40].
That is why usually by BDD it is meant the ROBDD corresponding to the
lexicographic order.
Definition 3.12. A simple game Γ is given in binary decision diagram form
(BDDF) by a BDD representing Wm(Γ).
3.1. Representations for Simple Games – 67
Algorithm 3 GeneratingBDDfromBT
Input: A binary tree representing a subset set S.
Output: A BDD representing S.
1: Merging duplicate terminal nodes that share the same label (0 or 1).
2: For each level from the bottom to the top:
3: loop
4: Merging duplicate inner nodes whose left-child and right-child are
connected with the same node.
5: Removing inner nodes with the same left-child and right-child.
6: end loop
The BDDF represents a set family in the same way as complete binary
trees, but in a more succinct way. The MWCs are represented by paths
leading to the 1-terminal.
Given a simple game Γ, we can compute BDD(Γ) from B(Γ). This
can be done through Algorithm 3, which was described in [40]. After each
step of the procedure, it is necessary to redirect all incoming arcs to the
corresponding new nodes. Steps 4 and 5 must be repeated as many times as
necessary. In general, starting with the level of the first component x1, and
ending with the level of the n-th component xn. Usually left-children are
denoted by a solid edge, whereas the right-children are denoted by a dashed
edge. In what follows, we use a double edge to represent a node in which
the left-child and the right-child are the same.
We can also consider the OBDD obtained by a procedure in which the
rule implemented in step 5 of Algorithm 3 is not used. In such a BDD every
path from the root to a terminal node has length n + 1. The so obtained
BDD is called a quasi-reduced binary decision diagram (QOBDD) [17, 29].
Note that for a fixed variable ordering, both QOBDD and ROBDD are
canonical representations, and hence, if we consider a QOBDD and its re-
spective ROBDD—sharing inner nodes—then checking whether both BDDs
are equivalent is trivial in the sense of computational complexity [115]. On
the other hand, let Γ1 and Γ2 be two simple games, such that the sizes of
their respective BDDs are r, s ∈ N; therefore, according to [28], determine
whether both BDDs are equal can be computed in O(min{r, s}).
Example 3.8. Given the simple game of Example 3.1, Figure 3.6 illustrates
the BDD obtained from the complete binary tree of Figure 3.3, after applying
Algorithm 3.
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1 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
Figure 3.6: BDD(Γ) obtained from the given binary tree B(Γ) for the game
Γ of Example 3.1. Marked nodes are merged or removed in the next step.
Let Γ be a simple game, we could construct, instead of BDD(W(Γ)),
any of the BDDs associated to any of the other fundamental set families,
BDD(L(Γ)), BDD(Wm(Γ)) or BDD(LM (Γ)). However, the differences be-
tween them and their corresponding forms of representation are the same
as for BDD(W(Γ)) and MWF. In some cases these alternatives provide big-
ger representation sizes than the others. For the particular case of regular
games, as we shall see in Section 3.2, some of those forms of representation
are of equivalent size.
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3.1.3 Representation Sizes and Conversion Problems
Now we summarize several known results related to the size of the forms of
representation defined before. We introduce some new results and we use
them to analyze the computational complexity of the corresponding conver-
sion problems. As the representation based on binary trees and variants are
based on the winning coalitions, we consider only the conversion problems
with respect to EWF and MWF.
First of all, it is necessary to remark that both the size of the PCBs
and BDDs (ROBDDs) depend on the ordering of players. It is interesting
to note that while a specific ordering could provide a very small size, an-
other one might mean an exponential size in terms of the number of players.
Moreover, the problem of finding the best variable ordering for a BDD is
NP-hard [25]. However, as in this work we use always an ordering of vari-
ables already given, we do not worry about this problem. Even so, there
exist classes of simple games Γ for which |BDD(Γ)| grows exponentially in
terms of n, independently of the order of the variables. For instance, con-
sider the Theorem 4 of [120], which shows a class of simple games—actually,
a class of weighted games—for which |BDD(Γ)| ∈ Ω(2
√
n/2). Additionally,
there exists a known result by Wegener which says that almost all QOB-
DDs for general Boolean functions—not only the monotone ones—have size
2n/(2n) [264]. The same author proved that QOBDDs are at most a factor
n+ 1 larger than their corresponding ROBDDs [265].
The relevance of BDDs with polynomial size has led to Ishiura and Ya-
jima to define the PolyBDD family [126]. This class, however, has no explicit
characterization, so it will not be discussed here. An interesting open ques-
tion is to characterize the simple games that can be represented by BDDs
with polynomial size.
It is easy to see that a simple game in MWF, PCBF or BDDF may turn
out to be very much smaller than in EWF. To see this, just consider the
simple game Γ of Example 3.2, where Wm = {∅}. In this case, |Wm| =
|PCB(Γ)| = |BDD(Γ)| = 1, but |W| = 2n is an exponential amount in
terms of n.
There are simple games whose representations in BDDF turn out to be
very much smaller than in MWF. For instance, the simple game given in
Example 3.14 in Section 3.3. Moreover, for a simple game with n > 1, to
represent a MWC in PCB(Γ) it is always required to have at least two nodes.
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Note that the game defined in Example 3.14 also shows that there exist
simple games for which their representation in BDDF grows exponentially
in terms of their representation in PCBF.
Hence, for every simple game Γ with n players, where n is sufficiently
large, |BDD(Γ)| ≤ |PCB(Γ)| ≤ n|Wm| ≤ n|W|. The above implies the
following easy results.
Lemma 3.5. PCBF EWF, BDDF EWF, BDDF MWF and also
BDDF PCBF can be solved in exponential time, and can not be solved
in sub-exponential time.
The following result establishes those conversion problems that can be
solved in polynomial time.
Lemma 3.6. EWF PCBF, EWF BDDF, MWF PCBF, MWF BDDF,
PCBF MWF and PCBF BDDF can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Polynomiality of MWF PCBF comes from [163]: Since the number
of nodes of PCB(Γ) is at most O(n|Wm|), then MWF PCBF can be com-
puted in O(n|Wm|) time. For PCBF MWF, as the number of paths from
the root to each terminal node is |Wm|, we can explore totally PCB(Γ) using
breadth-first traversal in O(|V |+ |E|) = O(|PCB(Γ)|) time, considering at
most n steps by each path for completing the coalitions that begins with
zeros. Thus, we can compute PCBF MWF in O(n · (|V |+ |E|)) time.
Polynomiality of EWF PCBF and EWF BDDF follow from the above.
As |BDD(Γ)| ≤ |PCB(Γ)| ≤ n|Wm|, for all x ∈ Wm we can build the cor-
responding path of BDD(Γ) in O(n|Wm|) time. Then the partial BDD(Γ)
can be explored with breadth-first traversal in O(|V | + |E|), joining each
node without right-child to the 0-terminal. Hence, as |V | ≤ n|Wm|, then
MWF BDDF can be computed in O(n|Wm|) time.
For PCBF BDDF, since all the leaves of PCB(Γ) have label 1, they can
be removed and replaced by a 1-terminal node, keeping the corresponding
edges. Then connect each node without right-child to the 0-terminal, and
finally merge duplicate inner nodes as in step 4 of Algorithm 3. All these
steps can be computed in polynomial time.
Note that, as MWF PCBF and PCBF MWF can be solved in poly-
nomial time, the computational complexity of each problem raised about
3.2. Representations for Regular Games – 71
simple games is the same, regardless of which of these two forms of rep-
resentation is chosen. On the other hand, if the simple game is given in
BDDF, changing the form of representation to MWF, PCBF or EWF, may
increase the complexity of the problem.
Let us now turn our attention to the cases in which the conversion prob-
lem requires exponential time. For PCBF EWF it is enough to compute
first an enumeration of MWF in polynomial time, according to Lemma 3.6,
and then apply Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3.7. PCBF EWF can be solved with polynomial-delay.
Note that Algorithm 1 cannot be applied for BDDs because we do
not have explicitly all the MWCs, and by Lemma 3.5, BDDF EWF can-
not be computed in polynomial time. The existence of an algorithm with
polynomial-delay for the conversion problems BDDF EWF, BDDF MWF
and BDDF PCBF remains open.
3.2 Representations for Regular Games
In what follows of this chapter, we assume that N = {1, . . . , n} is ordered
according to the usual lexicographical order ≤.
It is known that a regular game is completely determined by the set of
its shift-minimal winning coalitions—see [144], where authors are based on
the unpublished result of [203]. Furthermore, once the desirability ordering
is known, checking shift-minimality can be implemented in polynomial time.
Thus, we can consider this set as a valid form of representation for regular
games.
Definition 3.13. A regular game Γ is given in shift-minimal winning form
(SWF) as a pair (N,Ws), where Ws is the set of shift-minimal winning
coalitions.
As before, a matrix notation is useful to represent regular games in a
computational context. Consider an injective function f¯ : {0, 1}n → Nn
such that each winning coalition x is associated with a unique integer vector
x¯, defined for all a ∈ N as f¯(x)(a) = x¯(a) = Σ{x(b) | b ∈ N, a  b}. Thus,
X  Y if and only if x¯ ≤ y¯.
Example 3.9. It is easy to see that the simple game Γ = (N,Wm) of
Example 3.1 is regular. Let be Wm = {x¯ ∈ Nn | x ∈ Wm}, then:
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N abcde
22221 : x¯1
22211 : x¯2
Wm 33210 : x¯3
32210 : x¯4
32111 : x¯5
Since x¯2 ≤ x¯1 and x¯4 ≤ x¯3, it holds that:
N abcde
00101
Ws 10110
11001
It is clear that for every regular game, its set of shift-minimal winning
coalitions is a subset of all its MWCs. Furthermore, it is known that given
a simple game in MWF, it can be decided whether the game is regular or
linear in time polynomial in the size of the game. In fact, regularity can be
decided in linear time and linearity in O(n2 + n|Wm|)-time [163].
In what follows we consider a more succinct version of the form of repre-
sentation PCBF, restricted to regular games. However, it does not use the
set of shift-minimal winning coalitions defined above, keeping the focus in
the set of MWCs.
Definition 3.14. Given a simple game Γ and some total order over N ,
a fully condensed binary tree FCB(Wm(Γ)) is a binary tree obtained from
PCB(Wm(Γ)) by recursively removing all edges (ti, ti+1) such that ti has no
right-child, and for each removed edge, merging both nodes ti and ti+1.
It is clear that FCB(Wm(Γ)) can be carried out in polynomial time.
FCBs were defined by Makino [163] to decide in linear time the regularity
of a monotone Boolean function. In a non-binary, but alphanumeric context,
they were simultaneously defined in 1968 as Patricia tries [186] and without
name [110], being nowadays also known as radix trees.
Like PCBs, each MWC is represented by a leaf and its path from the root.
Analogously to previous data structures we have that determining whether
a coalition belongs to the represented set can be done in polynomial time.
Definition 3.15. A regular game Γ is given in fully condensed binary tree
form (FCBF) if Wm(Γ) is being represented by FCB(Wm(Γ)).
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1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
2
2
1
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
Figure 3.7: FCB(Γ) obtained from PCB(Γ) for the game Γ of Example 3.1.
Nodes between dashed edges on the first tree are merged in the second one.
By abuse of notation, we use FCB(Γ) to denote FCB(Wm(Γ)).
For any regular game Γ, FCB(Γ) is always complete, in the sense that
it has no inner nodes having only one child. For non-regular simple games
this may not be true [163].
Example 3.10. Given the PCB(Γ) for the game of Example 3.1 (see Fig-
ure 3.5), we can construct the FCB(Γ) illustrated in Figure 3.7. The nodes
have been labeled with integers representing the number of left-children
merged with the current node. Each node labeled by the number m repre-
sents m components 1, and all the latest missing components are 0.
An additional succinct form of representation for regular games uses an
invariant (~v,M) where ~v is a set of players’ classes and M is a matrix
that considers some special type of winning coalitions [43]. This type of
representation is less succinct than SWF and it is also less usual in computer
science approaches, so we leave as an open problem to study the conversion
problems for this case.
3.2.1 Conversion Problems for Regular Games
It is clear that |FCB(Γ)| ≤ |PCB(Γ)| for every simple game Γ. Moreover,
since the number of root-nodes of both FCB and PCB is equal to |Wm|,
but their total number of nodes is lower than n|Wm|, we conclude that the
difference between |FCB(Γ)| and |PCB(Γ)| is always polynomial in terms
of n.
Furthermore, as we showed before, it always holds Ws(Γ) ⊆ Wm(Γ), so
|Ws(Γ)| ≤ |Wm(Γ)|. However, in this case there are subclasses of simple
74 – Chapter 3. Representation and Conversion Problems
games in which the difference between |Ws| and |Wm| can grow exponen-
tially in terms of n.
Example 3.11. Consider the simple game Γ with the biggest size |Wm(Γ)|
as possible over N , i.e., the one given by Sperner [242]—see also [96]—with
Wm(Γ) = {X ⊆ N | |X| = bn2 c}. In this case, |Wm(Γ)| =
(
n
bn/2c
)
, but
|Ws(Γ)| = 1, because Ws(Γ) = {1n/20n/2}.
Note that in this example, |PCB(Γ)| ≥ ( nbn/2c) and |FCB(Γ)| ≥ ( nbn/2c),
so the difference between |Ws(Γ)| and |PCB(Γ)|, as well as between |Ws(Γ)|
and |FCB(Γ)|, can also grow exponentially in terms of n.
The above does not mean, however, that |Ws(Γ)| is always “small”.
Actually, as proved Krohn and Sudho¨lter [144]—see also [147]—there are
subclasses of regular games for which the number of its shift-minimal win-
ning coalitions also grows exponentially in terms of n—only that more slowly
than the number of its MWCs.
Example 3.12. The following regular game Γ is the biggest as possible for
n = 8, with |Ws(Γ)| = 14. Note that the number of shift-minimal winning
coalitions almost doubles the number of players. Obviously, the number of
MWCs is even bigger.
N abcdefgh
00001110
00010101
00100011
00111100
01011010
01100110
Ws 01101001
10010110
10011001
10100101
11000011
11011100
11101010
11110001
All the above, in addition to Lemma 3.5, implies the following results.
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Lemma 3.8. For regular games, SWF EWF, SWF MWF, SWF PCBF,
SWF FCBF, BDDF FCBF and FCBF EWF can be solved in exponen-
tial time, and can not be solved in sub-exponential time.
By the same considerations,we can prove the following result.
Lemma 3.9. For regular games, the conversion problems EWF SWF,
MWF SWF, PCBF SWF, EWF FCBF, MWF FCBF, PCBF FCBF,
FCBF PCBF, FCBF MWF, FCBF BDDF and FCBF SWF can be
solved in polynomial time.
Proof. The two first claims follow from an algorithm similar to the one
derived to solve the EWF MWF problem. Just compare all (minimal)
winning coalitions to each other, but deleting those whose respective vectors
x¯ are bigger in the lexicographic order. Since f¯(x) can be simultaneously
computed when each (winning) coalition is compared, this procedure takes
O(n · |W|2) time for the first case, and O(n · |Wm|2) for the second one.
Since PCBF MWF and MWF SWF can be solved in polynomial time,
then PCBF SWF can also be solved in polynomial time. The remaining re-
sults are deduced in the same way from PCBF FCBF and FCBF PCBF,
which are clearly polynomial by what is said in Section 3.2.
In addition, it is known that for regular games MWF MLF can be
solved in polynomial time [210], regardless the exponentiality for simple
games in general. Unlike the previous cases, the size relationship between
SWF and BDDF is less clear.
As stated in Section 3.1.3, in Theorem 4 of [120] is presented a subclass
of regular games where for every game Γ of this subclass, |BDD(Γ)| grows
exponentially in function of n. However, it does not seems that in this
example |Ws(Γ)| grows much lower than |BDD(Γ)|. Furthermore, although
we saw in Example 3.11 a game Γ with |Ws(Γ)| = 1, in this case |BDD(Γ)|
does not seems to increase too much in terms of n. For instance, with n = 8
and n = 9 we obtain respectively |BDD(Γ)| = 27 and |BDD(Γ)| = 32,
in contrast to the sizes of each game in MWF, which are n · |Wm| = 560
and 1134, respectively. On the contrary, if in some example it were shown
that both |Ws| and |BDD(Γ)| have an exponential growth, it could not be
deduced from here that SWF BDDF can be solved in polynomial time.
To compute SWF BDDF (or BDDF SWF), we can always compute
first SWF MWF (resp. BDDF MWF) and then MWF BDDF (resp.
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MWF SWF). But if we do this, the whole process requires exponential
time. The absence of known algorithms that are able to skip this interme-
diate step, leads us to state the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.1. For regular games, BDDF SWF and SWF BDDF can
be solved in exponential time, and can not be solved in sub-exponential
time.
It is interesting to note that there are some efficient algorithms that
benefit themselves from working with a smaller class of simple games such
as regular games. For instance, in [19] is shown that computing either
BDD(Wm(Γ)) or BDD(LM (Γ)) from BDD(W(Γ)) can be done in linear
time in the input size, if the game Γ is regular. Further, they designed an
algorithm to computing BDD(Ws(Γ)) from BDD(Wm(Γ)).
As at the end of Section 3.1.3, we finish this section with some enumer-
ation results considering the same notation as the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.10. For regular games, SWF MWF and FCBF EWF can be
solved with polynomial-delay.
Proof. Generation of Wm from Ws follows similar ideas than Algorithm 1
of Lemma 3.3, but considering as input the set Ws = {x1, . . . , xm}: See
Algorithm 4.
Given X ∈ Ws, let be R = {i ∈ X | i + 1 /∈ X}. It means that for
any j ∈ R we can do a 1-right-shift applied to j, i.e., to replace player j
by player j + 1. Note that given a winning coalition, to do a 1-right-shift
implies that the new coalition is still winning. Steps 7-10 update the set
R. Steps 7-8 consider the case where, being j > 1, j − 1 ∈ X, j ∈ X and
j+1 6∈ X, then a 1-right-shift applied to j implies that j 6∈ R but j−1 ∈ R.
Steps 9-10 consider the case where j ∈ X, j + 1 6∈ X and j + 2 6∈ X, then a
1-right-shift applied to j implies that j 6∈ R but j + 1 ∈ R.
Again, the algorithm is a branch and cut algorithm that uses the usual
backtrack tree providing an enumeration of all possible 1-right-shifts of a
minimal winning set without repetitions. Now, for each new MWC X, we
perform a traversal of the backtrack tree whenever it does not reach a set Xk
such that Xk  X, for any k > i—in this case it will be generated later—or
Xk ⊂ X, for any k < i—in this case it is not minimal. These properties and
the monotonicity guarantee that we generate all MWCs without repetitions.
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Algorithm 4 GenerateMWFfromSWF
Input: A simple game Γ in SWF with Ws = {X1, . . . , Xm} sorted in card-
lexicographic order.
Output: Γ in MWF.
1: Generate(X,R, i)
2: for all j ∈ R in increasing order
3: X = X ∪ {j + 1} \ {j};
4: if (for all k > i, Xk 6 X) ∧ (for all k < i, Xk 6⊂ X)
5: print X;
6: R = R \ {j};
7: if (j > 1) ∧ (j − 1 /∈ X)
8: R = R ∪ {j − 1};
9: if j + 2 /∈ X
10: R = R ∪ {j + 1};
11: Generate(X,R, i);
12: X = X ∪ {j} \ {j + 1};
13: {main}
14: for i = 1, . . . ,m do
15: print Xi;
16: R = {i ∈ Xi | i+ 1 /∈ Xi};
17: Generate(Xi, R, i);
00101
00011
10110
01110
01101
10101
11001
10101
Figure 3.8: Computing SWF MWF for the simple game of Example 3.1.
Following the same reasoning as for Algorithm 1 of Lemma 3.3, the
number of steps between the printing of one minimal wining coalition and
the next one is polynomial.
For FCBF EWF, just compute FCBF MWF in polynomial time—
Lemma 3.9—and then apply Algorithm 1.
We apply Algorithm 4 in the following example.
Example 3.13. Consider the simple game (N,Ws) of Example 3.9. Fig-
ure 3.8 shows the enumeration without repetition of all the MWCs of the
game. They are printed in the following order: 00101, 00011, 10110, 01110,
11001.
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We left as an open problem whether the conversion problem SWF EWF
can be solved with polynomial-delay. Similar to what happens for BDDs
with Lemma 3.3—see Conjecture 3.1—Algorithm 4 cannot be used with
BDDs. It also remains open to show whether for regular games BDDF SWF
can be solved with polynomial-delay.
3.3 Representations for Weighted Games
The following is the most natural way to represent weighted games.
Definition 3.16. A weighted game Γ is given in weighted representation
form (WRF) as a tuple [q;w1, . . . , wn], where q is the quota and w1, . . . , wn
are the weights of its players.
Observe that any tuple [q;w1, . . . , wn] represents a weighted game and
thus the WRF is a valid representation for weighted games.
Given a simple game in MWF, it can be decided in polynomial time
whether the game is weighted or not. This problem is known in the context
of Boolean functions as threshold synthesis problem and it was solved by
Peled and Simeone [209]. One common way to do this is solving the following
system of linear inequalities:
w(X) > w(Y ) for all X ∈ Wm, Y ∈ LM (3.1)
where w = (w1, . . . , wn) are the unknowns. The game is weighted if and only
if the linear system has a solution, i.e., if it produces a weighted realization
[q;w1, . . . , wn], where the quota can be derived from the weights by doing
q = min{w(X) | X ∈ Wm}. Hence each solution of this linear system defines
a weighted game.
Given an order over N , it is important to note that even though each sim-
ple (or regular) game can be univocally represented in EWF, MWF, PCBF
or BDDF (or SWF or FCBF), a weighted game may be represented in infinite
ways in WRF. This is true even for our restriction over natural numbers.
Actually, given a weighted game with realization [q;w1, . . . , wn], the real-
izations [cq; cw1, . . . , cwn], with c ∈ N, are all equivalent. But there may
be further equivalent realizations, as for instance [2; 2, 1, 1] and [3; 3, 2, 1].
In fact, given two realizations, determine whether both represent the same
weighted game is NP-hard [167].
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Regarding vector-weighted games, we know that any simple game Γ =
(N,W) can be represented by a certain number k of weighted games with
realizations [q(t);w
(t)
1 , . . . , w
(t)
n ], such that for all X ⊆ N and 1 ≤ t ≤ k,
X ∈ W if and only if w(t)(X) ≥ q(t), where w(t)(X) = ∑{w(t)a | a ∈ X}.
This expressions allow us to consider another valid form of representation
for simple games.
Definition 3.17. A simple game Γ is given in vector-weighted representation
form (VWRF) as a finite set of tuples [q(t);w
(t)
1 , . . . , w
(t)
n ], with 1 ≤ t ≤ k
for some k ∈ N.
The game represented by [q(t);w
(t)
1 , . . . , w
(t)
n ], for 1 ≤ t ≤ k, is the game
obtained as the intersection of the given family of weighted games.
In a similar way, regarding the codimension, we can consider the game
Γ represented by [q(t);w
(t)
1 , . . . , w
(t)
n ], for 1 ≤ t ≤ k, as the game obtained
as the union of the given family of weighted games. We refer to such rep-
resentation as co-vector-weighted representation form (coVWRF). Since any
simple game can be expressed as the union of a finite family of weighted
games [89], coVWRF is a valid representation form for simple games.
Observe that, for any representation of weighted games that is closed un-
der intersection or union, i.e., a representation of the intersection or union of
two games that can be obtained in polynomial time, the conversion problem
for simple games given in VWRF or coVWRF has the same complexity than
for weighted games given in WRF.
A generalization of games constructed through binary operators is the
family of binary games introduced in [80]. A binary game is defined by a
propositional logic formula and a finite collection of weighted games. The
boolean formula determines the requirements for a coalition to be winning
in the described game. When considering only monotone formulas, binary
games provide another representation of simple games.
3.3.1 Conversion Problems for Weighted Games
Ishiura and Yajima [126] proved that, for every weighted game in WRF, if
each weight is bounded by a polynomial of n, then the sizes of their respective
BDDs grow polynomially in terms of n. That is the case of the following
example, in which however the number of MWCs grows exponentially in
terms of n.
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n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
|BDD(Γ)| 74 91 117 150 184 223 274 331 388 459 545
|Wm| 77 133 240 429 772 1414 2588 4742 8761 16273 30255
Table 3.6: Exponential growth of a class of weighted games in MWF, in
terms of n.
Example 3.14. Consider, for every number of players n, the family of
weighted games Γ = [q;n, . . . , 1] such that q = d(∑ni=1 i)/ 2e. The number
of MWCs for each one of these games is specified by the following sequence
s(q, n):
s(q, n) =

0 if q = 0 or n = 0 or q >
n∑
i=1
i
(weights are not enough to get q)
n− q + s(q, q) if q > n
({{n}, {n− 1}, . . . , {q + 1}} ∈ Wm)
1 + s(q, n− 1) if q = n (take n or not)
s(q − n, n− 1) + s(q, n− 1) if q < n (take n or not)
This sequence grows exponentially on n when q = d(∑ni=1 i)/ 2e, as also
we can see in Table 3.6. Such values can be checked with the application of
Bolus [27].
Despite of this, in Section 3.2.1 was mentioned that there are subclasses
of weighted games whose sizes in BDDF also grow exponentially in terms
of n, independently of the ordering of the players and the weights consid-
ered in WRF [120]. Moreover, there exist exponential algorithms to solve
WRF BDDF [17, 29].
As the size of a weighted game in WRF is always n + 1, the first part
of the following result is quite simple, and it is deduced from the previous
Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.1. For the second part, just note that every weighted
game is a simple game with dimension 1.
Lemma 3.11. For weighted games, the conversion problems WRF EWF,
WRF MWF, WRF PCBF, WRF BDDF, WRF FCBF and also
WRF SWF can be solved in exponential time, and can not be solved in
sub-exponential time. For simple games, the same occurs replacing WRF
by VWRF.
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Despite of this result, there exist some subclasses of weighted games
for which WRF BDDF turns out to be polynomial. Such is the case of
homogeneous games.
Example 3.15. The regular game Γ of Example 3.11 is both weighted and
homogeneous, and can be represented in WRF by the vector [n2 ; 1, 1, . . . , 1].
It is known that every homogeneous game can be represented by a
QOBDD with size O(n2), and that from its weighted representations, this
QOBDD can be computed in O(n2 · log n) time [28]. Therefore, since
|BDD(Γ)| ≤ |QOBDD(Γ)|, then WRF BDDF for homogeneous games
can be solved in polynomial time.
Fredman and Khachiyan [84] showed that given a simple game Γ in
MWF, LM (Γ) can be computed in sub-exponential time; but until now, it
remains open to show if this can be done in polynomial time. However, if Γ
is regular or weighted, the problem turns out to be polynomial [210]. This
plus the fact that the linear programming is polynomial [138] proves that
the linear system (3.1) can be solved in polynomial time, implying together
with the previous lemmas the following result.
Lemma 3.12. For weighted games, the conversion problems EWF WRF,
MWF WRF, PCBF WRF, BDDF WRF, FCBF WRF and also
SWF WRF can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We just prove the last statement. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1,
according to Krohn and Sudho¨lter [144] each regular game Γ is completely
determined by Ws(Γ). Therefore, the system of linear inequalities (3.1) can
be replaced by the following:
w(X) > w(Y ) for all X ∈ Ws, Y ∈ LS (3.2)
where LS is the set of shift-maximal losing coalitions. Thus, as (3.2) has
less inequalities than (3.1), then it is clear that (3.2) can also be solved in
polynomial time.
For BDDF WRF we refer to [30], where the author solves the prob-
lem for QOBDDs using linear programming and producing real weighted
representations.
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Algorithm 5 GenerateMWFfromWRF
Input: Γ = [q;w1, . . . , wn] with
∑n
i=1wi ≥ q and w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wn.
Output: Γ in MWF.
1: WRFtoMWF(X, i, q′)
2: if i = n
3: print X ∪ {n}; return;
4: else
5: if (
∑n
j=i+1wj ≥ q) WRFtoMWF(X, i+ 1, q′);
6: if (wi ≥ q′) print X ∪ {i};
7: else WRFtoMWF(X ∪ {i}, i+ 1, q′ − wi);
8: return;
9: {main}
10: WRFtoMWF(∅, 1, q);
Algorithm 6 GenerateEWFfromWRF
Input: Γ = [q;w1, . . . , wn] with
∑n
i=1wi ≥ q and w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wn.
Output: Γ in EWF.
1: WRFtoEWF(X, i)
2: if i ≤ n
3: if w(X ∪ {i}) ≥ q
4: print X ∪ {i};
5: WRFtoEWF(X ∪ {i}, i+ 1);
6: WRFtoEWF(X, i+ 1);
7: {main}
8: WRFtoEWF(∅, 1);
We finish this section with some enumeration results. The proof of the
following Lemma 3.13 is based on an algorithm of [167], that the authors
used to compute the Deegan-Packel index [59] for weighted games in MWF.
Lemma 3.13. For weighted games, WRF EWF and WRF MWF can be
solved with polynomial-delay.
Proof. WRF MWF was shown by using Algorithm 5. Analogously to Al-
gorithms 1 and 4, steps 1-8 form the recursive procedure started by the
main routine of step 10. Each step has a time complexity bounded by O(1)
because of the updates of
∑n
j=i+1wj at each iteration. The whole algorithm
has time complexity O(n|Wm|) and memory complexity O(n) [167].
For WRF EWF, we show Algorithm 6 which is even simpler. Here also
every step has a time complexity bounded by O(1). Further, the algorithm
has time complexity O(n|W|) and memory complexity O(n). Both recur-
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sions of steps 5 and 6 allow to generate the winning coalitions in an orderly
fashion, so that none is repeated.
We think that there exists a similar procedure as Algorithms 5 and 6 to
postulate the following.
Conjecture 3.2. For weighted games, WRF SWF can be solved with
polynomial-delay.
Regarding vector-weighted games, note that there exist simple games
with exponential dimension in function of the number of players—see, for
instance, Theorem 8 of [72]. Therefore, it is not clear the complexity of the
conversion problem from other forms of representation to VWRF.
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Chapter 4
Computational Problems
In this chapter we present several complexity results related to the compu-
tation of the properties, parameters and solution concepts for simple games
defined in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
In Section 4.1 we survey the known results presented in the literature. In
Section 4.2 we prove new results related to the IsDecisive and IsStrong
problem for simple games, regular games, and weighted games in different
forms of representation. These results solve some open problems and re-
fute some conjectures proposed in other works. In Section 4.3 we solve the
Width open problem for simple games in MWF, we propose two new param-
eters related to the width and the length, and we introduce the IsDummy
problem for regular games in SWF.
We finish this chapter with Section 4.4, where we focus on the problem
of counting and enumerating subclasses of simple games. We survey the
main known results on this topic, and we present an idea to deal with the
enumeration of decisive regular games.
4.1 Known Complexity Results
4.1.1 Properties and Parameters
The known results of this section are summarized in tables. The absence of
references means that the result is trivial, easily verifiable from its definition.
Question marks “?” represent open problems.
Similarly to [92], we use the following general notation for the problems
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to be studied in this section.
Name: IsX
Input: Simple game Γ
Question: Does Γ satisfy property X?
Name: X
Input: Simple game Γ
Output: X(Γ), i.e. the value of the parameter X for Γ.
In general, we extend the notation IsX to the problem of deciding a
property X for games, players or coalitions, considering an input formed by
a simple game and players and/or coalitions. Additionally, we consider the
following two problems.
Name: Iso
Input: Two games.
Question: Are both games isomorphic?
Name: Equiv
Input: Two games.
Question: Are both games equivalent?
Table 4.1 shows the known computational complexity results to decide
some properties and parameters of simple games defined in Section 2.3.1,
under different forms of representation. Some results of the table are up-
dated in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The inputs of the problems IsBlocking
and IsSwing are a simple game in addition of a coalition. The inputs of
the problems of “Properties of players” consider a simple game and a player,
but the IsCritical problem also requires a coalition, and the IsSymmetric
problem also requires another player.
We denote gIso as the class of problems reducible to graph isomorphism.
Note that for simple games in MWF it is easy to see, using arguments
from [161], that the Iso problem and the graph isomorphism problem are
equivalent.
Regarding the dimension of a simple game, in [251] was shown that for
n ≥ 1 players, there is always a simple game of dimension n, and moreover,
that the dimension of a simple game may be exponential in the number of
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Simple games Regular Weighted
Problem EWF MWF VWRF SWF WRF
Properties of simple games
IsProper P P coNPC ? coNPC [92]
IsStrong P coNPC [215] coNPC ? coNPC [92]
IsDecisive P ? coNPC ? coNPC [10]
Properties of coalitions
IsBlocking P P P P P
IsSwing P P P P P
Properties of players
IsDummy P P coNPC [167] ? coNPC [167]
IsPasser P P P P P
IsVetoer P P P P P
IsDictator P P P P P
IsCritical P P P P P
IsSymmetric P P coNPC [167] P coNPC [167]
Parameters
Length P P NPH [10] P P [10]
Width ? ? P [10] ? P [10]
Coleman’s power P #PC [9] #PC [9] ? #PC [9]
Chow parameters P #PC [15, 9] #PC [9] ? #PC [99, 9]
Additional problems
Equiv P P coNPH [72] ? coNPC [72]
Iso gIso gIso ? ? ?
Table 4.1: Known complexity results for properties and parameters of simple
games.
players. Furthermore, it is known that given k weighted games, deciding
whether the dimension of their intersection exactly equals k is NP-hard [63].
Given k weighted games, it remains open to show whether the problem of
deciding if the codimension of their union exactly equals k is NP-hard.
For vector-weighted games in VWRF, these problems are at least as hard
as for weighted games in WRF. The results without references for this form
of representation are deduced from the column for WRF.
Properties of Simple Games
Given a simple game, to decide the IsProper problem it is just necessary
to consider the MWCs of the game. As a matter of fact, if the complement
N \X of a MWC X is losing, then it is clear that the complement N \Z of
every coalition Z with X ⊆ Z will be losing too.
Furthermore, given a simple game in EWF, to decide the IsStrong
problem we can verifying if the complement N \X of every maximal losing
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coalition X is winning. Then it is clear that the complement N \Z of every
coalition Z with Z ⊆ X will be winning too. Since by Lemma 3.2 we know
that EWF MLF can be solved in polynomial time, the IsStrong problem
can be solved in polynomial time when the simple game is given in EWF,
ELF and MLF.
However, it is hard to decide the IsStrong problem when only the set of
MWCs is given. Indeed, recall that MWF MLF and MWF ELF cannot
be solved in sub-exponential time. This difficulty seems to be impossible to
overcome even if the game is proper. Indeed, in [92] was conjectured that
the IsDecisive problem is coNP-complete for simple games given in MWF.
Fortunately, this assumption is wrong, as we shall see in Section 4.2.
Properties of Coalitions
The problems of this thesis regarding properties of coalitions are easy. In
general, to decide whether a coalition X ⊆ N is either blocking or a swing
can always be done in polynomial time, whenever ν(X) can be determined
in polynomial time.
Properties of Players
Most problems concerning properties of players are easy whenever for ev-
ery coalition X, ν(X) can be computed in polynomial time. For instance,
considering a player i, for the problems IsPasser and IsVetoer it is just
necessary to determine whether ν({i}) = 1 and ν(N \ {i}) = 0, respectively.
However, there are some exceptions for succinct forms of representations.
For the IsDummy problem it is necessary to check for the given player i
whether it is not contained in some MWC. Evidently this is easy when the
set of MWCs is explicitly given, which is not the case for weighted games in
WRF. As far as we know, the complexity of this problem for regular games
in SWF has not been determined. As a matter of fact, it is clear that if
there is some shift-minimal winning coalition that contains i, then i cannot
be a dummy player; but it is not so clear what happens when this is not the
case.
To solve the IsSymmetric problem in polynomial time it seems that
at least the set of shift-minimal winning coalitions must be given explicitly.
Let i, j two players in the grand coalition. For simple games in EWF, the
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problem is equivalent to deciding if for all X ∈ W, i ∈ X if and only if
j ∈ X. For simple games in MWF, the problem is equivalent to deciding
if for all X ∈ Wm, when i ∈ X and j /∈ X, there exists another MWC
Y ∈ Wm so that i /∈ Y and j ∈ Y . For regular games in SWF, the problem
is equivalent to the previous one, considering Ws instead of Wm, and the
fact that for every X ∈ Ws with i /∈ X and j /∈ X, it holds X  X ∪ {i}
and X  X ∪ {j}.
Parameters
Regarding the parameters, the Length problem can be computed in poly-
nomial time even for weighted games in WRF: Given a weighted game Γ =
[q;w1, . . . , wn], start with the player with less weight w1, and keep adding
more players with decreasing weights until
∑k
i=1wi ≥ q; then length(Γ) = k.
Since for any weighted game Γ its dual Γd can be obtained in polynomial
time, width(Γ) can also be computed in polynomial time [10]. However,
the dualization of a simple game in less succinct forms of representation
is not polynomial—see Section 4.2—so by the same reasoning we cannot
deduce the complexity of the Width problem for simple games in other
forms of representation. This open problem established in [10] is solved in
Section 4.3.
About both the Coleman’s power and Chow parameters problems,
it is clear that the second one is at least as computationally hard as the first
one. Further, if the Chow parameters problem can be computed in poly-
nomial time, then the Coleman’s power problem can also be computed
in polynomial time.
4.1.2 Solution Concepts
There is a lot of work done about solution concepts, although most is focused
in cooperative games rather than restricted to simple games. The compu-
tational complexity of solution concepts has been studied for many classes
of cooperative games, such as assignment games [105, 240, 196], coalitional
skill games [12], convex games [145], cyclic permutation games [241], flow
games [105, 60, 218], induced subgraph games [61], matching games [137],
min-cost spanning tree games [78], neighbor games [112], shortest path
games [195], spanning connectivity games [11], standard tree games [107],
90 – Chapter 4. Computational Problems
threshold network flow games [14], vertex connectivity games [13], among
several others.
There are various computational problems that can be defined over so-
lution concepts. We consider four kind of problems, restricted to simple
games, which were studied on [10, 73].
Name: Empty-X
Input: Simple game Γ
Question: Is the solution concept X empty in Γ?
Name: In-X
Input: Simple game Γ and payoff p
Question: Is the payoff p in the solution concept X of Γ?
Name: IsZero-X
Input: Simple game Γ and player i
Question: Is payoff of player i in game Γ zero according to solution X?
Name: Construct-X
Input: Simple game Γ
Output: A payoff in the solution concept X of Γ.
The known computational complexity results for these problems under
different solution concepts are illustrated on Table 4.2. Note that the fam-
ilies of problems Empty-X and In-X only apply to sets, and the family of
problems IsZero-X only applies to values. We omit from the table those
problems that do not apply, like for instance Empty-Banzhaf-value or
IsZero-Stable-set. The results without references are shown in the thesis
of Aziz [10].
The rows labeled Empty-, In-, IsZero- and Construct- refer to the
different kind of problems described above. The first column, below of each
of those rows, refers to the solution concepts considered for that problem.
The next four columns represent the complexity for each form of represen-
tation considered in the input of the problem. Thus, the fourth row, for
instance, means that the problem Empty-Stable-Set is always nonempty
for simple games in any representation form.
Henceforth, we denote the problems Construct-Banzhaf-value and
Construct-Shapley-Shubik-value as Bval and SSval, respectively.
4.1. Known Complexity Results – 91
Simple games Weighted
Problem EWF MWF VWRF WRF
Empty-
Stable-set always nonempty
Core P P P P [73]
-core P P NPH NPH [73]
Least-core always nonempty
Bargaining-set always nonempty if no passer
Kernel always nonempty if no passer
Prekernel always nonempty
Nucleolus always nonempty if no passer
Prenucleolus always nonempty
In-
Banzhaf-value P ? ? ?
Shapley-Shubik-value P ? NPH NPH
Stable-set ? ? ? ?
Core P P P P [73]
-core P P NPH coNPH [73]
Least-core P P NPH NPH [73]
Bargaining-set ? ? ? ?
Kernel P P ? ?
Prekernel P P ? ?
Nucleolus P P ? ?
Prenucleolus P P ? ?
IsZero-
Banzhaf-value P P ? ?
Shapley-Shubik-value P P NPH NPH
Core P P P P [73]
Nucleolus P P NPH coNPH [73]
Prenucleolus P P NPH NPH
Construct-
Banzhaf-value P [9] #PC [9] #PC [9]
#PC [219]
NPC [168]
Shapley-Shubik-value P [9] #PC #PC [9]
#PC [61]
NPC [168]
Stable-set P P P P
Core P P P P [73]
-core P P NPH NPH [73]
Least-core P P NPH NPH [73]
Bargaining-set P P ? ?
Kernel P P ? ?
Prekernel P P ? ?
Nucleolus P P NPH NPH [73]
Prenucleolus P P NPH NPH
Table 4.2: Known complexity results for solution concepts on simple games.
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Power Indices
In Table 4.2 we consider the problems related to the Banzhaf value and the
Shapley-Shubik value, instead of the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik
index, respectively. It is clear by Definition 2.28 that since the denominator
of the Shapley-Shubik index is fixed, the computation of the Shapley-Shubik
index and the Shapley-Shubik value has the same complexity. This is also
true for the probabilistic Banzhaf index and the Banzhaf value, but it is not
necessarily true for the Banzhaf index and the Banzhaf value—see Defini-
tion 2.29. In this latter case we only can said that if the Banzhaf value can be
computed, then it can be used to compute the Banzhaf index. Furthermore,
it is known that for any form of representation, computing the Shapley-
Shubik index is at least as hard as computing the Banzhaf index [10].
Note that both the Bval and SSval problems correspond to compute
ηi(Γ) and κi(Γ), respectively, for every player i on the simple game Γ. In de-
spite of the hardness results for weighted games in WRF, in [167] was proved
that there exist pseudo-polynomial time algorithms based on dynamic pro-
gramming to solve both problems. Since then, several algorithms have been
designed to solve the problem as quickly as possible [253, 140, 29].
Core, -Core and Least Core
The core imputations satisfy a system of weak linear inequalities. It is
closed and convex, which means that it is a feasible set that can be solved
by using linear programming. Moreover, for simple games the core is well
characterized by Proposition 2.4. The computation of the core for simple
games is easy even for succinct forms of representation.
To decide the Empty-Core problem it is just enough to check for any
player i ∈ N whether ν(N \ {i}) = 0. If this is true for at least one player,
the answer of the problem is “yes”; otherwise is “no”. The problems In-
Core, IsZero-Core and Construct-Core can be solved by using the
same characterization.
On the other hand, the least core can be computed for any simple game
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(N, ν) by using the following linear program [74]:
min 
s.t. pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N∑
i∈N pi = 1∑
i∈X pi ≥ ν(X)−  for all X ∈ Wm
whose solution is a least core imputation and the smallest  value of all
possible -cores. Note that the second inequality considers only minimal
winning coalitions. This is enough [10] because for any X ∈ Wm with
p(X) ≥ ν(X) −  = 1 − , if X ⊂ Y then p(Y ) ≥ 1 − ; and if Y ⊂ X
then p(Y ) ≥ 0 − . Therefore, as linear programming is solvable in poly-
nomial time [138], the problems Construct-Least-core and In-Least-
core can be solved in polynomial time whether the set of MWCs can be
obtained in polynomial time in terms of the input size.
Despite the hardness results for weighted games in WRF, the prob-
lems Empty--core, In--core, In-LeastCore, Construct--core and
Construct-Least-core, can be solved by pseudo-polynomial time al-
gorithms. Indeed, all these problems are polynomial-time solvable if the
weights are at most polynomially large in n, or—equivalently—if they are
represented in unary notation [73]. The same occurs for vector-weighted
games in VWRF [73, 74].
In general, by using Proposition 2.6, if the problem Length is NP-
hard then the problem In--core is also NP-hard [10]. Furthermore, it is
conjectured that if Length is NP-hard, then the problem Construct-
Least-core is also NP-hard [10].
Nucleolus and Prenucleolus
For any reasonable form of representation of a simple game, verifying whether
a payoff is an imputation or just a preimputation can be done in polyno-
mial time. Therefore, in terms of the computational complexity, there is no
difference between the problems concerning nucleolus or prenucleolus.
As the core, the nucleolus can also be computed with linear program-
ming. In this case, it is necessary to solve a sequence of at most n successive
linear programs [142]. The first linear program corresponds to the compu-
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tation of the least core:
min 
s.t. pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N∑
i∈N pi = 1∑
i∈X pi ≥ ν(X)−  for all X ∈ W ′
where, again, it is not necessary to consider all the set of coalitions, but
only W ′ = Wm ∪ {X ∪ {i} | X ∈ Wm, i ∈ N} [223, 10]. Lets denote the
output of this first linear program as (p1, 1). Let
∑1 be the set of tight
constraints for (p1, 1), which by a slight abuse of notation also represents
all the coalitions X ∈ W ′ such that p(X) = ν(X) − . Thus, the second
linear program is
min 
s.t. pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N∑
i∈N pi = 1∑
i∈X pi = ν(X)− 1 for all X ∈
∑1∑
i∈X pi ≥ ν(X)−  for all X ∈ W ′ \
∑1
where the tight constraints now appear in an equality. The remaining coali-
tions appear in the same inequality that needs to be re-computed until the
payoffs to all coalitions are determined, i.e., until the solution space of the
current linear program consists of a single point [74]. Hence, the jth linear
program is given by
min 
s.t. pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N∑
i∈N pi = 1∑
i∈X pi = ν(X)− 1 for all X ∈
∑1
. . . . . .∑
i∈X pi = ν(X)− j−1 for all X ∈
∑j−1∑
i∈X pi ≥ ν(X)−  for all X ∈ W ′ \
⋃j−1
k=1
∑k .
The explanation of this computation can also be seen in [74].
Since the nucleolus is unique, it is clear that if Construct-Nucleolus
can be solved in polynomial time, then the In-Nucleolus problem can
be decided in polynomial time. Moreover, if the Construct-Least-core
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problem is NP-hard, then Construct-Nucleolus is also NP-hard [10].
Regarding weighted games in WRF, if the core is nonempty, then the
nucleolus can be obtained in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.1 ([73]). Let Γ be a weighted game with nonempty core and
k vetoers. The nucleolus N (Γ) is given by the homogeneous imputation
(p1, . . . , pn), such that for all i ∈ N we have
pi =
 1k if i is vetoer0 otherwise.
When the core is empty, the Construct-Nucleolus problem is NP-
hard, but as the problems Construct--core and Construct-Least-
core, it can also be solved by a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm, so the
problem is polynomial-time solvable if the weights are at most polynomi-
ally large in n [73, 74]. The same occurs for vector-weighted games in
VWRF [73, 74]. Moreover, it is also interesting to note that there are sub-
classes of weighted games for which the problems Construct-Nucleolus,
In-Nucleolus and IsZero-Nucleolus are polynomial-time solvable, even
when the core is empty.
Proposition 4.1 ([211]). Let Γ = [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a decisive homogeneous
game in which each dummy player gets zero weight. Then the nucleolus is
N (Γ) = (w1/w(N), . . . , wn/w(N)).
Stable Set
The stable set is a solution concept slightly studied in simple games. It is
clear by Proposition 2.3 that the Construct-Stable-set problem can be
solved in polynomial time whenever a MWC can be obtained in polynomial
time. However, the same proposition does not implies that the In-Stable-
set problem can be decided in polynomial time, as it is stated in [10].
Actually, given an imputation, by using this result we can only verifying
whether it is contained in some of those stable sets provided by the MWCs.
But if the answer is “no”, there may exist other stable sets in which the
imputation is contained. In the absence of other explicit results, to our
knowledge this problem remains open.
96 – Chapter 4. Computational Problems
Kernel and Prekernel
The kernel has also been much studied in simple games, although unlike
the core, for this solution concept there are not too many complexity re-
sults. Analogously to the core and the nucleolus, it is known that the kernel
corresponds to a union of a finite number of closed convex polyhedra [55].
Given a simple game Γ = (N, ν) and a payoff p ∈ I(Γ), to decide both
the In-Kernel and In-Prekernel problems we can start by determining
the n(n− 1) maximum surpluses
sνij(p) = max{ν(X)− p(X) | X ∈ Wm, i ∈ X, j /∈ X}.
Note that, as in the core, we can concentrate the computation at the MWCs.
Indeed, for any X ∈ Wm and another coalition X ′ ⊆ N , if X ⊂ X ′, then we
have ν(X)− p(X) = 1− p(X) ≥ 1− p(X ′) = ν(X ′)− p(X ′), and if X ′ ⊂ X,
then ν(X) − p(X) = 1 − p(X) ≥ 0 − p(X ′) = ν(X ′) − p(X ′). In the case
that for all X ∈ Wm, j ∈ X, then sνij(p) must be given by a losing coalition,
because it does not contain j; therefore, the coalition that provides the
maximum surplus containing i is the singleton {i}. In the case that for all
X ∈ Wm, when j /∈ X it also holds that i /∈ X, then sνij(p) must be given by
a non-MWC, provided by the coalition X ′ ∪ {i} with the minimum p(X ′),
so that j /∈ X ′. Finally, we verify whether the payoff in the maximum
surpluses satisfy both the inequalities (sνij(p) − sνji(p))(pj − ν({j})) ≤ 0
and (sνji(p) − sνij(p))(pi − ν({i})) ≤ 0 for the kernel, and the equalities
sνij(p) = s
ν
ji(p) for the prekernel.
We know that in simple games with a nonempty set of imputations, the
intersection of the kernel and the least core coincides with the intersection of
the prekernel and the least core. There exist two solution concepts, namely
the lexicographic prekernel and the lexicographic kernel, that belong to these
intersections [79]. It is also known that if the maximum surpluses and the
MWCs can be obtained in polynomial time, then an outcome of both the
lexicographic prekernel and the lexicographic kernel can be obtained in poly-
nomial time [79]. Therefore, these solution concepts can be used to solve
both the Construct-Kernel and Construct-Prekernel problems in
polynomial time, depending on the form of representation of the game.
For weighted games in WRF, the complexity of the In-Kernel, In-
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Prekernel, Construct-Kernel andConstruct-Prekernel problems
is still open. This does not mean that these problems have not been studied.
We know at least the following.
Theorem 4.2 ([271, 10]). Let Γ = [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted game with-
out vetoers and such that q ≥ w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wn. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ I(Γ)
be a homogeneous payoff, where R = {1, . . . , r} ⊆ N is the set of r players
with payoff 1r and N \R is the set of n− r players with payoff equals zero.
Let be T (R) = {1, . . . , k} ∪ N \ R, where k = maxm∈[0,r]
∑
i∈T (R)wi < q.
This payoff p is in the kernel if and only if w(T (R)) + wr − wr+1 ≥ q and
w(T (R))− w1 + wk+1 + wr ≥ q.
Moreover, for some kind of weighted games, the kernel is equivalent to
the nucleolus given by the homogeneous imputation of Theorem 4.1 [7].
Bargaining Set
Similarly to the stable set, the bargaining set has been little studied in
simple games. The existence of several slightly different definitions [7] makes
their study more difficult to address. However, every bargaining set can be
obtained by a system of linear inequalities in the space of the payoffs [6].
Moreover, it is important to remember that in simple games, when the core
is nonempty, it is equivalent to the bargaining set [70]. Therefore, all the
open complexity problems related with the bargaining set are reduced to
analyze simple games with empty core, i.e., with no vetoers.
Recall that the kernel, and hence the nucleolus, are contained in the bar-
gaining set. Thus, given a subclass of simple games in certain representation
form, if either the Construct-Kernel or the Construct-Nucleolus
problem can be solved in polynomial time, then Construct-Bargaining-
set can also be solved in polynomial time.
4.2 Decisiveness and Strongness
In this section we solve several open complexity problems related to both
the IsDecisive and the IsStrong problems for simple games. Recall by
Definition 2.23 that a simple game is decisive if and only if it is proper and
strong. The main results are illustrated in bold in Table 4.3, where the
question mark remains as a conjecture.
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Simple games Regular Weighted
Problem EWF MWF VWRF SWF WRF
Properties of simple games
IsProper P P coNPC P coNPC
IsStrong P coNPC coNPC coNPC coNPC
IsDecisive P QP coNPC QP? coNPC
Table 4.3: New complexity results for decisiveness of simple games.
The main result of the following Section 4.2.1 is Theorem 4.3, that solves
a conjecture given by [92], which suggested that the IsDecisive problem
for simple games in MWF, rather than QP, was coNP-complete.
In Section 4.2.2 we provide some results regarding weighted games. Given
a simple game in MWF, we design an algorithm to decide in polynomial time
whether the game is weighted or not. With some slight modifications, we
can also decide in polynomial time whether the game is homogeneous or not.
By using the first algorithm, we can also decide in polynomial time whether
the game is majority—i.e., weighted and decisive—or sub-majority—i.e.,
weighted and strong. Thus, Theorem 4.5 solves another conjecture given
by [92], which suggested that this last problem, rather than polynomial,
was coNP-complete.
Finally, in Section 4.2.3 we show a polynomial-time reduction from the
IsDecisive (resp. IsStrong) problem for simple games in MWF to the
IsDecisive (resp. IsStrong) problem for regular games in SWF. Thus,
we prove that the IsStrong problem for regular games in SWF is coNP-
complete, and the IsDecisive problem is most probably not coNP-complete,
but probably belongs to QP.
4.2.1 Decisiveness for Simple Games
In this subsection we establish the equivalence among the IsDecisive prob-
lem and the duality problem for hypergraphs. We show that decisiveness
can naturally be represented in the context of hypergraph theory, in such a
way that it can be decided for simple games in quasi-polynomial time.
Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game, note from Definition 2.7 that W is a
hypergraph over N with ν(W) = W and µ(W) = Wm. Thus, the amount
of information needed to specify Γ is given by the size n · |µ(W)| of µ(W).
Note also that L = ¬(τ(W)) is the set of losing coalitions, and the simple
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game (N, τ(W)) corresponds to the dual game of (N,W).
Moreover, the properties of hypergraphs presented in Definition 2.8 are
closely related to some properties of simple games.
Lemma 4.1. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game, then:
• Γ is proper iff (W,W) is coherent iff (µ(W), µ(W)) is coherent,
• Γ is strong iff (W,W) is complete iff (µ(W), µ(W)) is complete,
• Γ is decisive iff (W,W) is dual iff (µ(W), µ(W)) is dual.
Proof. Just note that:
(W,W) is coherent iff ν(W) ⊆ τ(W) iff W ⊆ τ(W), i.e. iff Γ is proper.
(W,W) is complete iff ν(W) ⊇ τ(W) iff W ⊇ τ(W), i.e. iff Γ is strong.
(W,W) is dual iff ν(W) = τ(W) iff W = τ(W), i.e. iff Γ is decisive.
Example 4.1. In projective geometry, the Fano Plane is the smallest pro-
jective plane. It was introduced in simple game theory by [225] to define a
subclass of simple games called finite projective games. Since then, it has
been very much studied, due to it has special properties that make it a
likely counterexample for different results—for instance, without going into
details, it is the only non-partition game with the same number of mini-
mal winning coalitions and players [246]—as well as a case in which some
properties turn out to be the same—for instance, its reactive bargaining set
coincides with its kernel [106].
Observe that the Fano Plane can be represented by a hypergraph H over
N = {1, . . . , 7}, with seven evenly distributed hyperedges represented by the
following incidence matrix.
N 1234567
H 0000111
0011010
0101100
0110001
1001001
1010100
1100010
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It is easy to check that µ(H) = H and prove that (H,H) is coherent. It
is more difficult to prove the completeness of this pair—see the next Theo-
rem 4.3—but in fact it is dual. So the game (N, ν(H)) is proper and strong,
i.e., decisive. In addition, note that by its symmetry it is neither regular nor
linear.
It is well known that the IsProper problem can be solved in polynomial
time. In the context of hypergraphs, this is also clear because since ν is
monotone, (H,H) is coherent if and only if for all X,Z ∈ H, X ∩ Z 6= ∅, a
condition that can be verified in polynomial time.
Furthermore, it is known that the problem of deciding whether a pair
of hypergraphs (H,K) is complete is coNP-complete [215]. Since there is a
polynomial-time reduction from this problem to the same problem for the
case when H = K [84], then we conclude that the IsStrong problem for
simple games in MWF is also coNP-complete. Another proof for this last
result in simple games was shown in [92].
In turn, the IsDecisive problem for simple games in MWF belongs
to QP, since the duality of a pair of hypergraphs (H,H) can be decided
in quasi-polynomial time [84]. Thus, from all the above we conclude the
following.
Theorem 4.3. For simple games in MWF, the IsProper problem belongs
to P, the IsStrong problem is coNP-complete, and the IsDecisive problem
belongs to QP.
Note that the IsDecisive problem is most probably not NP-hard, unless
any NP-complete problem can be solved in quasi-polynomial time. But note
also that the mentioned quasi-polynomial algorithm does not allow us to
generate λ(H) = µ(τ(H)) in sub-exponential time, since |λ(H)| can not be
quasi-polynomially bounded by |µ(H)|. To prove this statement, consider
the following example.
Example 4.2. Let be N ′ = {1, . . . ,m} with m ∈ N, n = 2m and further
H = {{2i − 1, 2i} | i ∈ N ′}. Therefore, the irredundant transversals of H
are λ(H) = {X ⊆ N | for all i ∈ N ′, either 2i − 1 ∈ X or 2i ∈ X}. So
|H| = m, but |λ(H)| = 2m.
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Algorithm 7 DecideWeighted
Input: A simple game in MWF represented by a hypergraph H = µ(W).
Output: If the game is weighted, return “Yes”; otherwise “No”.
1: if H is not linear, return “No”;
2: Determine a linear ordering of N which makes H regular;
3: Generate J = ¬(λ(H));
4: if there is not exists a weighted representation [q;w1, . . . , wn] s.t.:
for all X ∈ H, w(X)≥ q;
for all Y ∈ J , w(Y ) ≤ q − 1;
for all i ∈ N , wi ≥ 0;
return “No”;
5: return “Yes”.
4.2.2 Decisiveness and Strongness for Weighted Games
The following result was firstly proved in the context of threshold functions.
Now we provide a proof related to hypergraphs and simple games.
Theorem 4.4. [209] For simple games in MWF, deciding whether it is
weighted or not, can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Let us consider Algorithm 7. It is well known that steps 1 and 2 can
be computed in polynomial time [163]. For step 3 we can use the algorithm
provided in [210], that given H = µ(W), it generates λ(H) in linear time and
at the same time proves that |λ(H)| ≤ n·|H|+1. Finally, step 4 only demands
the solution of a system of linear inequalities, which can also be found in
polynomial time [138]. Therefore, since each step can be accomplished in
polynomial time, this algorithm runs in polynomial time. Finally, as the
weighted games are the simple games that admit a representation in WRF,
the algorithm is correct and it proves the theorem.
Slightly modifying Algorithm 7, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.1. For simple games in MWF, deciding whether it is homoge-
neous or not, can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Just replace in Algorithm 7 the first inequation of step 4 by the
equation w(X) = q.
Based on the same idea of Algorithm 7, we have also the following result.
Theorem 4.5. For simple games in MWF, deciding whether it is majority—
i.e., weighted and decisive—or not, can be done in polynomial time.
102 – Chapter 4. Computational Problems
Algorithm 8 DecideMajority
Input: A simple game in MWF represented by a hypergraph H = µ(W).
Output: If the game is majority, return “Yes”; otherwise “No”.
1: if H is not linear, return “No”;
2: Generate K = λ(H);
3: if K 6= H return “No”;
4: if there is not exists a weighted representation [q;w1, . . . , wn] s.t.:
for all X ∈ H, w(X)≥ q;
for all Y ∈ ¬(K), w(Y ) ≤ q − 1;
for all i ∈ N , wi ≥ 0;
return “No”;
5: return “Yes”.
Proof. Let us consider Algorithm 8. The procedure to decide whether the
game is weighted is the same as the one given by Algorithm 7. Therefore,
we need to prove that the algorithm solves IsDecisive in polynomial time.
Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game. By the proof of Lemma 4.1 we know
that Γ is decisive if and only if τ(W) = W. By Definition 2.7, applying
the operator µ on the expression we obtain λ(W) = µ(W). Moreover, it is
easy to see that λ(µ(W)) = λ(W). Therefore, we can decide IsDecisive
through the following question: Is λ(H) = H? which is equivalent to the
two conditions given above. This question is addressed in the opposite way
in step 3. Therefore, the algorithm is correct, and since the operators can
be computed here in polynomial time [210], then it proves the theorem.
Slightly modifying Algorithm 8, we also obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.6. For simple games in MWF, deciding whether it is sub-
majority—i.e., weighted and strong—or not, can be done in polynomial
time.
Proof. Note that a simple game is strong if and only if τ(W) ⊆ W if and only
if λ(W) ⊆ µ(W). Therefore, in the same vein than the proof of Theorem 4.5,
we can decide IsStrong through the following question: Is λ(H) ⊆ ν(H)?
This question is addressed in the opposite way by replacing in Algorithm 8
the inequality K 6= H of step 3 by K 6⊆ ν(H). Thus, the algorithm is correct,
and as in the previous theorem, it can be computed in polynomial time.
It is known that up to eight players—see Table 4.5—all the simple games
which are regular and decisive are also majority games. This implies that
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step 4 of Algorithm 8 is unnecessary in these cases, because the answer
would always be “Yes”. However, from nine players onwards, this is not
always true. Indeed, it is known that for n = 9 there are 319124 regular and
decisive games [144], but only 175428 majority games [190].
4.2.3 Decisiveness and Strongness for Regular Games
In this section we study both the IsStrong and IsDecisive problems for
regular games given in SWF. We consider a decreasing lexicographical order
of the players, so that N = {n, . . . , 1}.
Lemma 4.2. Let Γ = (N,Ws) be a regular game in SWF and Z ⊆ N .
Deciding whether Z ∈ W or Z ∈ L can be done in polynomial time in
function of the size of Γ.
Proof. Given a coalition Z, consider its associated integer vector z¯—see
Section 3.2. If there is some X ∈ Ws such that x¯ ≤ z¯, then Z is win-
ning; otherwise, it is losing. Note that this candidate can be computed in
polynomial time when Ws is given.
From the above result, we have the following.
Lemma 4.3. Given a regular game in SWF, the IsProper problem can be
solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Let be Γ = (N,Ws), for all X ∈ Ws, if N \X ∈ L—by Lemma 4.2
this can be determined in polynomial time—then by monotonicity the com-
plement N \ Z of every coalition Z with X ⊆ Z will be losing too.
Now we define some concepts related to the increasing-shift presented in
Definition 2.38.
Definition 4.1. A left-shift on X is either an increasing-shift specified by a
pair (a, b) ∈ N \X ×X such that a = b+ 1; or, if 1 ∈ N \X, a replacement
of X by X ∪ {1}.
We use X ⊆′ Z to denote the fact that there exists a sequence of left-
shifts that can be applied on X to produce Z. Note that this relation ⊆′ is a
variation of the desirability relation, and it can also be decided in polynomial
time.
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Lemma 4.4. Given X,Z ⊆ N , we can decide whether X ⊆′ Z in time
polynomial in n.
Proof. Given X,Z ⊆ N , X ⊆′ Z if and only if, for any a ∈ N , we have
|{b ∈ X | a  b}| ≤ |{b ∈ Z | a  b}|. If X ⊆′ Z, then the stated
inequalities evidently hold. If the inequalities hold, then starting from X we
can always perform a sequence of left-shifts that preserve the inequalities to
finally produce Z.
Note also that if X ⊆ Z then X ⊆′ Z, i.e., ⊆′ is a monotone variation of
the relation ⊆. Further, the complement of ⊆′—as for ⊆—is antitone, i.e.,
if X ⊆′ Z then N \ Z ⊆′ N \X.
From the above, we can define the operators ν ′, τ ′, µ′, λ′ like the already
familiar ν, τ, µ, λ—see Definition 2.7—but with the relation ⊆′ instead of ⊆.
For instance, given H ⊆ P(N), τ ′(H) = {Z ⊆ N | for all X ∈ H, X 6⊆′
N \ Z}, and µ′(W) = {X ∈ W | for all Z ∈ W, Z 6⊂′ X} yields the shift-
minimal winning coalitions of the given game.
Observe that, given a hypergraphW over N , it holds thatW ⊆ ν(W) ⊆
ν ′(W), so (N,W) is a regular game if and only if ν ′(W) = W. Therefore,
ν ′(W) = ν(W) = W is equivalent to ν ′(W) ⊆ W, and hence regular games
are ⊆′-monotone games, as simple games are ⊆-monotone games.
Note also that if Γ is regular, then τ(W) = τ ′(W), so its dual game
(N, τ(W)) is regular too.
Lemma 4.5. Let Γ = (N,W) be a regular game:
• Γ is proper if and only if ν ′(W) ⊆ τ ′(W);
• Γ is strong if and only if ν ′(W) ⊇ τ ′(W); and
• Γ is decisive if and only if ν ′(W) = τ ′(W).
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 4.1 and the variations of the operators
based on the relation ⊆′.
For all the following results, we present a transformation T that from a
simple game, it produces a regular game over an expanded grand coalition.
We will show that this function reduces the IsDecisive problem for simple
games to the same problem for regular games, and further, this reduction
can be computed in polynomial time.
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Definition 4.2. Let N = {n, . . . , 1} and N ′ = {2n, 2n − 1, . . . , 2, 1}. Let
P(N) be ordered according to ⊆ and P(N ′) be ordered according to ⊆′.
Let T : P(N) → P(N ′) be a function such that given X ⊆ N and a ∈ N ,
2a ∈ T (X) if and only if a ∈ X, and 2a − 1 ∈ T (X) if and only if a /∈ X.
For any a ∈ N , let Za = {2a} ∪ {{2b − 1 | b ∈ N, a  b} ⊆ N ′ and let
G′ = {Za | a ∈ N} ⊆ P(N ′).
This definitions are applied later in Example 4.3. Note that T is an
injective function, and for all X,Z ⊆ N , X ⊆ Z if and only if T (X) ⊆′ T (Z).
Furthermore, the image T (P(N)) = {T (X) | X ⊆ N} of P(N) contains
only the coalitions X ′ ∈ P(N ′) such that, for all a ∈ N , either satisfy 2a ∈
X ′ or 2a− 1 ∈ X ′. Hence, if we restrict the codomain of the transformation
to T (P(N)), then T becomes bijective, i.e., what is called an isomorphism.
Lemma 4.6. For the transformation T and the set of coalitions G′ defined
above, it always holds that ν ′(G′) ∪ T (P(N)) = τ ′(G′).
Proof. If X ′ ∈ ν ′(G′) ∪ T (P(N)) and a ∈ N , then X ′ 6⊆′ N ′ \ Za, because
|{b′ ∈ X ′ | 2a− 1  b′}| > n− a = |{b′ ∈ N ′ \ Za | 2a− 1  b′}|. Therefore,
ν ′(G′) ∪ T (P(N)) ⊆ τ ′(G′).
Now it remains to prove that ν ′(G′) ∪ T (P(N)) ⊇ τ ′(G′). Note that this
inclusion is equivalent to P(N ′) \T (P(N)) ⊆ ν ′(G′)∪ ν ′(¬(G′)). Given Z ′ ∈
P(N ′) \ T (P(N)), let a ∈ N be maximal such that either {2a, 2a− 1} ⊆ Z ′
or {2a, 2a− 1} ∩ Z ′ = ∅. If the first holds, then Za ⊆′ Z ′; and if the second
one holds, then N ′ \ Za ⊆′ Z ′.
Now we are able to present the following key result, that applies the
transformation T on hypergraphs.
Lemma 4.7. Let be H,K ⊆ P(N) two hypergraphs, H′ = {T (X) | X ∈ H}
and K′ = {T (Y ) | Y ∈ K}, then:
• (H,K) is coherent if and only if (H′ ∪ G′,K′ ∪ G′) is coherent; and
• (H,K) is complete if and only if (H′ ∪ G′,K′ ∪ G′) is complete.
Proof. According to Definition 2.8 and Lemma 4.5, for the first statement
we need to prove that ν(H) ⊆ τ(K) if and only if ν ′(H′ ∪ G′) ⊆ τ ′(K′ ∪ G′).
Note that ν(H) ⊆ τ(K) if and only if X 6⊆ N \ Y , for all (X,Y ) ∈ H × K;
i.e., if and only if X ′ 6⊆′ N ′ \ Y ′, for all (X ′, Y ′) ∈ H′ × K′; i.e., if and
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only if ν ′(H′) ⊆ τ ′(K′). Moreover, Lemma 4.6 implies ν ′(G′) ⊆ τ ′(G′),
ν ′(H′) ⊆ τ ′(G′) and ν ′(G′) ⊆ τ ′(K′). So we completed the proof of the first
statement.
Analogously, for the second statement we prove that ν(H) ⊇ τ(K) if
and only if ν ′(H′ ∪ G′) ⊇ τ ′(K′ ∪ G′). Note that ν(H) ⊇ τ(K) if and only if
Z ∈ ν(H), for all Z ∈ P(N) with N \Z /∈ ν(K); i.e., if and only if Z ∈ ν(H′),
for all Z ′ ∈ T (P(N)) with N ′ \ Z ′ /∈ ν ′(K′). And since Z ∈ ν(G′) for all
Z ′ ∈ P(N ′) \ T (P(N)) with N ′ \ Z ′ /∈ ν ′(G′), we have proved the second
statement.
From Lemma 4.7, we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.7. For regular games given in SWF, the IsStrong problem
is coNP-complete. If the IsDecisive problem can be solved in polynomial
time for regular games in SWF, then the IsDecisive problem for simple
games in MWF will be also polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. The IsDecisive (resp. IsStrong) problem for simple games (N,W)
can polynomially be reduced to the IsDecisive (resp. IsStrong) problem
for regular games (N ′,W ′), specified by their shift-minimal winning coali-
tions µ′(W ′): Just apply the reduction T by setting H = K = W, and
considering that |G′| ≤ |N |.
This theorem translate the “bad news” of classical duality theory—
i.e., the NP-completeness of the IsStrong problem—to corresponding “bad
news” for the regular duality theory. However, it would also guaranty that
“good news” for the regular case—i.e., a possible polynomial-time algorithm
for the IsDecisive problem—translate to corresponding “good news” for
the classical theory.
Observe that, considering regular games in SWF rather than MWF, the
polynomial-time results of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 do not hold any more.
Moreover, we do not know if the IsDecisive problem for regular games in
SWF can be solved in quasi-polynomial time. This problem remains open.
Recalling that T (P(N)) ∩ ν ′(G′) = ∅, we immediately get the following.
Corollary 4.2. GivenH ⊆ P(N), let K = λ(H), H′ = {T (X) | X ∈ H} and
K′ = {T (Y ) | Y ∈ K}. Then K′ ⊆ λ′(H′ ∪ G′) = µ′(K′ ∪ G′). Furthermore,
λ(H) can be obtained from λ′(H′ ∪ G′).
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Suppose that for any regular game in SWF, starting with H′ = µ′(W)
we could determine K′ = λ′(W) in time polynomially bounded by the input
plus output size n · (|H′|+ |K′|). This does not contradict Corollary 4.2; but
according to Lemma 4.7 it would imply that all the so much investigated
decision problems, that until now are only known to be quasi-polynomial,
are in fact polynomial.
Let us now apply Corollary 4.2 in a pair of hypergraphs (H,K) that
represents a simple game in SWF.
Example 4.3. Reconsider Example 4.2 at the end of Section 4.2.1, where
I = {m, . . . , 1}, N = {2m, 2m − 1, . . . , 2, 1}, H = {{2i, 2i − 1} | i ∈ I}
and K = {Y ⊆ N | for all i ∈ I, either 2i ∈ Y or 2i − 1 ∈ Y }. Then
|G′| = 2m, so |H′ ∪ G′| = 3m. Therefore, with k = 3m, |H′ ∪ G′| = k and
|λ′(H′ ∪ G′)| ≥ |K′| = ck, where c = 21/3 > 1; so the size of the hypergraph
λ′(H′∪G′) grows exponentially in the size of µ′(H′∪G′). The following table
presents the case m = 2.
N 4321
H 1100
0011
K 1010
1001
0110
0101
N ′ 87654321
H′ 10100101
01011010
K′ 10011001
10010110
01101001
01100110
Z4 11000000
Z3 01110000
Z2 01011100
Z1 01010111
This also proves that for regular games in SWF, |λ′(W)| can grow expo-
nentially in function of |µ′(W)|; although |λ(W)| can be bounded linearly
in function of |µ(W)| [209]. This result was already proven before, using
different techniques, in Corollary 3 of [56].
4.3 Other Parameters and Properties
In this section we study the computational complexity of some parameters
and properties for simple games. The main results are illustrated in bold in
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Table 4.4.
Simple games Regular Weighted
Problem EWF MWF VWRF SWF WRF
Properties of players
IsDummy P P coNPC coNP coNPC
Parameters
Width P P P P P
Coleman’s power P #PC #PC ? #PC
Chow parameters P #PC #PC ? #PC
Table 4.4: New complexity results for properties of players and parameters
of simple games.
The Width problem has been considered explicitly open for simple
games in EWF and MWF [10]. In Section 4.3.1 we show that both cases can
be computed in polynomial time. In that section we also define and analyze
two new parameters called strict width and strict length. They are closely
related to the strict and the width, so for all the considered cases, they can
also be computed in polynomial time.
Finally, in Section 4.3.2 we propose an approach to the study of the
IsDummy problem for regular games in SWF.
4.3.1 The Width of a Simple Game
Let Γ be a simple game, recall from Definition 2.25 that the parameter
width(Γ) = min{|X| | N \X ∈ L}.
Note that whether a given simple game Γ is strong, then for all Y ∈ L,
N \Y ∈ W, so therefore, the width only can be the cardinality of a winning
coalition, i.e., the width is the same that the length: length(Γ) = min{|X| |
X ∈ W}.
Lemma 4.8. Let Γ be a simple game, width(Γ) = n−max{|X| | X ∈ L}.
Proof. Let be Z ⊆ N such that |Z| = min{|X| | N \X ∈ L}. If Z ∈ L, then
|N \Z| = max{|X| | X ∈ L}, and due to n = |Z|+ |N \Z|, the lemma holds.
If Z ∈ W, then it also holds that |N \ Z| = max{|X| | X ∈ L}, because if
there exists Y ∈ L with |Y | > |N \ Z|, this implies that |N \ Y | < |Z|, a
contradiction.
Now we define two new parameters.
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Definition 4.3. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game:
• The strict length of Γ is the minimum cardinality from which all the
coalitions are winning, i.e.,
slength(Γ) = min{k ∈ N | Pk(N) ⊆ W}.
• The strict width of Γ is the complement of the maximum cardinality
to which all coalitions are losing, i.e.,
swidth(Γ) = n−max{k ∈ N | Pk(N) ⊆ L}.
So we have the following.
Lemma 4.9. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game, then:
• width(Γ) = n+ 1− slength(Γ), and
• length(Γ) = n+ 1− swidth(Γ).
Proof. For the first sentence, by Definition 4.3 and Lemma 4.8, we need to
prove that slength(Γ) = max{|X| | X ∈ L}+ 1. Let be k ∈ N, suppose that
k = slength(Γ). Then for all Y ∈ L, |Y | < k. Further, there exists at least
one Y ∈ L with |Y | = k − 1, because otherwise slength(Γ) would be k − 1,
a contradiction. Therefore, max{|X| | X ∈ L}+ 1 = k − 1 + 1 = k.
For the second sentence, we need to prove that swidth(Γ) = n + 1 −
min{|X| | X ∈ W}. Now suppose that k = n − swidth(Γ). Then for all
X ∈ W, |X| > k. Further, there exists at least one X ∈ W with |X| = k+1,
because otherwise swidth(Γ) would be k + 1, a contradiction. Therefore,
n+ 1−min{|X| | X ∈ W} = n+ 1− (k + 1) = n− k.
From the above we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.8. Let Γ be a simple game in EWF or MWF, the problems
Length, Width, sLength and sWidth can be computed in polynomial
time.
Proof. Note that Length can trivially be computed in polynomial time.
Therefore, as length(Γ) = n+1−swidth(Γ), sWidth can also be computed
in polynomial time. Let k = slength(Γ). Observe that, by definition, all
the coalitions with k players are winning in Γ but at least one coalition with
cardinality k−1 is losing. Therefore, there is a MWC with cardinality k and
there are no MWCs with cardinality k+ 1. Thus, computing k is equivalent
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to compute the maximum cardinality of a MWC. The last quantity can be
obtained in polynomial time from a description of Wm, so sLength can be
computed in polynomial time. Finally, as width(Γ) = n + 1 − slength(Γ),
Width can be computed in polynomial time.
Moreover, for regular games in SWF it holds an analogous result.
Theorem 4.9. Let Γ be a regular game in SWF, the problems Length,
Width, sLength and sWidth can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. If the game has a shift-minimal winning coalition {1, . . . , k} ∈ Ws,
with k ≤ n, then slength(Γ) = k, because for any other coalition Z ∈ Pk(N),
it holds that X  Z. Otherwise, slength(Γ) = max{|X| | X ∈ Ws} + 1,
because for all Z ∈ Ws, {1, . . . , |Z|}  Z, but {1, . . . , |Z|} /∈ Ws. The
remaining results are clear from Lemma 4.9 and the fact that Length here
can also trivially be computed in polynomial time.
4.3.2 Dummy Players in Regular Games
The following is an approach to the study of the IsDummy problem for
regular games in SWF. Let Γ be a simple game, recall that a player i ∈ N
is dummy when it does not belong to any MWC.
Since Ws(Γ) ⊆ Wm(Γ), it is clear that if for all X ∈ Wm, i /∈ X, then
for all X ∈ Ws, i /∈ X. Hence, if there exists some X ∈ Ws such that i ∈ X,
then i is not dummy. Furthermore, we have the following.
Lemma 4.10. Let Γ = (N,Ws) be a regular game in SWF. Given X ∈ Ws,
i ∈ X and j /∈ X with i ≺ j, deciding whether X \ {i} ∪ {j} is a MWC can
be done in polynomial time.
Proof. We know by definition that Z = X \ {i}∪ {j} is a winning coalition.
Therefore, Z is a MWC if and only if for all h ∈ N , Z \ {h} ∈ L; and by
Lemma 4.2, we know that deciding Z \ {h} ∈ L can be done in polynomial
time.
From the above we have the following result.
Lemma 4.11. For regular games in SWF, the IsDummy problem belongs
to coNP.
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Proof. We can decide whether i is dummy by checking if for every shift-
minimal winning coalition X and for every Z ⊆ N obtained by increasing-
shifts from X, Z is not a MWF.
In despite of the above, the number of permutations required to decide
whether a player is dummy can be exponential in the size of the input, so it
is possible that given a regular game in SWF, the IsDummy problem could
not be solved in polynomial time. In remains open to prove whether for
regular games in SWF, IsDummy is coNP-hard.
4.4 Counting and Enumerating Results
In this section we focus on the study of counting and enumerating specific
subclasses of simple games.
In Section 4.4.1 we survey the main known results related to the counting
of the members of subclasses of simple games, and we present some known
approaches to enumerate subclasses of simple games. In Section 4.4.2 we
propose a new strategy to enumerate decisive regular games. We use an
experimental approach. Although the correctness of the algorithm has not
yet been formally proved, the correctness of the algorithm has been vali-
dated experimentally for the considered cases. By using these ideas, we can
correctly enumerate all the decisive regular games up to eight players.
4.4.1 Known Results
The numbers of simple games in the subclasses defined in Chapter 3 are
summarized in Table 4.5. The references on the second last column show
the details of how the last value of the corresponding sequence was obtained.
The last column shows the sequence numbers according to the Online En-
cyclopedia of Integer Sequences (OEIS) [238]. Further, most of the question
marks refer to really difficult open combinatorial problems. In what follows
we explain some general aspects about those results. It is important to re-
mark that the counting of both the Dedekind numbers—i.e., the number of
simple games— and the decisive games consider all the isomorphic games
obtained by permutation of players. However, since in regular and weighted
games the grand coalition is ordered, the remaining sequences of the table
are up to isomorphism, i.e., the isomorphic games are counted only once.
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Number of players
Subclass 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Simple games 3 6 20 168 7,581 7,828,354 2,414,682,040,998
↪→ Regular 3 5 10 27 119 1,173 44,315
↪→ Weighted 3 5 10 27 119 1,113 29,375
↪→ Homogeneous 1 3 8 23 76 293 1,307
↪→ Decisive 1 2 4 12 81 2,646 1,422,564
↪→ Regular 1 1 2 3 7 21 135
↪→ Weighted 1 1 2 3 7 21 135
Number of players
Subclass 8 9
Simple games 56,130,437,228,687,557,907,788 ?
↪→ Regular 16,175,190 284,432,730,176
↪→ Weighted 2,730,166 989,913,346
↪→ Homogeneous 6,642 37,882
↪→ Decisive 229,809,982,112 423,295,099,074,735,261,880
↪→ Regular 2,470 319,124
↪→ Weighted 2,470 175,428
Number of players
Subclass 10 Reference OEIS
Simple games ? [267] A000372
↪→ Regular ? [91] A132183
↪→ Weighted ? [248, 146] A000617
↪→ Homogeneous 239,490 [144] (n = 9) A189359
↪→ Decisive ? [38] A001206
↪→ Regular 1,214,554,343 [141] A109456
↪→ Weighted 52,980,624 [190] (n = 9) A001532
Table 4.5: Results of counting the number of members for subclasses of
simple games.
Note that the enumeration problems require an additional computational
effort than the counting problems, in order to represent explicitly the games
that are enumerated. As a matter of fact, the last values of the sequences of
Table 4.5 are obtained through counting algorithms, but usually the mem-
bers of the respective subclasses have not been yet explicitly enumerated.
The number of simple games up to 4 players—including trivial games—
were counted in 1897 by Dedekind [58]. The Dedekind number for n = 5 was
discovered in 1940 [47], and for n = 6 in 1946 [260]. The next number was
found in 1965 [48] and rediscovered again in 1976 [20]. The largest known
Dedekind number, for n = 8, was found in 1991 by Wiedemann [267], using
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a similar method than in [20]. All these numbers were found in the context
of order theory, using mathematical methods and enumerating the members
of free distributive lattices defined over n generators.
It is well known that the number of members of a free distributive lattice
is equivalent to the number of simple games. The definition of free distribu-
tive lattices generated by n elements, as we know it, was firstly introduced
by Skolem in 1931 [237], being even older than the explicit definition of
simple games of von Neumann and Morgenstern [258]. Furthermore, the
Dedekind numbers also describe the number of monotone Boolean functions
on n variables, the number of labeled Sperner families on n vertices, and the
number of antichains in the power set of a grand coalition [274].
The decisive games up to 4 players were illustrated in 1897 by Dedekind,
as the self-dual members of the free distributive lattices [58]. For 5 play-
ers they were counted in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgenstern [258].
For 6 players in 1959 by Gurk and Isbell [109]. For 7 players in 1992 by
Loeb [156]—see also [24]—and for 8 players in 1995 by Loeb and Con-
way [157], requiring only twelve minutes of computation. This latter result
takes advantages of symmetrical combinatorial structures called maximal
intersecting families (MIFs), which allow us to skip the redundant and au-
tomorphic games. The number of decisive games for 9 players was published
in 2013 by Brouwer et al. [38], and it was obtained through the counting of
independent sets in a sparse graph; computation time is not mentioned in
this case.
Regular games up to 8 players and decisive regular games up to 9 players
were counted in 1995 by Krohn and Sudho¨lter [144]. The authors not only
found the numbers but also enumerate the games. Their idea was to use
linear programming in order to enumerate regular games represented as lat-
tices formed by its shift-minimal winning coalitions. Taking advantage that
these lattices are rank-symmetric—i.e. the complement of a shift-winning
coalition on one level of the lattice is on their opposite side—the resulting
algorithms are faster, but they require a lot of memory, and that is why
they cannot enumerate games with larger number of players.
The number of regular games for 9 players was found in 2010 by Freixas
and Molinero [91]—see also [90, 93]. As above, they also enumerate the
regular games, allowing to verify the games that are weighted. Thus, they
are also able to enumerate weighted games in WRF. Their idea is to char-
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acterize the regular games in a form of representation slightly less succinct
than SWF. Thus, they generate the regular games, by using a brute-force
mechanism, not avoiding repetitions of isomorphic games. From this point,
they start a classification of weighted games. By using known upper bounds
for the weights of the weighted games [187, 102] they minimize the num-
ber of inequalities required to define these games—in a similar way than
expression (3.2) in Section 3.3.1—and then solve the obtained systems of
linear inequalities by using linear programming. Unfortunately, these re-
duced systems of linear inequalities may also have an exponential number
of restrictions, becoming in the main obstacle of this method.
The number of decisive regular games for 10 players was computed in
2008 by Knuth [141]. The first counting is based on regular games in a form
of representation similar to SWF, and the second one on binary decision
diagrams. In [146, 147] it is proposed an algorithm which counts cliques—
subsets of an undirected graph such that every pair of nodes is connected
by an edge—and establishes a bijection among these cliques and the reg-
ular games, achieving excellent results in computational speed to counting
regular games.
The first serious approaches for counting weighted games are in the con-
text of Boolean functions, i.e., have to do with counting threshold Boolean
functions. Those functions were counted up to 6 players in 1959 by Muroga
et al. [188], and for 7 players in 1964 by Winder [269]—see also [270, 62].
In 1967 Muroga et al. published several results counting threshold Boolean
functions and subclasses of them by using linear programming. Among other
results, the authors succeed to count the number of weighted games up to
8 players [190]. Several years later, in the context of simple game theory,
first Tautenhahn in 2008 on his Master’s thesis [248], and then Kurz [146]
in 2011, count the number of weighted games for 9 players, again by using
linear programming methods.
Regarding decisive weighted games, they were explicitly given up to 5
players in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgenstern [258], for 6 players in 1959
by Isbell and Gurk [109], and for 7 players in the same year by Isbell [125].
In the above mentioned result of Muroga et al. in 1967, they count the
number of decisive weighted games up to 9 players [190]. The number of
decisive weighted games for 10 players was given in OEIS by W. Lan—
sequence A001532 [238]—but it is not documented how the author found
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this number.
Finally, regarding homogeneous games, they can be counted by using
brute force mechanisms for a larger number of players. Besides the 239, 490
homogeneous games for 10 players showed on Table 4.5, we know that there
are 1, 661, 564 homogeneous games for n = 11, and 12, 548, 067 for n = 12.
The sequence could probably be extended. Moreover, Sudho¨lter provided in
1989 an explicit recursive formula to count them [244]. The author repre-
sents homogeneous games as step functions—i.e., a piecewise constant func-
tion with a finite number of pieces—in such a way that these games can
be counted and enumerated. The number of homogeneous games up to 9
players was presented in 1995 by Krohn and Sudho¨lter [144]. In that paper
the authors are not interested into count the homogeneous games for larger
number of players. However, by using the mentioned recursive formula of
Sudho¨lter, it could be possible to extend the counting results.
4.4.2 Enumerating Decisive Regular Games
In this section we propose a new strategy to enumerate decisive regular
games, motivated by the Master thesis of Riquelme, which was supervised
by Polyme´ris [227]. The main idea is to define a free distributive lattice on n
generators, where each member is a decisive regular game in SWF. In what
follows we consider a decreasing lexicographical order of the players, so that
N = {n, . . . , 1}.
The construction of the lattice attempts to ensure that all the decisive
regular games with n players belong to it, and also that the games are
never repeated. Furthermore, all the games are located into the lattice
in such a way that each one of them can be recognized by its neighbors.
The analogous lattice on n + 1 generators can be obtained constructively
by expanding the domain of the existing games, and then obtaining from
them all the missing games. The new games should be located into the new
lattice, being connected to all the games from which they can be generated.
The main obstacle of this process is the exponential increase in the size
of the lattices, in terms of n. However, this can be considered an intrinsic
complexity of the problem, and the complexity should be analyzed in terms
of the output size. Therefore, the efficiency of the algorithm must be based
mainly on two aspects: first, that it does not generate replicated games;
and second, that in order to generate the new lattice, the algorithm does
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not have to access to the elements of the original lattice more than once.
We start with the following definition.
Definition 4.4. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game and let Z ⊆ N . We say
that Γ responds to Z if either there exists X ∈ W with X ⊆ Z, or there
exists Y ∈ L with Z ⊆ Y .
Note that a simple game is strong if and only if it responds to all Z ⊆ N .
For regular games in SWF, we know that the IsProper problem belongs
to P but the IsStrong problem is coNP-complete—see Lemma 4.3 and
Theorem 4.7, respectively. As we want to enumerate regular games which are
decisive—i.e., proper and strong—it is important to avoid the computation
of the IsStrong problem. For this purpose we introduce the following.
Definition 4.5. A regular game is boring if for all X ∈ Wm, 1 /∈ X.
Note that every regular game with 1 /∈ X, for all X ∈ Ws, is boring. The
following result characterizes strong regular games from proper and boring
regular games.
Lemma 4.12. Let Γ be a proper and boring regular game. If for all Z ⊆ N
with 1 /∈ Z, Γ responds to Z, then Γ is strong, and therefore decisive.
Proof. Let Z ⊆ N with 1 ∈ Z and let Z ′ = Z \ {1}. If there exists X ∈ W
with X ⊆ Z ′, then it is clear that X ⊆ Z. If there exists Y ∈ L with Z ′ ⊆ Y ,
then Z  Y , so therefore Z ∈ L. Thus, Γ responds to Z.
For what follows we need an additional definition.
Definition 4.6. Let Γ be a regular game and X ∈ Ws(Γ). The set of im-
mediate successors of X is the set α(X) = {Z ⊆ N | X ≺ Z and for all Y ⊆
N with X ≺ Y  Z, then Y = Z}.
Now we prove that from any decisive regular game we can obtain a boring
decisive regular game. Recall that for decisive games, the complement of any
winning coalition is losing, and vice versa.
Lemma 4.13. Every decisive regular game produces a boring decisive reg-
ular game.
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Algorithm 9 BDRGfromDRG
Input: Decisive regular game Γ = (N,Ws) in SWF.
Output: Boring decisive regular game Γ′ = (N,Ws′) in SWF.
1: repeat
2: if for all X ∈ Ws, 1 /∈ X, return Γ′ = Γ;
3: Choose X ∈ Ws with 1 ∈ X;
4: Define X ′ = N \X;
5: Ws =Ws \ {X} ∪ α(X);
6: Ws =Ws \ {Z ∈ Ws | X ′  Z} ∪ {X ′}.
Proof. We prove that by exchanging winning coalitions by its complemen-
tary losing coalitions, we can provide a construction that from any decisive
regular game produces a boring decisive regular game. See Algorithm 9.
Step 5 converts a shift-minimal winning coalition that contains the player 1
into a losing coalition, in such a way that the game continues responding as
many coalitions as possible. Step 6 brings the complementary losing coali-
tion X ′ into the set of shift-minimal winning coalitions, and removes from
Ws those coalitions Z so that Z  X ′.
Now we prove that the output is always a regular game in SWF. Let
be X ∈ Ws, Z ∈ α(X) and Z ′ ∈ Ws \ {X}. If Z  Z ′, since X ≺ Z we
have that X  Z ′, a contradiction. If Z ′  Z, since X ≺ Z and there is no
Y 6= Z with X ≺ Y  Z, then Z ′  X, a contradiction. Therefore, since
step 6 maintains the regularity, then the output is a regular game in SWF.
Now we prove that the output is a decisive game. Note that Γ is proper,
so X ∈ W(Γ) implies N \ X ∈ L(Γ). Therefore, in step 5 we also obtain
proper games, since for all Z ∈ α(X), Z  X and hence N \ Z is losing.
However, in this step the game is not strong, because both X and X ′ are
losing. But this is fixed in step 6, where the coalition X ′ is added to the
set of shift-minimal winning coalitions. Finally, since the coalitions Z ∈ Ws
with Z  X ′ that are removed maintain the properness of the current game,
the new game obtained in each repetition of the algorithm is decisive.
By step 2, it is clear that the output is always a boring game. Therefore,
Algorithm 9 always returns a boring decisive regular game.
In turn, note also that from boring decisive regular games we can obtain
decisive regular games.
Lemma 4.14. Let Γ = (N,Wm) and Γ′ = (N \ {1},Wm) be two simple
118 – Chapter 4. Computational Problems
Algorithm 10 DRGfromBDRG
Input: Boring decisive regular game Γ = (N,Ws) in SWF.
Output: Decisive regular game Γ′ = (N,Ws′) in SWF.
1: Choose X ∈ Ws with 1 /∈ X;
2: Define X ′ = N \X;
3: Ws =Ws \ {X} ∪ α(X);
4: Ws =Ws \ {Z ∈ Ws | X ′  Z} ∪ {X ′};
5: return Γ′ = Γ.
games. Then Γ is a boring decisive regular game if and only if Γ′ is a decisive
regular game.
Proof. Let Γ be a boring decisive regular game. If X \ {1} ∈ W(Γ′), then
N \X ∈ L(Γ), because Γ is proper; therefore, N \ (X \ {1}) ∈ L(Γ′), so Γ′ is
proper. Note that Γ is boring, so for all X ∈ L(Γ), 1 /∈ X. If X\{1} ∈ L(Γ′),
then N \ (X \ {1}) ∈ W(Γ′), because 1 ∈ N \ (X \ {1}); so Γ′ is strong.
Let Γ′ be a decisive regular game. Note that Γ is clearly boring, because
we do not add new MWCs. If X ∈ L(Γ), then N \ X ∈ W(Γ), because
1 does not belong to any losing coalition; so Γ is strong. If X ∈ W(Γ),
we have two cases: 1) if 1 /∈ X, it is clear that X \ {1} ∈ W(Γ′), so then
N \ (X \ {1}) ∈ L(Γ′), because Γ′ is proper; hence N \X ∈ L(Γ), because
1 /∈ X, and thus Γ is proper. 2) if 1 ∈ X, it is clear that X ∈ W(Γ)\Wm(Γ),
so then X \ {1} ∈ W(Γ′), and since Γ′ is proper, N \ (X \ {1}) /∈ L(Γ′);
therefore, N \ X ∈ L(Γ), because it is formed from the losing coalition
N \(X \{1}) of Γ′, without adding any additional player. Thus, Γ is proper.
Finally, since Γ′ remains regular in both cases, then the lemma holds.
Note that Lemma 4.14 implies that every decisive regular game on n
players can be obtained from a boring decisive regular game on n+1 players.
Moreover, based on Lemma 4.13 we can show the following.
Lemma 4.15. Every decisive regular game on n players can be obtained
from a boring decisive regular game on n players.
Proof. We need to prove that by using the same exchange of coalitions used
in the proof of Lemma 4.13, we can obtain decisive regular games from boring
decisive regular games. See Algorithm 10, which is the same Algorithm 9,
but without repetitions, and choosing in step 3 of the previous algorithm
the coalitions X ∈ Ws with 1 /∈ X.
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Just note that when some shift-minimal winning coalition X ∈ Ws be-
comes losing and N \X becomes winning, the new coalitions Z ∈ Ws with
1 ∈ Z are such that X ≺ Z.
In what follows we construct enumeration algorithms. To display these
enumerations we use additional notation. To denote that we are enumerating
or printing a decisive regular game, we draw the game within a box, like for
instance:
10010
01110
When a decisive regular game Γ′ is obtained from other decisive regular
game Γ, by exchanging a coalition X ∈ Ws(Γ) by N \X—see steps 3 and 4
of Algorithm 10—we include an arrow pointing from the coalition X to Γ′,
like this:
10010
01110
10100
01101
10011
In turn, this notation derives some additional definitions.
Definition 4.7. Let G be a set of decisive regular games in SWF. We define a
function δ : G×P(N)→ G such that for all (Γ, X) ∈ G×P(N), δ(Γ, X) = Γ′,
where Ws(Γ′) = (Ws(Γ) \ {X}∪α(X)) \ {Z ∈ Ws | N \X  Z}∪ {N \X}.
We denote by a pair (G, δ) a set of decisive regular games connected by
arrows according to the relationship δ, i.e., such that for all Γ,Γ′ ∈ G, there
exists a coalition X such that either δ(Γ, X) = Γ′ or δ(Γ′, X) = Γ.
Note that Ws(Γ′) corresponds to the set Ws′ obtained from Γ by the
exchange of X by N \ X in steps 3 and 4 of Algorithm 10. Based on this
algorithm, in the following result we construct an enumeration algorithm to
list decisive regular games from a set of boring decisive regular games.
Lemma 4.16. There is an algorithm to enumerate all the decisive regular
games up to 4 players.
Proof. Let be N = {n, . . . , 1}. We consider the enumerations for n = 1 and
n = 2 as base cases, because by Table 4.5, we know that for both cases there
is only one decisive regular game. For n = 1, the only decisive regular game
in SWF is the one with Ws = {1}. Let us print this game:
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Algorithm 11 EnumeratingDRGs(WithRepetitions)
Input: A pair (G, δ) of connected decisive regular games on n− 1 players.
Output: A pair (G′, δ) of connected decisive regular games on n players.
1: N = N ∪ {1};
2: Define (G′, δ) = (G, δ);
3: for all Γ ∈ G repeat
4: print Γ;
5: for all X ∈ Ws with 1 /∈ X repeat
6: Define X ′ = N \X;
7: Ws =Ws \ {X} ∪ α(X);
8: Ws′ =Ws \ {Z ∈ Ws | X ′  Z} ∪ {X ′};
9: print Γ′ = (N,Ws′);
10: G′ = G′ ∪ Γ′;
11: Define δ(Γ, X) = Γ′;
12: return (G′, δ).
1
For n = 2, the only decisive regular game in SWF can be obtained by
increasing the domain of the previous game, so we obtain the regular game
with Ws = {10}:
10
Now let us consider Algorithm 11, which repeats the procedure of Al-
gorithm 10 for every shift-minimal winning coalition that does not contains
the player 1. After each exchange of coalitions, this new algorithm enumer-
ates the obtained decisive regular game, and further saves the connections
created among the games due to this exchange.
For n = 3, note that G only contains the game withWs = {10}. In step 1
we increase again the domain of the previous game, obtaining a decisive reg-
ular game on three players with Ws = {100}. Note that by Lemma 4.14,
whenever we increase the domain of the games, we obtain a boring decisive
regular game, so the game is enumerated in step 4. Since α({100}) = {101},
in step 7 we have Ws = {101}; and then in step 8 we have Ws = {011},
because 011 ≺ 101. Thus, we enumerate in step 9 the new decisive regu-
lar game with Ws = {011}, and we save the changes in steps 10 and 11,
obtaining the following output in step 12:
100 011
Analogously, for n = 4, we increase the domain of the previous games,
4.4. Counting and Enumerating Results – 121
obtaining two boring decisive regular games on four players. Let us consider
first the game withWs = {1000}. Here α({1000}) = {1001}, so in step 8 we
obtain Ws = {1001, 0111}, because {0111} 6 {1001}. On the other hand,
from the second game, with Ws = {0110}, we have α({0110}) = {0111},
and moreover {1001} 6 {0111}. Therefore, from both games the algorithm
produces the following output:
1000
0110
1001
0111
which is the third decisive regular game that exists on four players.
Note that in the previous enumeration for n = 4, we obtain the same
decisive regular game from two different boring decisive regular games. Such
repetitions should be avoided if we eventually want to obtain algorithms with
polynomial-delay. When we are enumerating decisive regular games on n
players, the repetitions can be avoided: we recall the relation δ obtained from
the created games on n − 1 players, which are represented in our notation
by the arrows.
To denote a game that has been blocked, so it can not generate the same
game that has already been enumerated, we use a dotted arrow, like this:
01100
10010
01110
10100
01101
10011
Our next result explains how we can avoid this kind of repetitions.
Lemma 4.17. There is an algorithm to enumerate all the decisive regular
games up to 4 players, without repetition.
Proof. Let us consider Algorithm 12, which is the same Algorithm 11 but
with the new step 6. Until 3 players, the procedure is the same than the
explained in the proof of Lemma 4.16.
For n = 4, as usual we increase the domain of the games obtained on
three players, obtaining two boring decisive regular games on four play-
ers: Γ1, with Ws(Γ1) = {1000}; and Γ2, with Ws(Γ2) = {0110}. For Γ1,
note that δ(Γ1, 1000) = Γ2, so by step 6 we continue the procedure like in
Lemma 4.16 and we obtain the game Γ3 with Ws(Γ3) = {1001, 0111}. Note
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Algorithm 12 EnumeratingDRGsUpTo4
Input: A pair (G, δ) of connected decisive regular games on n− 1 players.
Output: A pair (G′, δ) of connected decisive regular games on n players.
1: N = N ∪ {1};
2: Define (G′, δ) = (G, δ);
3: for all Γ ∈ G repeat
4: print Γ;
5: for all X ∈ Ws with 1 /∈ X repeat
6: if δ(Γ, X) 6= ∅ then
7: Define X ′ = N \X;
8: Ws =Ws \ {X} ∪ α(X);
9: Ws′ =Ws \ {Z ∈ Ws | X ′  Z} ∪ {X ′};
10: print Γ′ = (N,Ws′);
11: G′ = G′ ∪ Γ′;
12: Define δ(Γ, X) = Γ′;
13: return (G′, δ).
that Γ3 contains the coalition 0111, which is the complement of the coali-
tion 1000 of Γ1. Then, by step 12 the connection for Γ1 is updated with
δ(Γ1, 1000) = Γ3.
On the other hand, note that the remaining coalition of Γ3, 1001, could
also be obtained by the exchange of its complementary coalition, 0110, from
other decisive regular game. But this game is Γ2, which is the projection in
n = 3 of the game obtained from Γ1. Therefore, since δ(Γ2, 0110) = ∅, we
avoid to repeat again the same game, and we obtain the following:
1000
0110
1001
0111
Therefore, we have enumerated all the decisive regular games up to 4
players, without repetition.
Let us continue applying Algorithm 12, from the pair (G, δ) obtained for
n = 4 at the end of the proof of Lemma 4.17.
For n = 5, we increase the domain of the previous games, obtaining three
boring decisive regular games on five players. Applying the same procedure,
we obtain:
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10000
01100
10010
01110
10001
01111
10100
01101
10011
Note that the third boring game does not generates new games, because
it has only two coalitions, and its projection on n = 4 was pointed by exactly
two boring games.
However, by Table 4.5 we know that there are seven regular decisive
games on n = 5, instead of five. The remaining games must be obtained
from the non-boring game with coalition 10100. Thus, considering the same
Algorithm 12, but replacing step 3 by “for all Γ ∈ G′ repeat”, we obtain
the seven decisive regular games for 7 players:
10000
01100
10010
01110
10001
01111
10100
01101
10011
11000
01011
00111
This leads us to propose the following conjecture.
Conjecture 4.1. There is an algorithm that, with enough memory re-
sources, is able to enumerate all the decisive regular games, without rep-
etition and with polynomial-delay.
Now we show an experimental validation of the previous procedure.
Experimental Validation
The procedure described before was implemented in C++. We checked that
the algorithm enumerates all the 2, 470 decisive regular games on 8 players
and thousands of decisive regular games for 9 players. We verified that
all the enumerated games were decisive regular, and that they were not
repeated. Furthermore, with an Intel Core 2 Duo processor clocked at 3.16
GHz, we obtained for less than 9 players very good runtimes, as we can see
in Table 4.6.
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
time (sec.) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.027 1.307
Table 4.6: Time results for enumerating decisive regular games.
In Appendix A we provide the list of all the 170 decisive regular games
from n = 1 until n = 7.
Besides the correctness of the algorithm, the biggest problem of this
strategy of enumeration is that to generate the set of all decisive regular
games on n players, it is necessary to have in memory the set of all decisive
regular games on n−1 players. As the size of these sets grows exponentially
in terms of n, the enumeration is limited by memory resources. Indeed, it
was not possible to enumerate explicitly the set of all decisive regular games
on n = 9. After a long computation time, the computer ran out of memory
space. In despite of the above, we have been able to enumerate a good set of
decisive regular games over nine players. This set could be used for instance
as benchmarking to study other properties of decisive regular games.
Example 4.4. The following is a decisive regular game in SWF. By using
linear programming, we also know that it is not weighted.
N 987654321
Ws 011011011
011100100
100011100
100100011
100101000
101000000
Since every weighted game is regular—see Section 2.3.3— by Table 4.5
we can conclude that all the 2470 decisive regular games on eight players
are also weighted. As far as we know, explicit examples of simple games
with nine players, which are regular and decisive, but not weighted, have
not been illustrated until now. However, another regular game that in fact
meets these characteristics can be found in [245].
Part III
Influence games
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Chapter 5
Influence Games
In this chapter we study influence games, a new subclass of simple games.
Briefly, an influence game is described by an influence graph, modeling a
social network, and a quota, indicating the required minimum number of
agents that have to cooperate to perform successfully the task. A team will
be successful or winning if it can influence at least as many individuals as
the quota establishes. We take the spread of influence in the linear threshold
model as the value that measures the power of a team. From this model
we can study all the problems related to simple games, including properties,
parameters and solution concepts, from the context of multi-agent systems,
social networks, social choice, among other topics.
In Section 5.1 we define the model. In Section 5.2 we explain its ex-
pressiveness, by showing that influence games capture the whole class of
simple games. In Section 5.3 we characterize the computational complexity
of several problems defined in Chapter 2 for influence games. Finally, in Sec-
tion 5.4 we analyze those problems for some particular extremal subclasses
of influence games, with respect to the propagation of influence, showing
tighter complexity characterizations.
5.1 Definitions and Preliminaries
Before introducing formally the family of influence games we need to define
a family of labeled graphs and a process of spread of influence based on the
linear threshold model [108, 230]. In this first analysis of influence games, we
draw upon the deterministic version of the linear threshold model, in which
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node thresholds are fixed, as our model for influence spread following [45, 5].
We use standard graph notation following [26]. As in graph theory, here
n = |V | and m = |E|. For any 0 ≤ k ≤ n, Pk(X) denotes the subsets of X
with exactly k-elements.
Definition 5.1. An influence graph is a tuple (G,w, f), where G = (V,E)
is a weighted, labeled and directed graph without loops. As usual V is the
set of vertices, agents or actors, E is the set of edges and w : E → N is a
weight function. Finally, f : V → N is a labeling function that quantifies
how influenceable each agent is. An agent i ∈ V has influence over another
j ∈ V if and only if (i, j) ∈ E. We also consider the family of unweighted
influence graphs (G, f) in which every edge has weight 1.
Given an influence graph (G,w, f) and an initial activation set X ⊆ V ,
the spread of influence of X is the set F (X) ⊆ V which is formed by the
agents activated through an iterative process. We use Fk(X) to denote the
set of nodes activated at step k. Initially, at step 0, only the vertices in X
are activated, that is F0(X) = X. At step i > 0, those vertices for which
the sum of weights of the edges connecting nodes in Fi−1(X) to them meets
or exceeds their label functions are activated, i.e.,
Fi(X) = Fi−1(X) ∪
{
v ∈ V |∑u∈Fi−1(X),(u,v)∈E w((u, v)) ≥ f(v)} .
The process stops when no additional activation occurs and the final set of
activated nodes becomes F (X).
Example 5.1. Figure 5.1 shows the spread of influence F (X) in an un-
weighted influence graph G = (V, f), with V = {a, b, c, d}, for the initial
activation X = {a}. In the first step we obtain F1(X) = {a, c}, and in the
second step (the last one) we obtain F (X) = F2(x) = {a, c, d}.
As the number of vertices is finite, for any i > n, Fi(X) = Fi−1(X).
Thus, F (X) = Fn(X) and we have the following well known basic result.
Lemma 5.1. Given an influence graph (G,w, f) and a set of vertices X,
the set F (X) can be computed in polynomial time.
In what follows, unless otherwise stated, results and definitions will be
stated for directed graphs. All of them can be restated for undirected graphs.
Now we define influence games.
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F0(X) = X = {a}
1a 1 b
1c 2 d
F1(X) = {a, c}
1a 1 b
1c 2 d
F2(X) = F (X) = {a, c, d}
1a 1 b
1c 2 d
Figure 5.1: The spread of influence starting from the initial activation of
X = {a} on an unweighted influence graph.
Definition 5.2. An influence game is given by a tuple (G,w, f, q,N) where
(G,w, f) is an influence graph, q is an integer quota, 0 ≤ q ≤ |V | + 1, and
N ⊆ V is the set of players. X ⊆ N is a successful team if and only if
|F (X)| ≥ q, otherwise X is an unsuccessful team.
As it was done for influence graphs, we also consider the family of un-
weighted influence games for the cases in which the graph G is unweighted.
In such a case we use the notation (G, f, q,N).
Influence games adopt a correspondence with simple games.
Example 5.2. Let (G, f) be an influence graph and N any subset of agents.
Two particular ranges of the quota lead to some trivial simple games. By
setting q = 0, thus considering influence games of the form (G, f, 0, N),
we have that every team of agents is successful, therefore (G, f, 0, N) is
a representation of the simple game (N,P(N)). When q > |V (G)|, the
influence game (G, f, q,N) is a representation of the simple game (N, ∅) as
there are no successful teams in the game.
Let us provide an example of influence game based on the influence graph
considered in Example 5.1.
Example 5.3. Consider the influence game (G, f, 3, V (G)), where (G, f)
is the influence graph considered in Example 5.1. In this case, we have
that F ({a}) = {a, c, d}, and thus {a} ∈ W. The fundamental set families
for Γ are Wm = {{a}, {b}}, LM = {{c, d}}, L = {{c, d}, {c}, {d}, {}} and
W = P(V (G)) \ L.
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5.2 Expressiveness
Influence games are monotonic as, for any X ⊆ N and i ∈ N , if |F (X)| ≥ q
then |F (X ∪{i})| ≥ q, and if |F (X)| < q then |F (X \{i})| < q. Thus, every
influence game is a simple game. Moreover, we will show that the opposite
is also true.
Theorem 5.1. Every simple game can be represented by an unweighted in-
fluence game. Furthermore, when the simple game Γ is given in either EWF
or MWF, an unweighted influence game representing Γ can be obtained in
polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that a simple game Γ is given by (N,W) or (N,Wm). It is
already well known that given (N,W), the family Wm can be obtained in
polynomial time. Thus we assume in the following that the set of players
and the set Wm are given.
In order to represent Γ as an influence game we first define an unweighted
influence graph (G, f). The graph G = (V,E) is the following. The set V
of nodes is formed by a set with n nodes, VN = {v1, . . . , vn}, one for each
player, and a set of nodes for each MWC. For any X ∈ Wm, we add a
new set VX with slength(Γ) − |X| nodes. We connect vertex vi with all
the vertices in VX whenever i ∈ X. Finally, the label function is defined as
follows, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, f(vi) = 1 and, for any X ∈ Wm and any v ∈
VX , f(v) = |X|. Observe that in the influence game (G, f, slength(Γ), VN )
a team is successful if and only if its players form a winning coalition in
Γ. Therefore (G, f, slength(Γ), VN ) is a representation of Γ as unweighted
influence game. It remains to show that given (N,Wm) a description of
(G, f, slength(Γ), N) can be computed in polynomial time. For doing so it
is enough to show that slength(Γ) can be computed in polynomial time. Let
k = slength(Γ).
Observe that, by definition, all the coalitions with k players are winning
in Γ but at least one coalition with size k − 1 is losing. Therefore there is a
MWC with size k and there are no MWCs with size k+ 1. Thus, computing
k is equivalent to compute the maximum size of a MWC. The last quantity
can be obtained in polynomial time from a description of Wm.
The following example provides an illustration of the construction.
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Figure 5.2: An unweighted influence graph associated to the simple game
({1, 2, 3, 4}, {{1, 2, 4}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}).
1 . . . 1
q
n nodes
n nodes1 . . . 1
w1 wn
1 1
Figure 5.3: An influence graph (G,w, f) associated to the weighted game
[q;w1, . . . , wn].
Example 5.4. Let Γ = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {{1, 2, 4}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}) be a simple
game in MWF. We have that slength(Γ) = 3 because all subsets of N with
cardinality 3 are winning, i.e., {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4} ∈ W. For
coalition {1, 2, 4} we do not need to add nodes to the graph. For each of the
teams {2, 3} and {3, 4}, we need to add one node with label 3 − 2 = 1. A
drawing of the resulting unweighted influence graph is given in Figure 5.2.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 shows the expressiveness of the family of in-
fluence games with respect to the class of simple games. However, the
construction cannot be implemented in polynomial time when the simple
game is given in succinct ways like WRF. Observe also that the number
of agents in the corresponding influence game is in general exponential in
the number of players. For the particular case of weighted games in WRF,
we can show that there exist representations by influence games having a
polynomial number of agents.
Theorem 5.2. Every weighted game can be represented as an influence
game. Furthermore, given a weighted representation of the game, a repre-
sentation as an influence game can be obtained in polynomial time.
Proof. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted game, consider the influence game
(G,w, f, n + 1, N), whose influence graph is shown in Figure 5.3. The n
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Figure 5.4: An unweighted influence graph (G, f) associated to the weighted
game [q;w1, . . . , wn].
nodes in the first level of G correspond to the set N , each of them has as
associated label the value 1. Each node i ∈ N is connected to a central node
with label q and the corresponding edge has weight wi. The n nodes in the
last level are another set of n nodes with label 1. Observe that X ⊆ N
is a winning coalition in [q;w1, . . . , wn] if and only if
∑
i∈X wi ≥ q. The
last condition is equivalent to |F (X)| ≥ n + 1. Thus we have that X ⊆ N
is a winning coalition in [q;w1, . . . , wn] if and only if X ⊆ N is a winning
coalition in (G,w, f, n+ 1, N).
Finally, observe that the construction of (G,w, f, n+ 1, N) can be done
in polynomial time with respect to the size of [q;w1, . . . , wn].
Observe that in the previous construction the size of the influence graph
is polynomial in the number of agents but the overall construction is done in
polynomial time in the size of the weighted representation. We can change
slightly the construction and get a representation as unweighted influence
game by increasing again the proportion of players.
Theorem 5.3. Every weighted game can be represented as an unweighted
influence game. Furthermore, given a weighted representation of the game,
a representation as unweighted influence game can be obtained in pseudo-
polynomial time.
Proof. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted game, consider the unweighted in-
fluence graph (G, f) sketched in Figure 5.4. The n nodes in the first level
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correspond to the set N . For any i ∈ N , node i is connected to a set of wi
different nodes in the second level representing its weight. Thus, X ⊆ N
is a winning coalition if and only if
∑
i∈X wi ≥ q, which is equivalent to
|F (X)| ≥ n+∑ni=1wi. Therefore, the influence game (G, f, n+∑ni=1wi, N)
is a representation of the given weighted game.
Observe that given [q;w1, . . . , wn], constructing the graph G requires
time O(n+w1 + · · ·+wn) and thus the construction can be done in pseudo-
polynomial time.
In the previous results we have assumed that a weighted representation of
the game is given. It is known that there are weighted games whose weighted
representation requires that maxi∈N{wi} to be (n+1)(n+1)/2/2 [208]. There-
fore the construction of the previous lemma will require exponential space
and time with respect to the number of players.
Our next result establishes the closure of influence games under intersec-
tion and union. Furthermore, we show that an influence game representing
the resulting simple game can be obtained in polynomial time.
Theorem 5.4. Given two influence games, their intersection and union can
be represented as an influence game. Furthermore, both constructions can
be obtained in polynomial time.
Proof. Let Γ = (G,w, f, q,N) be an influence game with G = (V,E), recall
that, for any X ⊆ N , Fi(X) ⊆ V denotes the spread of influence of X in the
i-th step of the activation process and that we can assume that 0 < i ≤ n.
All the sets considered in our constructions are replications of either the set
N or the set V . For sake of simplicity, we use the term corresponding node
to refer to the same node in a different copy of N or V .
We start constructing an influence graph (G′, w′, f ′) as shown in Fig-
ure 5.5. G′ has 2n+ 1 columns of nodes. The first column F 0 represents V ,
and the remaining nodes are divided in pairs of sets (f i, F i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the sets f i and F i have n nodes each, as a replication
of the nodes in V . The edges are defined as follows, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a
node y ∈ F i−1 is connected to a node z ∈ f i if and only if (y, z) ∈ E. These
edges have associated weight w(y, z). Furthermore, every node in F i−1 is
connected by an edge with weight 1 to its corresponding node in F i. Every
node in f i is connected by an edge with weight 1 to its corresponding node
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Figure 5.5: The influence graph (G′, w′, f ′) associated to the influence game
(G,w, f, q,N).
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(G′1, w′1, f ′1)
(G′2, w′2, f ′2)
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1 s1
...
1 s4n2+3n+2
Figure 5.6: The influence graph associated to the intersection (x = 2) or the
union (x = 1) of two influence games with influence graphs (G1, w1, f1) and
(G2, w2, f2) and quotas q1 and q2 respectively.
in F i. The labeling function assigns label 1 to all the nodes in sets F i and
maintains the original labeling for nodes in the sets f i.
Note that after the activation of a team X ⊆ F 0 in (G′, w′, f ′), for any
0 ≤ i ≤ n, the set of nodes in F i that are activated coincides with the
set Fi(X). Thus the subset of activated nodes in F
n coincides with F (X).
Observe also that (G′, w′, f ′) has 2n2+n nodes and that it can be constructed
in polynomial time in the size of a given influence game (G,w, f, q,N).
Now, given two influence games, namely Γ1 = (G1, w1, f1, q1, N) and
Γ2 = (G2, w2, f2, q2, N), we construct the two influence graphs (G
′
1, w
′
1, f
′
1)
and (G′2, w′2, f ′2) as described before—see Figure 5.5. We use the construction
depicted in Figure 5.6 to construct another influence graph. In this last
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Figure 5.7: Influence graphs associated to [q1;w
1
1, . . . , w
1
n] ∩ [q2;w21, . . . , w2n]
(x = 2), and [q1;w
1
1, . . . , w
1
n] ∪ [q2;w21, . . . , w2n] (x = 1).
construction we add a set F which is a copy of N . All the nodes in F have
label 1. The nodes in F are connected to their corresponding nodes in F 01
and in F 02 through edges with weight 1. Furthermore, we add a node with
label q1, a node with label q2, a node with label x, and a set with 4n
2+3n+2
nodes. Those new nodes are connected according to the pattern given in
Figure 5.6. The nodes in the last column, Fni , of (G
′
i, w
′
i, f
′
i) are all connected
to the node with label qi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. The nodes with labels q1 and q2
are connected to the node with label x which is connected to the last set of
nodes. All those new connections have assigned weight 1. Observe that in
total we have at most 2(2n2 + n) + n + 3 + 4n2 + 3n + 2 nodes. Thus the
overall construction can be computed in polynomial time.
Let (G∪, w∪, f∪) be the influence graph obtained by setting x = 1 and
(G∩, w∩, f∩) be the influence graph obtained by setting x = 2. Consider
the games Γ∪ = (G∪, w∪, f∪, 4n2 + 3n + 2, F ) and Γ∩ = (G∩, w∩, f∩, 4n2 +
3n+ 2, F ). By construction a team X is successful in Γ∪ if and only if X is
successful in either Γ1 or Γ2. Furthermore, a team is successful in Γ∩ if and
only if X is successful in both Γ1 and Γ2.
It is interesting to note that it is possible to devise a construction rep-
resenting the intersection or the union of weighted games as the influence
games (G′∪, w′, f ′∪, n+2, N) and (G′∩, w′, f ′∩, n+3, N). The corresponding in-
fluence graphs (G′∪, w′, f ′∪) and (G′∩, w′, f ′∩) are shown in Figure 5.7—setting
as before label x to be 1 or 2 depending on the considered operation. This
new construction requires only a linear number of additional nodes, however
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the graph is weighted.
Thus, as any simple game can be represented as the intersection or union
of a finite number of weighted games, we have an alternative way to show
the completeness of the family of weighted influence games with respect
to the class of simple games—Theorem 5.1. However, as the dimension
and the codimension of a simple game might be exponential in the number
of players—but bounded by the number of maximal losing and minimal
winning coalitions, respectively [94, 89]—we cannot conclude that any simple
game can be represented by a weighted influence game whose number of
agents is polynomial in the number of players. For the particular case of
unweighted influence game we know the following.1
Theorem 5.5. The family of unweighted influence games in which the num-
ber of agents in the corresponding influence graph is polynomial in the num-
ber of players is a proper subset of simple games.
Proof. We use a simple counting argument to show the result. Observe that,
for any n ≥ 0, there are more than 2(2n/n) simple games with n players [139].
Taking into account that a simple game has at most n! isomorphic simple
games we know that there are more that 2(2
n/n)/n! different simple games
on n players.
Consider an unweighted influence game with n players and f(n) agents.
The possibilities for the edge sets are less than 2(f(n)+1)
2
. It suffices to
consider label functions assigning values between 0 and f(n) + 1. Thus
there are at most (f(n) + 2)f(n)+2 possibilities for the labeling functions.
Finally, for the quota, only f(n) + 2 possibilities have to be considered.
Thus, the number of unweighted influence games with n players and f(n)
agents is at most 2O(f(n)
2).
Taking f(n) = nlogn, the family includes all unweighted influence games
with n players and polynomial number of agents. Taking the logarithm
on both sides, one easily sees that 2O(f(n)
2) is asymptotically smaller than
2(2
n/n)/n!.
Even though we have shown in Theorem 5.2 that all games with polyno-
mial dimension or polynomial codimension can be represented as weighted
influence games in polynomial time—i.e., they admit weighted influence
1We thank Sascha Kurz for pointing out the proof of Theorem 5.5.
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Figure 5.8: The simple game whose set of players N = {1, . . . , n} admits
a partition N1, . . . , Nm in such a way that W = {S ⊆ N ; ∃Ni with Ni ⊆
S} has exponential dimension, n1 · . . . · nm−1 [94], but this game admits
a polynomial unweighted influence graph (G, f) with respect to n for the
corresponding unweighted influence game (G, f, n+ 1, N).
graphs with polynomial number of agents—a fundamental open question
is determining which simple games can be represented as an (unweighted)
influence games with polynomial number of agents. In particular, it remains
open to know whether there are games with exponential dimension that also
require an exponential number of players in any representation as influence
games.
In this line, we know that the simple game with exponential dimension
with respect to the players of Section 2 in [94] can be represented by an un-
weighted influence game—see Figure 5.8—in polynomial time with respect
to the number of players. Another candidate is the simple game with ex-
ponential dimension of Theorem 8 in [72] for which we have been unable to
show whether it can be represented by a (unweighted) influence game with
polynomial number of agents or not.
In Appendix B we show all the minimal unweighted influence games
(G, f, q,N) withN = V , over three and four players, and their corresponding
10 and 30 representations as simple games in MWF.
5.3 Problems and Complexity
Our second set of results settles the complexity of the problems related to
simple games presented in Section 2.3. Hardness results are obtained for
unweighted influence games in which the number of agents in the network
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Influence games
Problem (G,w, f, q,N)
Properties of simple games
IsProper coNPC
IsStrong coNPC
IsDecisive coNPC
Properties of coalitions
IsBlocking P
IsSwing P
Properties of players
IsDummy coNPC
IsPasser P
IsVetoer P
IsDictator P
IsCritical P
IsSymmetric P
Parameters
Length NPH
Width NPH
Additional problems
Equiv coNPH
Iso coNPH
Table 5.1: New results of complexity for properties and parameters of influ-
ence games.
is polynomial in the number of players, while polynomial time algorithms
are devised for general influence games. The new results about properties
and parameters are summarized in Table 5.1, complementing the results for
simple games presented in Tables 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4.
The new results about solution concepts are summarized in Table 5.2,
complementing the results for simple games presented in Table 4.2. Recall
that problems Construct-Banzhaf-value and Construct-Shapley-
Shubik-value are also denoted as Bval and SSval, respectively. We omit
in this table the generic results of Table 4.2 regarding nonemptiness.
From Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 we know that all the computational prob-
lems related to properties and parameters that are computationally hard
for simple games in EWF or MWF, as well as for weighted games in WRF,
are also computationally hard for influence games. Nevertheless, the hard-
ness results do not apply to unweighted influence games with polynomial,
in the number of player, number of agents. In this section we address the
computational complexity of problems for games with a polynomial number
of agents. All the hardness proofs are given for the subclass formed by un-
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Influence games
Problem (G,w, f, q,N)
Empty-
Core P
In-
Core P
-core NPH
IsZero-
Core P
Construct-
Banzhaf-value #PC
Shapley-Shubik-value #PC
Stable-set P
Core P
Table 5.2: New results of complexity for solution concepts of influence games.
weighted influence games on undirected influence graphs, which is a subset
of all the other variations. The polynomial time algorithms are devised for
the biggest class of general influence games, i.e., weighted influence games
on directed graphs which includes all others.
Before starting to analyze problems we state here some basic results.
From Lemma 5.1 we know that, for a given team X, we can compute in
polynomial time the set F (X). Therefore we have the following.
Lemma 5.2. For a given influence game (G,w, f, q,N), deciding whether
a team X ⊆ N is successful can be done in polynomial time.
Our next result concerns a particular type of influence games that we will
use first as a basic construction, which associates an unweighted influence
game to an undirected graph, and later as a representative of a particular
subclass of influence games.
Definition 5.3. Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), the unweighted
influence game Γ(G) is the game (G, f, |V |, V ) where, for any v ∈ V , the
label f(v) is the degree of v in G, i.e., f(v) = dG(v).
Recall that a set S ⊆ V is a vertex cover of a graph G if and only if, for
any edge (u, v) ∈ E, u or v (or both) belong to S. From the definitions we
get the following result.
Lemma 5.3. Let G be an undirected graph. A team X is successful in
Γ(G) if and only if X is a vertex cover of G, Furthermore, the influence
game Γ(G) can be obtained in polynomial time, given a description of G.
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Theorem 5.6. Computing Length, Width, sLength and sWidth of an
unweighted influence game is NP-hard.
Proof. For Length, we provide a reduction from the minimum set cover
problem. Let C = {C1, . . . , Cm} be a collection of subsets of a universe with
n elements. We associate to C the unweighted influence game (G, f, q,N)
where G = (V,E). The graph G has three disjoint sets of vertices: Y =
{y1, . . . , ym}, T = {t1, . . . , tn}, and Z = {z1, . . . , zm+1}, together with an
additional vertex x. The components of the game are the following.
• V = Y ∪ T ∪ {x} ∪ Z,
• E = {(yj , ti) | i ∈ Cj}∪{(ti, x) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪{(x, zk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m+1},
• f(yj) = n+ 1, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
• f(ti) = 1, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
• f(zk) = 1, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m+ 1,
• f(x) = n,
• q = m+ n+ 1 and
• N = Y .
Therefore, it is easy to see that a team X ⊆ N succeeds if and only if it
corresponds to a set cover, so the length of (G, f, q,N) coincides with the
size of a minimum set cover.
For Width we provide a reduction from the maximum set packing prob-
lem. Consider an influence game (G′, f ′, q′, N) where G′ is constructed from
G. We remove node {x}, add the connections {(ti, zk) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤
k ≤ m + 1}, and set f ′(ti) = 2 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We keep N = Y and
set q′ = m + 1. It is easy to see that a team X ⊆ N is unsuccessful in
(G′, f ′, q′, N) if and only if X corresponds to a set packing in C. Hence, the
width of (G′, f ′, q′, N) is n minus the size of a maximum set packing of C.
The remaining results for sLength and sWidth follow from the rela-
tionships of Lemma 4.9.
The hardness result for Length can also be obtained directly from
Lemma 5.3 which provides a reduction from the minimum vertex cover
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problem. However, the reductions from the minimum set cover problem
given in the previous theorem allow us to extract additional results about
the complexity of approximation. In particular, the reductions in Theo-
rem 5.6 imply that Length is neither approximable within (1 − ) · logm
nor within c · log n, for some c > 0, and that Width is not approximable
within m1/2−, for any  > 0, using the non-approximability results from [8]
for the problems minimum set cover and minimum set packing.
Our next result settles the complexity of the computation of the Banzhaf
and Shapley-Shubik values of a given player.
Theorem 5.7. Computing Bval and SSval for a given influence game and
a given player is #P-complete.
Proof. Both problems belong trivially to #P. To show hardness we construct
a reduction for the problem of computing the number of vertex covers of a
given graph which is known to be #P-complete [95]. Let G be a graph, we
first construct the graph G′ which is obtained from G adding a new vertex
x and connecting x to all the vertices in G. The associated input to Bval
is formed by the influence game Γ(G′) and the player x. Observe that the
reduction can be computed in polynomial time.
Let X be a successful team in Γ(G′) such that x ∈ X. When X 6= V (G′)
we know that X \ {x} must be a vertex cover of G. Furthermore x ∈ Cx
as X \ {x} is not winning in Γ(G′). When X = V (G′), X \ {x} is winning
in Γ(G′) and thus x /∈ Cx. As a consequence, we have that ηx(Γ) coincides
with the number of vertex covers of G minus one. As computing the number
of vertex covers of a graph is #P-hard, we have that Bval is #P-hard.
According to [10] (Theorem 3.29, page 50), to prove that SSval is #P-
hard, it is enough to show that Bval is #P-hard and that influence games
verify the property of being a reasonable representation. In the remaining
of this proof we show that influence games are a reasonable representation.
Let Γ = (G,w, f, q,N) be an influence game, and assume thatG = (V,E)
has n vertices and m edges. Consider the influence graph (G′, w′, f ′) where
• G′ = (V ′, E′) and V ′ = V ∪ {x, y} ∪ {a1, . . . , a2n},
• E′ = E ∪ {(x, y)} ∪ {(v, y) | v ∈ V } ∪ {(y, ai) | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n},
• w′(e) = w(e), for any e ∈ E, and w′(e) = 1, for any e ∈ E′ \ E, and
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• f ′(v) = f(v), for any v ∈ V , f ′(x) = 1, f ′(y) = q + 1, and f ′(ai) = 1,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Finally, we consider the influence game Γ+ = (G′, w′, f ′, q′, N ′) where q′ =
2n and N ′ = N ∪ {x}.
From the previous construction, it follows that all the winning coalitions
in Γ+ must include x. Furthermore, X ∪ {x} is a winning coalition in Γ+ if
and only if X is a winning coalition in Γ. Therefore, Γ+ is a representation
of Γ′ and has polynomial size with respect to the size of Γ. So, we conclude
that influence games are a reasonable representation.
For the following Theorem 5.8, we consider a new construction. Let
G = (V,E) be a graph where V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, . . . , em}, and
let k be an integer—which will be useful to consider a set cover of size k
or less. Then the unweighted influence game ∆1(G, k) = (G1, f1, q1, N1)
is defined as follows, where Figure 5.9 shows the corresponding influence
graph. G1 = (V1, E1) has V1 = {v1, . . . , vn, e1, . . . , em, x, y, z, s1, . . . , sα}
where α = m + n + 4. The edges in E1 are constructed as follows. We
include the incidence graph of G: for any e = (vi, vj) ∈ E, we add to E1
the edges (e, vi), (e, vj) and (e, y). For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we add the edge
(vi, x). For any 1 ≤ j ≤ α, we add the edges (x, sj) and (y, sj). Finally, we
add the edge (z, y). The labeling function f1 is defined as: f1(vi) = m+ 2,
1 ≤ i ≤ n; f1(ej) = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m; f1(s`) = 1, 1 ≤ ` ≤ α; and f1(z) = 2,
f1(x) = k + 1, f1(y) = m+ 1. The quota is q1 = α and the set of players is
N1 = {v1, . . . , vn, z}.
Observe that by construction the games Γ(G) and ∆1(G, k) can be ob-
tained in polynomial time. As an immediate consequence of the defini-
tion, we have that X is a successful team in ∆1(G, k) if and only if either
(|X ∩ V | ≥ k + 1) or z ∈ X and X \ z is a vertex cover in G.
Our next result settles the complexity of the problems which are coNP-
complete.
Theorem 5.8. For unweighted influence games with polynomial number
of vertices, the problems IsSymmetric, IsDummy, IsProper, IsStrong
and IsDecisive are coNP-complete.
Proof. Membership in coNP follows from the definitions. To get the hardness
results, we provide reductions from the complement of the Vertex Cover
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Figure 5.9: Influence graph (G1, f1) of the game ∆1(G, k).
problem and some other problems derived from it. Let (G, k) be an input
to Vertex Cover, as usual we assume that G has n vertices and m edges.
Let us start considering the IsDummy problem. Starting from G =
(V,E) and k, we construct the unweighted influence game ∆1(G, k) and the
pair (∆1(G, k), z) which is an instance of the IsDummy problem. If G has a
vertex cover X with size k or less, by construction, we have that X∪{z} is a
successful team of ∆1(G, k). Furthermore, if X is a vertex cover of minimum
size, we have that X∪{z} is a minimal successful team. Therefore, z is not a
dummy player in ∆1(G, k). If G does not have a vertex cover with size k or
less and X is a successful team containing z, it must hold that |X \{z}| > k,
therefore X \ {z} is a successful team. In consequence z is a dummy player
in ∆1(G, k). As the pair (∆1(G, k), z) is computable in polynomial time, we
have the desired result.
Let us consider now the IsSymmetric problem. Starting from G =
(V,E) and k, we construct the unweighted influence game ∆2(G, k) =
(G2, f2, q2, N2) (see Figure 5.10). G2 is obtained from the graph G1 ap-
pearing in the construction of ∆1(G, k) by adding two new vertices t and
s and the edges (x, s), (y, s) and (t, s). Recall that the vertices of G1 are
V (G1) = {v1, . . . , vn, e1, . . . , em, x, y, z, s1, . . . , sα}. The label function is the
following: f2(v) = f1(v), for v ∈ V (G2) ∩ V (G1); f2(s) = 4; f2(t) = 2.
Finally, q2 = α + 1 = n + m + 5 and N2 = {v1, . . . , vn, z, t}. Note that a
description of G2 can be obtained in polynomial time as well as a description
of ∆2(G, k) given a description of (G, k). Let us show that the construction
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Figure 5.10: Influence graph (G2, f2) used in the definition of the game
∆2(G, k).
is indeed a reduction.
When G has a vertex cover X of size k or less, by construction the team
X ∪ {z} is successful in ∆2(G, k) while the team X ∪ {t} is unsuccessful.
Therefore z and t are not symmetric. When G does not have a vertex cover
X of size k or less, by construction, any successful team Y must contain
a subset with at least k + 1 vertices from {v1, . . . , vn}. Therefore both
Y ∪ {z} and Y ∪ {t} are successful teams in ∆2(G, k), i.e., vertices z and t
are symmetric.
To prove hardness for the next two problems, IsProper and IsDeci-
sive, we provide a reduction from the following variation of the Vertex
Cover problem:
Name: Half vertex cover
Input: Undirected graph with an odd number of vertices n.
Question: Is there a vertex cover with size (n− 1)/2 or less?
We first show that the Half vertex cover problem is NP-complete. By
definition the problem belongs to NP. To prove hardness we show a reduction
from the Vertex Cover problem. Given a graph G with n vertices and an
integer k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we construct a graph Gˆ—see Figure 5.11—as follows.
Gˆ has vertex set Vˆ = V (G)∪X∪Y ∪{w}, where X has n−k−1 vertices,
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Figure 5.11: Graph Gˆ used to prove that Half vertex cover is NP-hard.
Y has k + 1 vertices, and edge set
Eˆ = E ∪ {(x, x′) | x 6= x′ ∧ x, x′ ∈ X}
∪ {(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }
∪ {(w, z) | z ∈ V ∪X ∪ Y }.
By construction, Gˆ has 2n + 1 vertices, so it can be constructed in
polynomial time. Note that any vertex cover S of Gˆ with minimum size has
to contain w, all the vertices in X and no vertex from Y . The remaining of
the cover, S ∩ V must be a minimum vertex cover of G. Therefore, G has a
vertex cover of size k or less if and only if Gˆ has a vertex cover of size n or
less.
Let us provide a reduction from the Half vertex cover to the Is-
Proper and the IsDecisive problems. Let G be an instance of Half
vertex cover with 2k + 1 vertices, for some value k ≥ 1. Consider the
unweighted influence game ∆1(G, (n − 1)/2) = (G1, f1, q1, N1). Recall that
V (G′) = {v1, . . . , vn, e1, . . . , em, x, y, z, s1, . . . , sα} where α = n + m + 4,
q1 = n+m+ 5, and N1 = {v1, . . . , vn, z}. Let k = (n− 1)/2.
If G has a vertex cover X with |X| ≤ k, the team X ∪ {z} is success-
ful and, as n + 1 − |X ∪ {z}| > k, we have that N \ (X ∪ {z}) is also
successful. Hence ∆1(G, k) is not proper. When all the vertex covers of
G have more than k vertices, any successful team Y of ∆1(G, k) verifies
|Y ∩ {v1, . . . , vn}| > k, i.e., |Y ∩ {v1, . . . , vn}| ≥ k + 1. For a successful
team Y , we have to consider two cases: z ∈ Y and z /∈ Y . When z ∈ Y ,
N \ Y ⊆ {v1, . . . , vn} and |N \ Y | < n − k − 1 = k. Thus, N \ Y is an
unsuccessful team. When z /∈ Y , |N \ (Y ∪ {z})| ≤ k and N \ Y is again
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an unsuccessful team. So, we conclude that ∆1(G, (n− 1)/2) is proper. As
∆1(G, (n−1)/2) can be obtained in polynomial time, the IsProper problem
is coNP-hard.
Observe that when G is an instance of the Half vertex cover and
all the vertex covers of G have more than (n − 1)/2 vertices, the game
∆1(G, (n− 1)/2) is also decisive. When this condition is not met, the game
∆1(G, (n−1)/2) is not proper and thus it is not decisive. Thus, we conclude
that the IsDecisive problem is also coNP-hard.
To finish the proof we show hardness for the IsStrong problem. We
provide a reduction from the complement of the following problem.
Name: Half independent set
Input: Undirected graph with an even number of vertices n.
Question: Is there an independent set with size n/2 or higher?
The Half independent set trivially belongs to NP. Hardness follows
from a simple reduction from the Half independent set. Starting from
a graph G with an odd number of vertices we construct a new graph G′ by
adding one new vertex connected to all the vertices in G. This construction
guarantees that G has a vertex cover of size (n−1)/2 or less if and only if G′
has a vertex cover with size n/2 or less. As the complement of a vertex cover
is an independent set, we have that G has a vertex cover of size (n− 1)/2 if
and only if G′ has an independent set with size n/2 or higher.
Now we show that the complement of the Half independent set prob-
lem can be reduced to the IsStrong problem. We associate to an input
to Half independent set the game ∆3(G,n/2) = (G3, f3, n+m+ 5, N3)
where N3 = V ∪ {z} and (G3, f3) is the influence graph described in Fig-
ure 5.12. Which is a variation of ∆1(G, k) using ideas similar to those in
the reduction from the Set Packing problem in Theorem 5.6.
When G has an independent set with size at least n/2, G also has an
independent set X with |X| = n/2. It is easy to see that both the team
X ∪ {z} and its complement are unsuccessful in ∆3(G,n/2). Therefore,
∆3(G,n/2) is not strong. Assume now that all the independent sets in G
have less than n/2 vertices. Observe that, for a team X in ∆3(G,n/2) with
|X ∩ V | < n/2, its complement has at least n/2 + 1 elements in V and thus
it is successful. When |X ∩ V | > n/2 the team is successful. Therefore we
have to consider only those teams with |X ∩ V | = n/2. In such a case, we
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Figure 5.12: Influence graph (G3, f3) of the game ∆3(G, k).
know that neither X ∩ V nor V \ (X ∩ V ) are independent sets. Then, by
construction, one of the setsX orN\X must contain z and is successful while
its complement is unsuccessful. In consequence ∆3(G,n/2) is strong.
The complexity of the remaining problems is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.9. For influence games, the problems IsPasser, IsVetoer,
IsDictator, IsCritical, IsBlocking and IsSwing belong to P.
Proof. We provide characterizations of the properties in terms of the sizes
of F (X) for adequate sets X. Given an influence game Γ = (G,w, f, q,N),
i ∈ N and X ⊆ N , we have.
• Player i is a passer if and only if |F ({i})| ≥ q.
• Player i is a vetoer if and only if |F (N \ {i})| < q.
• Player i is a dictator if and only if |F (N \ {i})| < q and |F ({i})| ≥ q.
• Player i is critical for X if and only if |F (X)| ≥ q and |F (X \{i})| < q.
• Team X is blocking if and only if |F (N \X)| < q.
• Team X is a swing if and only if |F (X)| ≥ q and there is i ∈ X for
which |F (X \ {i}) < q.
Therefore, from Lemma 5.1, we get the claimed result.
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Now we consider the complexity of the problems related to game isomor-
phism and equivalence. We state here the definitions for influence games.
Definition 5.4. Let Γ = (G,w, f, q,N) and Γ′ = (G′, w′, f ′, q′, N ′) be two
influence games with the same number of players. Γ and Γ′ are isomorphic if
and only if there exists a bijective function ϕ : N → N ′, such that for every
team X ⊆ N , |F (X)| ≥ q if and only if |F (ϕ(X))| ≥ q′. Moreover, when
N = N ′ and ϕ is the identity function, then we say that the two influence
games are equivalent.
Theorem 5.10. For unweighted influence games with polynomial number
of vertices, the problem Equiv is coNP-complete and the problem Iso is
coNP-hard and belongs to Σp2.
Proof. Membership to the corresponding complexity classes follows directly
from the definition of the problems. For the hardness part we provide a
reduction from the complement of the Vertex Cover problem. Let G be
a graph and consider the influence game Γ1 = ∆1(G, k) as defined before—
see Figure 5.9. Recall that the set of players is N1 = {v1, . . . , vn, z}. To
define the second influence game Γ2 we consider the weighted game with
set of players N1 and quota q = k + 1. The weights of the players are the
following: w(vi) = 1, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and w(z) = 0. A representation
of Γ2 as an unweighted influence game can be obtained in polynomial time
using the construction of Theorem 5.3. Our reduction associates to an input
to vertex cover (G, k) the pair of influence games (Γ1,Γ2). Observe that Γ1
is equivalent (isomorphic) to Γ2 if and only if G does not have a vertex cover
of size k or less.
We have been unable to provide a complete classification for the Iso
problem. It remains open to show whether the problem is Σp2-hard or not.
Regarding the remaining solution concepts, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.11. For influence games, the problems Construct-Stable-
Set, Empty-Core, In-Core, IsZero-Core and Construct-Core be-
long to P.
Proof. Construct-Stable-Set belongs to P by Proposition 2.3, because
given an influence game, we can determine a minimal successful team in
polynomial time: starting by the empty team, then continue adding vertices
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until obtain a team whose spread of influence meets the quota; this team is
winning, but without the last vertex is unsuccessful, so the team is minimal.
The remaining problems belong to P by Proposition 2.4, since by Theo-
rem 5.9 it is polynomial to decide whether a player is vetoer.
We know by Theorem 5.6 that computing Length in influence games is
NP-hard, so according the conjecture of [10], for influence gamesConstruct-
Least-Core would be NP-hard, and hence Construct-Nucleolus would
also be NP-hard. Furthermore, by Proposition 2.6 we have the following.
Corollary 5.1. For influence games, In--Core is NP-hard.
5.4 Subclasses of Influence Games
In this section we focus in restricted subclasses of influence games. These
restrictions could be useful to model particular systems, as well as to char-
acterize subfamilies for which the computational complexity of some of the
considered problems changes, becoming in general more tractable.
There are several ways to restrict an influence game (G,w, f, q,N). In
the previous sections of this chapter, we have already considered unweighted
influence games, as well as cases in which all the agents are players, i.e.,
N = V . Later, in Section 6.1.1, we restrict the labeling function so that
it corresponds to the majority rule, when individuals are convinced when a
majority of their neighbors are active. Further, in Chapter 6 we consider
some restrictions in the topology of the influence graphs, considering bipar-
tite graphs and star graphs. Bipartite graphs have been already used in the
context of spread of influence through social networks [136], and also for
collective choice model for societies [255, 256].
In what follows we consider two extreme cases of influence spread for
undirected and unweighted influence games, with restricted levels of influ-
ence. In Section 5.4.1 we consider a maximum influence requirement, where
agents adopt a behavior only when all its peers have already adopted it.
In Section 5.4.2 we consider a minimum influence requirement, in which an
agent gets convinced when at least one of its peers does. We show that, in
both cases, the problems IsProper, IsStrong and IsDecisive, as well as
computing Width, have polynomial time algorithms. Computing Length
150 – Chapter 5. Influence Games
is NP-hard for maximum influence and polynomial time solvable for mini-
mum influence.
5.4.1 Maximum Influence Requirement
Here we analyze first the case with maximum influence and maximum spread,
that is games of the form Γ = (G, f, |V |, V ) where f(v) = dG(v), or, as we
said in Definition 5.3, the game Γ = Γ(G), for some graph G. When the
graph G is disconnected with connected components C1, . . . , Ck, the associ-
ated game Γ(G) can be analyzed from the Γ(C1), . . . ,Γ(Ck). Observe that,
due to maximum spread, a successful team must influence all the vertices
in the graph. Therefore, the members of a successful team in a connected
component must influence all the vertices in their component. So, a team
X is successful in Γ(G) if and only if, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the team X ∩V (Ci)
is successful in Γ(Ci). We analyze first the case in which G is connected.
Theorem 5.12. In an unweighted influence game Γ with maximum influ-
ence and maximum spread on a connected graph G it holds that:
• Γ is proper if and only if G is not bipartite.
• Γ is strong if and only if G is either a star or a triangle.
• Γ is decisive if and only if G is a triangle.
Proof. From Lemma 5.3 we know that the successful teams of Γ = Γ(G)
coincide with the vertex covers of G. We also recall that the complement of
a vertex cover is an independent set.
If G = (V,E) is bipartite, let (V1, V2) be a partition of V so that V1
and V2 are independent sets. In such a case, both V1 and V2 = N \ V1 are
successful teams in Γ. Therefore, Γ is not proper. For the opposite direction,
if Γ is not proper, then the game admits two disjoint successful team, i.e, two
disjoint vertex covers of G, and hence each of them must be an independent
set. Thus the graph G is bipartite.
Now we prove that Γ is not strong if and only if G has at least two non-
incident edges. Observe that a graph where all edges are incident is either
a triangle or a star. If G has at least two non-incident edges e1 = (u1, v1)
and e2 = (u2, v2), {u1, v1} and N \ {u1, v1} are both unsuccessful teams,
therefore Γ is not strong. When the game is not strong, there is a team X
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such that both X and N \X are unsuccessful. For this to happen it must
be that there is an edge uncovered by X and another edge uncovered by
N \X. Thus G must have two non-incident edges.
Finally, it is well known that non-bipartite graphs has at least one odd
cycle, so the only non-bipartite graph with all pair of edges incidents (proper
and strong) is a triangle (decisive).
When the graph is disconnected, a successful team Xi in the game Γ(Ci)
can be completed to a winning coalition in Γ. Observe that, if Xi = V (Ci)\
Xi, the set V \Xi is successful in Γ and contains Xi. For an unsuccessful
team Xi in Γ(Ci) both Xi and V \Xi are unsuccessful in Γ. Therefore, the
previous result can be extended to disconnected graphs by requesting the
conditions to hold in all the connected components of the given graph.
Corollary 5.2. In an unweighted influence game Γ with maximum influence
and maximum spread on a graph G the following properties hold.
• Γ is proper if and only if all the connected components of G are not
bipartite.
• Γ is strong if and only if all the connected components of G are either
a star or a triangle.
• Γ is decisive if and only if all the connected components of G are
triangles.
Furthermore, the problems IsProper, IsStrong and IsDecisive belong
to P for unweighted influence games with maximum influence and maximum
spread.
In regard to the complexity of the two main parameters we have the
following result.
Theorem 5.13. For unweighted influence games with maximum influence
and maximum spread on a connected graph G, computing Length is NP-
hard. Computing Width of Γ(G) can be done in polynomial time even when
G is disconnected.
Proof. As before we use the fact that Γ(G) can be computed in polynomial
time. Furthermore, from Lemma 5.3, length(Γ(G)) is the minimum size of
a vertex cover of G. Therefore Length is NP-hard.
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We prove that Width can be computed in polynomial time by a case
analysis. If G is just an isolated vertex or just one edge, the empty set is the
unique unsuccessful team, thus width(Γ) = 0. Otherwise, either G has no
edges or has at least one edge and an additional vertex. In the first case, the
graph is an independent set with at least two vertices. Assume that u ∈ V ,
then V \ {u} is unsuccessful and we conclude that width(Γ) = n− 1.
In the second case G has at least one edge e = (u, v) and V \ {u, v} is
nonempty. We have again two cases, either G has an isolated vertex u or
all the connected components of G have at least one edge. When u is an
isolated vertex the team V \{u} is unsuccessful, therefore width(Γ) = n−1.
When all the connected components of G have at least one edge, any team
with n− 1 nodes is a vertex cover, thus width(Γ) < n− 1. Observe that the
set V \ {u, v} is not empty and, furthermore it does not cover the edge e,
thus we have an unsuccessful team with n − 2 vertices. Thus, in this case
width(Γ) = n− 2.
As the classification can be checked trivially in polynomial time we get
the claimed result.
For the case of maximum influence but not maximum spread, that is
influence games of the form (G, f, q, V ) where f(v) = dG(v) and q < n, the
game cannot be directly analyzed from the games on the connected com-
ponents, as the total quota can be fulfilled in different ways by the agents
influenced in each component. Nevertheless, as the influence is maximum,
any set of vertices X can influence another vertex u only when all the neigh-
bors of u are included in X, alternatively when u becomes an isolated vertex
after removing X. This leads to the following characterization of the suc-
cessful teams.
Lemma 5.4. In an unweighted influence game with maximum influence
Γ = (G, dG, q, V ) where G has no isolated vertices, X ⊆ V is a successful
team if and only if removing X from G leaves at least q − |X| isolated
vertices.
This characterization gives rise to the following problem:
Name: AreIsolated
Input: Graph G = (V,E) and q, k ∈ N.
Question: Is there S ⊆ V such that |S| ≤ k and removing S from G
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there are at least q − k isolated vertices?
Observe that for q = n we have that the solution S in the previous
problem must be a vertex cover, and thus the AreIsolated problem is
NP-hard.
Theorem 5.14. For influence games Γ with maximum influence, Length
is NP-hard and Width belongs to P.
Proof. The hardness result follows from the previous observation. Observe
that computing the minimum size of a solution to theAreIsolated problem
is equivalent to compute the Length of the game Γ = (G, dG, q, V ) and thus
the later problem is NP-hard.
When computing the Width of Γ = (G, dG, q, V ) we want to maximize
the size of the unsuccessful teams. Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to
analyze only unsuccessful teams X for which F (X) = X. We have that X
is an unsuccessful team with F (X) = X if and only if |X| < q and every
non isolated vertex in V \X remains non isolated in the subgraph induced
by N \X, i.e., G[V \X].
We consider first the case in which G has no isolated vertices. We first
solve the problem of deciding whether, for a given α, it is possible to discard
α nodes from G without leaving isolated vertices. For doing so we sort
the sizes of the connected components of G in increasing order of size. As
G has no isolated vertices all the connected components have at least two
vertices. Assume that G has k connected components C1, . . . , Ck with sizes
2 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wk.
When wk = 2, all the connected components have exactly two vertices.
Therefore, if α is even and at most n, we can discard the α vertices in
the first α/2 components, without leaving isolated vertices. Otherwise, the
removal of any set of size α will leave at least one isolated vertex.
When wk > 2. We compute the first value j for which
∑j
i=1wi ≤ α
but
∑j+1
i=1 wi > α. Let β =
∑j
i=1wi. Let Sj be the set of vertices in the
first j-components. If β = α, Sj can be removed without leaving isolated
vertices. When β < α we have two cases:
(1) wj+1 > α− β+ 1. Let C ⊂ Cj+1 be a set with wj+1− (α− β) vertices
such that G[C] is connected. The vertices in Sj together with the α−β
vertices of Cj+1 not in C can be removed without leaving any isolated
vertex.
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(2) wj+1 ≤ α−β+1. By construction, α < β+wj+1, thus wj+1 = α−β+1.
If j+1 < k, removing the vertices in Sj together with α−β−1 vertices
from the j+1-th component—as in case (1)—and one additional vertex
from the k-th component leaves no isolated vertices. If j + 1 = k, the
removal of any set of size α will leave at least one isolated vertex.
The previous characterization can be decided in polynomial time for any
value of α. By performing the test for α = q−1, q−2, . . . , 1 we can compute
in polynomial time the maximum value of α (αmax) for which α nodes can
be discarded without leaving isolated vertices. As the Width of the game
is just αmax we get the desired result for graphs without isolated vertices.
When G has n0 isolated vertices, we consider the graph G
′ obtained
from G by removing all the isolated vertices. Note that for a team X with
X = F (X) and any set Y of isolated vertices we have that F (X∪Y ) = X∪Y ,
thus width(Γ) = min{width(Γ′) + n0, q − 1}. Therefore Width can be
computed in polynomial time.
5.4.2 Minimum Influence Requirement
Let be Γ = (G, 1V , q,N) where 1V (v) = 1 for any v ∈ V . Observe that if
G is connected, the game has a trivial structure as any nonempty vertex
subset of N is a successful team. For the disconnected case we can analyze
the game considering an instance of the Knapsack problem. Assume that
G has k connected components, C1, . . . , Ck. Without loss of generality, we
assume that all the connected components of G have nonempty intersection
with N . For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let wi = |V (Ci)| and ni = |V (Ci) ∩N |.
Lemma 5.5. If a successful team X is minimal then it has at most one node
in each connected component. Minimal successful teams are in a many-to-
one correspondence with the MWCs of the weighted game [q;w1, . . . , wk].
Moreover, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.15. For unweighted influence games with minimum influence,
the problems Length, Width, IsProper, IsStrong and IsDecisive be-
long to P.
Proof. Let Γ = (G, 1V , q,N) be an unweighted influence game with mini-
mum influence.
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To compute Length, assume that the connected components of G are
sorted in such a way that w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wk. To minimize the size of a winning
coalition we consider only those coalitions with at most one player in a
connected component. Observe that, the length(Γ) is the minimum j for
which
∑j
i=1wi ≥ q but
∑j−1
i=1 wi < q. Of course this value can be computed
in polynomial time.
To compute Width, observe that an unsuccessful team of maximum
size can be obtained by computing a selection S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} of connected
components in such a way that
∑
i∈S wi < q and
∑
i∈S ni is maximized.
Computing such selection is equivalent to solving a Knapsack problem
on a set of k items, item i having weight wi and value ni, and setting the
knapsack capacity to q. As the Knapsack problem can be solved in pseudo-
polynomial time and, in our case, all the weights and values are at most n,
we conclude that Width can be computed in polynomial time.
To compute IsStrong, observe that in order to minimize the influence
of the complementary of a team X it is enough to consider only those teams
X that contain all or none of the players in a connected component. Let
wN =
∑k
i=1wi, and let αmax be the maximum α ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} for which
there is a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} with ∑i∈S wi = α. Note that α can be zero
and thus S can be the empty set. Observe that Γ is strong if and only
if wN − αmax ≥ q. The value αmax can be computed by solving several
instances of the Knapsack problem. As the weights are at most n, the
value can be obtained in polynomial time.
To compute IsProper, note that to check whether the game is not
proper it is enough to show that there is a winning coalition whose com-
plement is also winning. For doing so we separate the connected compo-
nents in two sets: those containing one player and those containing more
that one player. Let A = {i | ni = 1} and B = {i | ni > 1}. Let
NA = ∪i∈A(N ∩ V (Ci)) and NB = N \ NA. Let wA =
∑
i∈Awi and
wB = wN − wA. As all the components in B have at least two vertices,
we can find a set X ⊆ NB such that |F (X)| = |F (NB \X)| = wB. Thus if
wB ≥ q the game is not proper. When wB < q the game is proper if and
only if the influence game Γ′ played on the graph formed by the connected
components belonging to A and quota q′ = q − wB is proper. Observe that
Γ′ is equivalent to the weighted game with a player for each component in
i ∈ A with associated weight wi and quota q′. Let αmin be the minimum
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α ∈ {q′, . . . , wA} for which there is a set S ⊆ A with
∑
i∈S wi = α. Observe
that Γ′ is proper if and only if wA−αmin < q′. The value αmin can be com-
puted by solving several instances of the Knapsack problem having item
weights polynomial in n. Therefore, αmin can be computed in polynomial
time and the claim follows.
Chapter 6
Collective Choice Models
In the previous chapter, through the definition of influence games, we studied
the ways in which the actors of a multi-agent system influence each other
through their interactions in a social network and, in particular, the social
rules that can be used for the spread of influence. This chapter concerns
to some applications of unweighted influence games in multi-agent systems,
decision theory and social choice.
In Section 6.1 we define four collective choice models: OLF systems,
OLFM systems, mediation systems and influence systems. All of them can
be studied in the context of influence games.
OLF systems were defined in [255] as a kind of opinion leader-follower
collective choice model. Opinion leadership is a well known and established
model for communication policy in sociology and marketing. It comes from
the two-step flow of communication theory proposed since the 1940s [152].
This theory recognizes the existence of collective decision making situations
in societies formed by actors called opinion leaders, who exert influence over
other kind of actors called the followers, becoming in a two-step decision
process [152, 134]. In the first step of the process, all actors receive infor-
mation from the environment, generating their own decisions; in the second
step, a flow of influence from some actors over others is able to change the
choices of some of them [252].
The other three models are new. OLFM systems are a generalization of
OLF systems that supports inner nodes. In influence games, a set of agents
have to take a decision among two possible alternatives with the help of the
social environment or network of the system itself. However, sometimes not
157
158 – Chapter 6. Collective Choice Models
all individuals play the same role in the process of taking a decision. Thus,
mediation systems are inspired in a multi-agent system with a very simple
topology, but nevertheless it allows to study systems with a mediator, an
external kind of actor that can exert influence, in different degrees, to the
agents and thus help to reach a decision. In this sense, mediation systems
are an extension of unweighted influence games, in order to incorporate
an additional level of influence spread, exerted by the mediator. These
systems allows to model a natural mediation schema occurring in society.
Furthermore, we shall see that the main difference between influence games
and OLF systems is that in the first ones only one of the two alternatives
of the actors can be propagated, while in OLF systems it is propagated the
alternative with majority. Two kind of influence systems are defined to deal
with this difference.
In Section 6.2 we study some computational problems for mediation sys-
tems, showing that the presence of a single mediator facilitates the compu-
tation of several problems that are hard for influence games—see Table 5.1
of Section 5.3.
In Section 6.3 we study the computational complexity of computing the
satisfaction or Rae index for influence systems. The satisfaction measure was
defined in [255] for OLF systems, motivated by the theoretical study of the
effects that different opinion leader-follower structures can exert in collective
decision making systems. However, this measure is the same than the Rae
index, a power index introduced by Douglas W. Rae [220] for anonymous
games, that afterwards it was applied by Dubey and Shapley [66] for simple
games. We show that the computation of this measure is hard, and then we
present polynomial results for some particular cases. One of this particular
cases is closely related to the mediation systems.
In Section 6.4 we generalize for OLFM systems some properties that
the satisfaction measure meets for OLF systems. By using these properties,
we provide an axiomatization of the satisfaction score for the case in which
followers maintain their own initial decisions unless all their opinion leaders
share an opposite inclination. This new axiomatization generalizes the one
given by [256] for OLF systems under the same restrictions.
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6.1 Models
In general, a collective decision making model or collective choice model M
for a set of n actors is a decision system that defines a collective (choice)
decision function CM(x), where x ∈ {0, 1}n is the initial decision vector
or initial choice vector of the actors, assigning one of the values 1 or 0 as
collective decision. Let V be a set of actors, abusing of notation we may
consider CM(X) instead of CM(x) where i ∈ X ⊆ 2V if and only if xi = 1.
Note that the decision process may include many parameters in the model,
but in all models considered in this chapter we assume that the collective
decision function can be computed in polynomial time.
Definition 6.1. We said that x ∈ {0, 1}n is an initial decision vector, where
xi represents the initial decision of the i-th actor of some decision system.
Observe that we can associate to any simple game a collective decision
function in a natural way:
Definition 6.2. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be
an initial decision vector of the players. The collective decision function
associated to Γ is defined as follows:
CΓ(x) =
1 if X(x) ∈ W,0 otherwise
where X(x) is defined as {i ∈ N | xi = 1}.
6.1.1 OLF Systems
OLF systems are structured on directed bipartite graphs. The decision pro-
cess considers three kind of actors: opinion leaders, followers and indepen-
dent actors. Opinion leaders cannot be influenced but they may exert their
influence over its followers. Followers can change their initial decision when
the influence from the leaders is high enough. Independent actor neither
can influence nor can being influenced by others. At the end of the process
all actors arrive to an stable solution and the collective decision function
corresponds to the simple majority voting system.
Note that the influence games are able to represent a “more-than-two-
step flow of communication”, providing more complex influence relationships
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between the different actors than in this model. The model can be formalized
as follows.
Definition 6.3. Let n be an odd number. An opinion leader-follower
system—OLF system, in short—for a set of n actors is a pair S = (G, q)
where G = (V,E) is a bipartite digraph, representing the actors’ relation,
and q is a rational number with 1/2 ≤ q < 1, here called fraction value. The
set V is partitioned into three subsets:
• The opinion leaders: L(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅}.
• The followers: F(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) 6= ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
• The independent actors: I(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
Moreover, the fraction value q represents the fraction of opinion leaders with
the same inclination that is necessary to influence the decision of a follower.
When there is no risk of ambiguity, we simply use I, L or F instead
of I(G), L(G) or F(G). Note that in an OLF system S = ((V,E), q), if
(i, j) ∈ E then i ∈ L and j ∈ F.
Now we define the collective decision process of an OLF system, accord-
ing to [255].
Definition 6.4. Given an OLF system S, the collective decision vector
c = cS(x) associated to an initial decision vector x is defined as
ci =
b if |{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = b}| > bq · |PG(i)|c,xi otherwise. (6.1)
where b ∈ {0, 1} and q ∈ [12 , 1), and thus the collective decision function
CS(x) is defined as
CS(x) =
1 if |{i ∈ V | ci = 1}| > |{i ∈ V | ci = 0}|,0 if |{i ∈ V | ci = 1}| < |{i ∈ V | ci = 0}|. (6.2)
corresponding to the alternative with the greatest number of “votes” in the
final choice vector.
Observe that an OLF system S requires the number of actors to be
odd in order to ensure that decisions by the simple majority rule can be
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Figure 6.1: Example of an opinion leader-follower system.
reached [255, 256]. That is why inequalities in the last expression are strict.
Furthermore, both leaders and independent actors always follow their own
inclinations in the collective choice decision vector. A follower follows the
majority decision among its predecessors or their own inclination. In par-
ticular, when a follower has an even number of predecessors and q = 12 , it is
produced a tie, so the tiebreaker is given by the initial decision of the fol-
lower. Finally, note also that SG(L) = F, PG(F) = L and SG(I) = PG(I) = ∅.
Example 6.1. Figure 6.1 illustrates a bipartite digraph G = (V,E) corre-
sponding to an OLF system S = (G, 12) over a set of five actors. For both
initial decision vectors x = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0) and y = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) we obtain the
same collective decision vector cS(x) = cS(y) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) and the same
collective decision CS(x) = CS(y) = 1.
Note that the collective decision function of OLF systems is monotonic.
Lemma 6.1. Let S = (G, q) be an OLF system, its corresponding collective
decision function is monotonic, with respect to inclusion, on P(V (G)).
Proof. Let be x ∈ {0, 1}n. If i ∈ L ∪ I, as ci(x) = xi and xi ∈ {0, 1}, it is
clear that C(x− i) ≤ C(x) ≤ C(x+ i). If i ∈ F, we have three possibilities:
1) xi = 0 and ci(x) = 1, implying ci(x+ i) = 1, so C(x) ≤ C(x+ i);
2) xi = 1 and ci(x) = 0, implying ci(x− i) = 0, so C(x− 1) ≤ C(x); and
3) xi = ci(x), which is the same case as for opinion leaders and independent
actors.
6.1.2 OLFM Systems
In this section we define opinion leader-follower through mediators systems—
OLFM systems—as a generalization of the OLF systems of the previous
section. OLFM systems allow us to model decision making situations with
inner nodes that we called mediators, i.e., actors that behave as opinion
leaders and followers, in the sense that they receive their influence from
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opinion leaders or other mediators, and can influence the followers or other
mediators. Thus, while OLF systems are supported on directed bipartite
graphs, OLFM systems are supported on layered digraphs.
Definition 6.5. A layered digraph is a digraph G = (V,E) where V can
be partitioned into k subsets L1, . . . ,Lk called layers, so that every edge
connects a vertex from one layer to another vertex in a layer immediately
below, i.e., for all (a, b) ∈ E, a ∈ Li and b ∈ Li+1, for some 1 ≤ i < k.
This generalization allows to represent more complex social structures
in which there are more than only two hierarchical levels.
Definition 6.6. An opinion leader-follower through mediators system—
OLFM system, in short—for a set of n actors is a pair S = (G, q), where
G = (V,E) is a layered digraph and q ∈ [12 , 1) is the fraction value. The set
V is partitioned into four subsets:
• The opinion leaders: L(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅}.
• The followers: F(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) 6= ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
• The independent actors: I(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
• The mediators: M(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) 6= ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅}.
As for OLF systems, for OLFM systems we also restrict our attention
to an odd number of actors. Both the collective decision vector and the
collective decision function of the system coincide with the ones for OLF
systems—see expressions (6.1) and 6.2) in Definition 6.4. However, here the
collective decision vector must be determined in order, starting from the
actors in the first layer, then the ones in the second layer, and so on.
Observe that the opinion leaders and independent actors belong to the
first layer of the graph, L1. The mediators are distributed into layers of
mediation, whereas there are no mediators pointing to upper layers. The
opinion leaders can only be connected with the mediators of the first layer
of mediation, L2; the mediators of the last layer of mediation can only be
connected with the followers, and the mediators of interlayers can only be
connected with the mediators of the layer immediately below. Moreover,
L1 = L ∪ I and for all i ∈ Lk, i ∈ F. Hence, the OLF systems can be seen
as OLFM systems with only two layers, i.e., with k = 2. Note also that the
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Figure 6.2: An OLFM system with one layer of mediation.
influence of actors in higher layers can affect the actors’ decision in much
lower layers.
Example 6.2. Figure 6.2 illustrates a graph G corresponding to an OLFM
system S = (G, 12) over a set of seven actors. Here L = {1, 2}, I = {3},
M = {4, 5} and F = {6, 7}. The computation of the collective decision
function is shown in Table 6.1, where the initial decision vectors are ordered
according to binary numeration. The vertical suspension points on the table
indicate that both the collective decision vector and the collective decision
function are the same than for the previous and the next decision vector.
It is clear by Lemma 6.1 that the collective decision function for OLFM
systems is also monotonic.
6.1.3 Mediation Systems
In this section we consider a social network together with an external par-
ticipant, namely the mediator. The mediator can exert influence on some
nodes and accept advice from others, thus introducing a modification on the
way that influence spreads through the network. On the bottom layer, the
influence is exerted among the agents; on the second layer, the relationship
of influence between the agents and an external mediator is kept.
We model the society by a set of nodes where the relation with the me-
diator can be expressed by three disjoint sets (A,B,C). The set A is formed
by the agents that can influence the mediator but are not influenced by him.
The set B contains those agents that influence and can be influenced by the
mediator. Finally, the set C is formed by the agents that can be influenced
by the mediator but cannot exert influence. This kind of relationship can
be understood by means of the following star influence graph.
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x c(x) C(x) x c(x) C(x) x c(x) C(x)
0000000 0110100 0110110 1 1001110 1001101 1... 0000000 0 0110101 0110111 1 1001111 1001101 1
0001111 0110110 0110110 1 1010000 1011000 0
0010000 0110111 0110111 1 1010001 1011001 1... 0010000 0 0111000 0110010 0 1010010 1011000 0
0011111 0111001 0110010 0 1010011 1011001 1
0100000 0100010 0 0111010 0110010 0 1010100 1011101 1
0100001 0100010 0 0111011 0110010 0 1010101 1011101 1
0100010 0100010 0 0111100 0110110 1 1010110 1011101 1
0100011 0100010 0 0111101 0110111 1 1010111 1011101 1
0100100 0100110 0 0111110 0110110 1 1011000 1011000 0
0100101 0100111 1 0111111 0110111 1 1011001 1011001 1
0100110 0100110 0 1000000 1001000 0 1011010 1011000 0
0100111 0100111 1 1000001 1001001 0 1011011 1011001 1
0101000 0100000 0 1000010 1001000 0 1011100 1011101 1
0101001 0100000 0 1000011 1001001 0 1011101 1011101 1
0101010 0100010 0 1000100 1001101 1 1011110 1011101 1
0101011 0100010 0 1000101 1001101 1 1011111 1011101 1
0101100 0100110 0 1000110 1001101 1 1100000
0101101 0100111 1 1000111 1001101 1
... 1101111 1
0101110 0100110 0 1001000 1001000 0 1101111
0101111 0100111 1 1001001 1001001 0 1110000
0110000 0110010 0 1001010 1001000 0
... 1111111 1
0110001 0110010 0 1001011 1001001 0 1111111
0110010 0110010 0 1001100 1001101 1
0110011 0110010 0 1001101 1001101 1
Table 6.1: Collective decision function for an OLFM system.
Definition 6.7. A star influence graph (A,B,C, k) is an unweighted influ-
ence graph ((V ∪ {x}, E), f), where V can be partitioned into three sets
A,B,C ⊆ V and x is the central node or mediator, in such a way that
E = {(u, x) | u ∈ A ∪ B} ∪ {(x, v) | v ∈ B ∪ C}. The labeling function is
given by f(x) = k ∈ N and f(i) = 1, for all i ∈ V .
Based on this definition, we can define the following.
Definition 6.8. A star influence game is a tuple (A,B,C, k, q), where
(A,B,C, k) is a star influence graph, and a team X ⊆ V is successful if
and only if, for some q ∈ N, either:
• |X| ≥ q, or
• |X ∩ (A ∪B)| ≥ k and |X ∪B ∪ C| ≥ q.
Thus, we can introduce our mediation systems as follows.
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Figure 6.3: The spread of influence starting from the initial activation of
X = {a} on an unweighted influence graph.
Definition 6.9. A star mediation influence game is represented by a tu-
ple (G, f,A,B,C, k, q), where (G, f) is an unweighted influence graph and
(A,B,C, k) is a star influence graph, so that a team X ⊆ V is successful if
and only if, either:
• X is successful in the unweighted influence game (G, f, q, V ), or
• X ∪B ∪ C is successful in (G, f, q, V ) and also |X ∩ (A ∪B)| ≥ k.
Note that when a team is able to influence the mediator, then all the
agents influenced by the mediator are activated and they propagate the
alternative through the network.
Example 6.3. Let Γ = (G, f, 3, V ) be the influence game whose influence
graph (G, f) is illustrated at the left of Figure 6.3. For Γ we have Wm =
{{a, b, d}, {c}}, LM = {{a, b}, {a, d}, {b, d}}, L = LM ∪ {∅, {a}, {b}, {d}}
and W = P(V ) \L. Now let Γ′ = ({a}, {b}, {c, d}, 2, 3) be the star influence
game whose star influence graph—see Figure 6.3 at the right—is defined on
the same vertices of Γ. Thus, W(Γ′) = {{a, b}, {a, b, c}, {a, b, d}, {a, c, d},
{b, c, d}, {a, b, c, d}}. The team {a, b} is obtained from the second condition
of Definition 6.8, and the remaining teams from the first condition. Hence,
for the star mediation influence game Γ′′ = (G, f, {a}, {b}, {c, d}, 2, 3) we
obtain W(Γ′′) =W(Γ) ∪ {a, b}.
6.1.4 Influence Systems
In this section we consider two collective decision making models: the obliv-
ious influence system and the non-oblivious influence system. In the first
one, as in influence games—see Definition 5.2—the initial decision of the
actors in V \N is not taken into account and a pessimistic point of view of
their opinion is taken. In the second one, as in OLF systems—see Definition
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6.4—the initial decision of actors in V \N is taken into account under some
considerations.
Definition 6.10. An oblivious influence system is a collective decision mak-
ing model defined on the set of vertices of an unweighted influence game
Γ = (G, f, q,N) whose collective decision function CΓ is defined as follows:
CΓ(x) =
1 if |F (X(x) ∩N)| ≥ q,0 if |F (X(x) ∩N)| < q
where x ∈ {0, 1}|N | is the initial decision vector of the players.
Definition 6.11. A non-oblivious influence system is a collective decision
making model defined on the set of vertices of an unweighted influence game
Γ = (G, f, q,N) whose collective decision function CΓ is defined as follows:
CΓ(x) =
1 if |{i ∈ V | ci = 1}| ≥ q,0 otherwise
where x ∈ {0, 1}|N | is the initial decision vector of the players, and the
collective decision vector c = cΓ(x) is defined, for any i ∈ N , as
ci =
1 if i ∈ F (X(x)),0 otherwise
and for any i ∈ V \N , as
ci =

1 if pi(x) ≥ f(i) and qi(x) < f(i),
0 if qi(x) ≥ f(i) and pi(x) < f(i),
xi otherwise,
where pi(x) = |F (X(x) ∩N) ∩ P (i)| and qi(x) = |P (i) \ F (X(x) ∩N)|.
Note that for influence games in which N = V the oblivious and non-
oblivious model coincide because, in that case, for the non-oblivious model
we have that CΓ(x) = 1 if and only if |{i ∈ V | i ∈ F (X)}| = |F (X)| ≥ q.
Now we analyze some properties of the collective decision functions.
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Lemma 6.2. Let Γ = (G, f, q,N) be an unweighted influence game. For
both the oblivious and the non-oblivious system defined by Γ, the corre-
sponding collective decision functions are monotonic, with respect to inclu-
sion, on P(V (G)).
Proof. For the oblivious case, let be X,X ′ ⊆ V , it is enough to observe that
if X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ V then (X ∩N) ⊆ (X ′ ∩N) ⊆ N , and by monotonicity of the
spread of influence CΓ(X) ≤ CΓ(X ′).
For the non-oblivious case, let be X ⊆ V and i 6∈ X. When i ∈ N the
monotonicity of the spread of influence gives that CΓ(X) ≤ CΓ(X ∪ {i}).
When i 6∈ N we have that (F (X ∩N) ∩ P (i)) ⊆ (F ((X ∪ {i}) ∩N) ∩ P (i));
therefore, pi(X) ≤ pi(X ∪{i}) and qi(X) ≥ qi(X ∪{i}), and by definition it
follows that CΓ(X) ≤ CΓ(X ∪ {i}).
Observe that the above property allow us to use the collective decision
function of an influence system to define a simple game on the set of actors.
Note also that since OLFM systems are non-oblivious influence systems,
then by Lemma 6.2 it is easy to see that the collective decision function for
both OLFM and OLF systems are monotonic, as it was previously stated in
Lemma 6.1.
In order to relate OLF systems with influence games we consider the
following construction. Given an OLF system S = (G, q) we associate the
unweighted influence game Γ(S) = (G, f, q′, N) constructed as follows: N =
L ∪ I, q′ = ⌊n2 ⌋+ 1 and the labeling function f is defined as
f(i) =
dq · δ−(i)e if i ∈ F,1 if i ∈ L ∪ I.
Furthermore, note that N omits the set of followers because, under the
influence model, after their initial choice followers never can enforce their
personal conviction and their final decision depends exclusively on whether
the opinion leaders can influence them or not.
Lemma 6.3. The collective decision functions of both an OLF system S =
(G, q) and the non-oblivious influence system defined by Γ(S) coincide.
Proof. Let Γ(S) be the oblivious influence system associated with S. Let
X ⊆ V be the initial decision of the actors, c = cS(X) and c′ = cΓ(S)(X).
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For any actor i ∈ L ∪ I, by construction we have that i ∈ F (X ∩N) if and
only if i ∈ X. Observe that for i ∈ L ∪ I, the nodes can not be influenced
by any other node in S. Therefore ci = c′i. For any actor i ∈ F, we have
that {j ∈ P (i) | xj = 1} = F (X ∩N) ∩ P (i). Therefore ci = c′i because the
tie-breaking rule is the same in both systems. Thus, we have CS = CΓ(S)
and the claim follows.
As a consequence of the previous result we have a way to map OLF
systems to a subfamily of the non-oblivious influence systems. In general,
an OLF system cannot be cast as an oblivious influence system because the
tie-breaking rules are different. Nevertheless, we can consider a subfamily,
the odd-OLF systems, in which ties do not arise.
Definition 6.12. An odd-OLF system is an OLF system (G, 12) in which,
for any i ∈ F, δ−(i) is odd.
With no ties we can define a similar notion for influence graphs.
Definition 6.13. A majority influence graph is an influence graph (G, f)
in which, for any i ∈ V (G), δ−(i) is either odd or zero. If δ−(i) is odd, then
f(i) = (δ−(i) + 1)/2 and if δ−(i) = 0, then f(i) = 1.
Similarly to Lemma 6.3, we have the following.
Lemma 6.4. The collective decision functions of both an odd-OLF system
S = (G, 12) and the oblivious influence system defined by Γ(S) coincide. The
collective decision functions of both oblivious and non-oblivious influence
systems on a majority influence graph coincide.
Proof. Let S = (G, 12) be and odd-OLF system and let Γ(S) be the influence
game associated to S. Let X ⊆ V be the initial decision of the actors. As
in Lemma 6.3, for any actor i ∈ L∪ I we have that cS(i) = cΓ(S)(i). For any
actor i ∈ F, we have that {j ∈ P (i) | xj = 1} = F (X ∩ N) ∩ P (i). Since
1/2 ≤ q ≤ 1 and δ−(i) is odd, we cannot have |F (X ∩N)∩P (i)| = |P (i)| −
|F (X ∩N) ∩ P (i)| and thus no tie in the size of the expanded predecessors
arises. Therefore, in the oblivious model we have that CS = CΓ(S) and the
claim follows. The proof for the second part of Lemma is analogous.
Note that Lemma 6.4 is not true for OLF systems where some follower
has even indegree, as it is shown in the following example.
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Figure 6.4: When followers have an even number of predecessors, the satis-
faction in each model produces different results.
Example 6.4. Consider the OLF system S = (G, 12), whose graph G =
(E, V ) is depicted on the left hand side of Figure 6.4, and its associated in-
fluence game Γ(S) = (G, f, 3, V \ {1}) is shown on its right hand side. Note
that in the influence game, f(1) > 12δ
−(1), being δ−(1) an even number, so
that considering an initial activation containing exactly 12δ
−(i) = 2 prede-
cessors of i, then the follower can not be influenced. Therefore, assuming
an initial choice vector x with these characteristics, according to the oblivi-
ous influence system CΓ(x) = 0, but for the non-oblivious influence system
CΓ(x) depends of the initial choice x1 of the follower 1.
6.2 Computational problems of mediation systems
In this section we study several problems of simple games and influence
games for the mediation systems defined in Section 6.1.3.
For star influence games, the characterization of successful and unsuc-
cessful teams given by Definition 6.8 allow us to decide in polynomial time
whether a coalition of the associated simple game is either minimal winning
or maximal losing.
Theorem 6.1. Let (A,B,C, k, q) be a star influence game. Given a team
X ⊆ A ∪ B ∪ C, deciding whether X represents either a minimal winning
coalition or a maximal losing coalition, can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Note that for all X ∈ Wm, X ∩C 6= ∅ if and only if |X ∩A∩B| < k,
so that every X ⊆ (A ∪ B ∪ C) with |X| = q and X ∩ C 6= ∅ is a MWC.
The remaining MWCs depend of the quota. If q ≤ k, then every team
X ⊆ (A ∪ B) with |X| = q represents a MWC, and there are no other
MWCs. On the other hand, if q > k, we need to distinguish two cases: If
q > k+|B|+|C|, then every team X ⊆ A with |X| = q−|B|−|C| is a MWC;
otherwise, every team X ⊆ (A∪B) with |X| = k and |X∩A| ≥ q−|B|−|C|
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Algorithm 13 EnumeratingMWCs
Input: Star influence game (A,B,C, k, q).
Output: Minimal winning coalitions of the associated game (N,Wm).
1: print {X ⊆ (A ∪B ∪ C) | |X| = q,X ∩ C 6= ∅, |X ∩A ∩B| < k};
2: if (q > k + |B|+ |C|)
3: print {X ⊆ A | |X| = q − |B| − |C|};
4: else
5: if (q > k)
6: print {X ⊆ (A ∪B) | |X| = k, |X ∩A| ≥ q − |B| − |C|};
7: if (q ≤ k)
8: print {X ⊆ (A ∪B) | |X| = q};
9: return.
is a MWC. Since these conditions cover all possible cases, there is no other
MWC. Further, since each condition can be verified in polynomial time,
deciding whether X is a MWC can be done in polynomial time.
Furthermore, note that for all X ∈ LM , |X| = q − 1. Therefore, we
need to consider two cases. If |X ∩ (A ∪ B)| < k, then X ∈ LM if and
only if |X| = q − 1; otherwise, X ∈ LM if and only if |X| = q − 1 but also
(B∪C) ⊆ X. Since these conditions cover all possible cases, and both cases
can be verified in polynomial time, then the theorem holds.
Based in the previous result, we can construct algorithms with good
performance to enumerate both the MWCs and the maximal losing coalitions
of the associated simple game.
Theorem 6.2. Given a star influence game, both Wm and LM can be
enumerated with polynomial-delay.
Proof. Let us consider Algorithm 13, that follows the conditions given in the
proof of Theorem 6.1 for MWCs. By using standard techniques in steps 1,
3, 6 and 8, we can list every MWC in polynomial time.
Analogously, Algorithm 14 follows the conditions given in the proof of
Theorem 6.1 for maximal losing coalitions. Again, by using standard tech-
niques in steps 3 and 5, we can list every maximal losing coalition in poly-
nomial time. Note that in this case we only worry about the coalitions with
size q − 1.
From Theorem 6.1, we obtain that it is easy to decide several properties
for star influence games.
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Algorithm 14 EnumeratingMLCs
Input: Star influence game (A,B,C, k, q).
Output: Maximal losing coalitions of the associated game (N,LM ).
1: for all Y ⊆ N repeat
2: if (|Y ∩ (A ∪B)| < k)
3: if (|Y | = q − 1) print Y ;
4: else
5: if (|Y | = q − 1 and (B ∪ C) ⊆ Y ) print Y ;
6: return.
Theorem 6.3. For star influence games, the IsProper, IsStrong, IsDe-
cisive, IsDummy, IsPasser, IsVetoer and IsDictator problems can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let X ⊆ N be a team, α = |A|, β = |B|, γ = |C|; nα = |X ∩ A|,
nβ = |X∩B|, nγ = |X∩C|; and n¯α = |A|−nα, n¯β = |B|−nβ, n¯γ = |C|−nγ .
From the conditions of Definition 6.8, we can characterize every considered
property through equations and linear systems. Recall that linear systems
can be checked in polynomial time.
For IsProper, a star influence game is improper if at least one of the
following four linear systems is satisfiable.
Case I:
nα + nβ + nγ ≥ q;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ ≥ q.
Case II:
nα + nβ + nγ ≥ q;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ < q;
n¯α + n¯β ≥ k;
n¯α + β + γ ≥ q.
Case III:
nα + nβ + nγ < q;
nα + nβ ≥ k;
nα + β + γ ≥ q;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ ≥ q.
Case IV:
nα + nβ + nγ < q;
nα + nβ ≥ k;
nα + β + γ ≥ q;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ < q;
n¯α + n¯β ≥ k;
n¯α + β + γ ≥ q.
For IsStrong, if at least one of the following linear systems is satisfiable,
then the star influence game is weak.
Case I:
nα + nβ + nγ < q;
nα + nβ < k;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ < q;
n¯α + n¯β < k.
Case II:
nα + nβ + nγ < q;
nα + nβ < k;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ < q;
n¯α + n¯β ≥ k;
n¯α + β + γ < q.
Case III:
nα + nβ + nγ < q;
nα + nβ ≥ k;
nα + β + γ < q;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ ≥ q.
Case IV:
nα + nβ + nγ < q;
nα + nβ ≥ k;
nα + β + γ < q;
n¯α + n¯β + n¯γ < q;
n¯α + n¯β ≥ k;
n¯α + β + γ < q.
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Let i ∈ N be a player, the polynomial results for IsDummy, IsPasser,
IsVetoer and IsDictator comes from the following characterizations:
Conditions to fulfill the property
i ∈ A i ∈ B i ∈ C
Dummy never
γ = 0 and
q > k + β + 1
q ≥ k + γ
Passer
either q = 1, or k = 1
and q ≤ β + γ + 2
either q = 1, or k = 1
and q ≤ γ + 2 q = 1
Vetoer q = α+β+γ+1 = n q = α+β+γ+1 = n q = α+β+γ+1 = n
Dictator
q = β + γ + 2
and α = k = 1
q = γ + 2
and β = k = 1
never
Since every condition can be decided in polynomial time, the theorem
holds.
In despite of the above, since the successful teams of star mediation
influence games depend of a general influence game, then from Theorems 5.8
and 5.9 we have the following.
Corollary 6.1. Given a star mediation influence game, the IsProper, Is-
Strong, IsDecisive and IsDummy problems are coNP-complete, while Is-
Passer, IsVetoer and IsDictator can be computed in polynomial time.
Observe that when we restrict the games to only certain types of actors,
then we can get some interesting equivalences. The following result is related
to the Equiv problem mentioned in Section 4.1.1.
Proposition 6.1. Let (A,B,C, k, q) be a star influence game, then:
• if |A| = |C| = 0, the games (∅, B, ∅, k, q), (∅, B, ∅, q, q) and (∅, B, ∅, k, k)
are equivalent. Moreover, if q ≤ k, (∅, B, ∅, k, q) and (A, ∅, B, 1, q) are
equivalent; otherwise, (∅, B, ∅, k, q) and (∅, ∅, B, 1, k) are equivalent.
• if |B| = |C| = 0, then if q ≤ k, (A, ∅, ∅, k, q), (A, ∅, ∅, q, q) and
(A, ∅, ∅, k, k) are equivalent; otherwise, (A, ∅, ∅, k, q) and (A, ∅, ∅, 1, q)
are equivalent.
• if q ≤ |B| + |C| + 1 and q ≤ k, then the games (A,B,C, k, q) and
(∅, A ∪B ∪ C, ∅, q, q) are equivalent.
We finish this section with some restrictions that help us to obtain char-
acterizations of homogeneous games.
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Proposition 6.2. Let Γ = (A,B,C, k, q) be a star influence game, then:
1. if |A| = |B| = 0, Γ is always homogeneous with realization [q; 1, . . . , 1].
2. if |A| = |C| = 0, Γ is always homogeneous. If q ≤ k, with realization
[q; 1, . . . , 1], otherwise, with realization [k; 1, . . . , 1].
3. if |B| = |C| = 0, Γ is always homogeneous with realization [q; 1, . . . , 1].
6.3 Computing Satisfaction or Rae Index
According to [255], the satisfaction of an actor in a society refers to the
number of possible decisions that all actors can take as a group, such that
the collective decision coincides with the decision taken by the actor in
the initial choice vector. This general formulation allow us to define the
satisfaction measure for a generic collective decision making model.
Definition 6.14. Let M be a collective decision making model over a set
of n actors. The satisfaction measure of the actor i is defined as follows:
SatM(i) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}n | CM(x) = xi}|.
It is relevant to note that when the collective decision making modelM
is monotonic, with respect to inclusion, the satisfaction measure coincides
with the known Rae index.
Definition 6.15. LetM be a monotonic collective decision making model—
such as a simple game—over a set of n = |V | actors. The Rae index of the
actor i is defined as follows:
RaeM(i) = |{X ⊆ V | i ∈ X ∈ W or i /∈ X /∈ W}|.
In the context of simple games, Dubey and Shapley [66] established an
affine-linear relation between the Rae index and the Banzhaf value [149]:
Sat(i) = Rae(i) = 2n−1 + η(i) (6.3)
where η(i) = ηi(Γ) denotes the Banzhaf value of player i in a game Γ—see
Definition 2.28.
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It is clear that this equality holds for any collective decision making
model that is monotonic, such as OLF systems, OLFM systems, oblivious
and non-oblivious influence systems.
In what follows we analyze the computational complexity of Bval or
Construct-Banzhaf-value, and that of the following problem, for influ-
ence systems, simple games and subfamilies of simple games.
Name: Rae
Input: A collective decision making model M and an actor i.
Output: RaeM(i).
By equation (6.3), for simple games and influence games, the Rae prob-
lem and the Bval problems are computationally equivalent. The second
problem has received more attention and its complexity has been analyzed
before—see Sections 2.3.2, 4.1.2 and 5.3. For instance, from Theorem 5.7
we know that for influences games the Bval problem—and therefore, the
Rae problem—is #P-complete. In the same vein, note that given an actor i
and a value k, to determine whether Rae(i) ≤ k or Rae(i) ≥ k is NP-hard,
because we can just to apply a dichotomic search taking into account that
0 ≤ Rae(i) ≤ 2n.
It is also interesting to note that the Rae problem is closely related to
the Chow parameters problem for simple games—see Section 4.1.1—but
considering also losing coalitions. We continue with some additional results.
Lemma 6.5. Let M be any monotonic collective decision making model.
For any player i we have Rae(i) ≥ 2n−1. Moreover, if i is dummy then
Rae(i) = 2n−1, and if i is a dictator then Rae(i) = 2n.
Proof. The sentence Rae(i) ≥ 2n−1 is deduced from the equation (6.3). If i
is dummy, we know from Section 2.3.2 that η(i) = 0, so then Rae(i) = 2n−1.
If i is dictator, then for any coalition X ⊆ N , if X ∈ W then i ∈ X, and if
X 6∈ W then i 6∈ X, so hence Rae(i) = 2n.
The following example uses the reformulation of Lemma 6.4 to compute
the satisfaction measure of an odd-OLF system.
Example 6.5. Let S = (G, 12) be an odd-OLF system whose graph is
given in Figure 6.1. The equivalent oblivious influence system is Γ(S) =
(G, f, 3, N), where f(1) = 2 and, for any i 6= 1, f(i) = 1. Therefore,
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Rae(1) = Rae(5) = 16 and Rae(2) = Rae(3) = Rae(4) = 24. Note
that for every actor i ∈ V , the number of winning coalitions that contain
i coincides with the number of losing coalitions that not contain i, and it
corresponds to Rae(i)/2.
In the following Section 6.3.1 we show that the Rae problem remains
hard when the influence graph is restricted to be bipartite. In Section 6.3.2
we show two subfamilies of bipartite influence graphs on which Rae and
Bval can be solved in polynomial time.
6.3.1 Hardness Results
Let (G, f) be an unweighted influence graph, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n define
F k(V,G, f) = {X ⊆ V | |F (X ∩ N)| = k}. When there is no risk of
ambiguity, we say simply F k(V ). Since F k(N) = {X ⊆ N | |F (X)| = k},
we have |F k(V )| = 2|V |−|N | · |F k(N)|. Associated with this quantity we
consider the following problem:
Name: Expansion
Input: An influence graph (G, f), a set of vertices N and an integer k.
Output: |F k(N)|.
Our next result shows the relationship among the Rae and the Expan-
sion problems for oblivious influence systems. Before stating it we intro-
duce some notation. For an influence graph (G, f) and a vertex i ∈ V (G),
Fi = {j ∈ SG(i) | |PG(j)| = 1}. We denote as R(G, f, i) the influence graph
(G′, f ′) where G′ = G[V (G) \ (Fi ∪ {i})], f ′(j) = f(j) for j /∈ SG(i), and
f ′(j) = f(j)− 1 for j ∈ SG(i).
Lemma 6.6. Let (G, f, q,N) be an oblivious influence system, the satis-
faction, for the actors i ∈ V (G) \ N that can not participate in the initial
activation set and the ones without predecessors, is given by the following
expression:
Rae(i) =

2n−1 if i /∈ N
2n−1 + 2n−|N| · |F q−1(N\{i}, R(G, f, i))| if i ∈ N,PG(i) = ∅, SG(i) = ∅
2n−1 + 2n−|N| ·
r∑
j=1
|F q−j(N\{i}, R(G, f, i))| if i ∈ N,PG(i) = ∅, SG(i) 6= ∅
where r = 1 + |Fi|.
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Proof. Let z be an initial decision vector, set Z = {i ∈ V | zi = 1} and
X = Z ∩N .
For an actor i /∈ N , we consider two cases. When X ∈ W, CΓ(z) = 1.
Thus, actor i is satisfied only when zi = 1. When X ∈ L, CΓ(z) = 0, hence
actor i is satisfied only when zi = 0. Therefore, since for any initial decision
vector V \ {i} there is only one way to complete the initial decision vector
in such a way that the collective decision coincides with actor i’s decision,
then Rae(i) = 2n−1.
For a player i ∈ N , we have three cases in which i is satisfied by the
collective decision. The first two cases are the following: When X \{i} ∈ W
and zi = 1, so CΓ(z) = 1 = zi; and when X \ {i} ∈ L and zi = 0, so
CΓ(z) = 0 = zi. These two first cases provide a total of 2
n−1 initial decision
vectors for which the collective decision coincides with the initial decision
of player i. However, when X \ {i} ∈ L and zi = 1, then CΓ(z) = 1 if
X ∈ W. So we have another set of initial decision vectors for which player
i is satisfied.
We have to count all the winning coalitions X so that X \ {i} is losing.
To remove the influence of actor i we have to take into account the influence
graph R(G, f, i).
When SG(i) = ∅, actor i cannot influence any other actor. Observe that
Y ∈ F q−1(N \{i}, R(G, f, i)) if and only if Y ∈ L but Y ∪{i} ∈ W. Thus, as
the system is oblivious, we have 2n−|N | · |F q−1(N \{i}, R(G, f, i))| additional
initial decision vectors than can be completed, by adding zi = 1, to an initial
decision vector z with CΓ(z) = 1.
When SG(i) 6= ∅, player i can influence other actors. In this case we
have to separate those vertices which can be influenced directly and only by
i, those in the set Fi, from the rest. Observe that all the vertices in SG(i)\Fi
have degree at least 2. Now for a coalition Y , Y ∈ L but Y ∪{i} ∈ W if and
only if Y ∈ F q−j(N\{i}, R(G, f, i)), for some 1 ≤ j ≤ r. Taking into account
that the system is oblivious, there are 2n−|N | · |F q−j(N \ {i}, R(G, f, i))|
additional initial vectors that can be completed, by adding zi = 1, to an
initial vector z giving expansion q − j, with CΓ(z) = 1.
Note that in the case of odd-OLF systems N = L ∪ I. Furthermore,
for i ∈ I, PG(i) = SG(i) = ∅, and for i ∈ L, PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅.
Therefore, the previous lemma provides a complete characterization of the
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Rae measure. Note that it also shows that, as expected, opinion leaders
have always a satisfaction greater or equal than the independent actors, and
that both have always a satisfaction greater or equal than the followers.
For our hardness result we need to consider a variation of the counting
vertex cover problem [95]:
Name: #23-VC
Input: An undirected graph G = (V,E).
Output: Number of vertex covers of size exactly 23 |V | in G.
It is known that the problem of computing the number of independent
sets with size exactly 23 |V | in a graph is hard, in the sense that it cannot
be computed by a sub-exponential time algorithm, unless the well known
#P-complete #3-Sat problem—the counting version of the 3-satisfiability
problem—could be computed in sub-exponential time [118]. Hence, as the
complement of an independent set is a vertex cover, then the same result
shows that #23-VC is also hard. Now we are able to present the following
result, by using the same notion of hardness.
Theorem 6.4. The Expansion problem is hard for directed bipartite in-
fluence graphs.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the #23-VC problem. In our reduction
we produce two influence graphs. Let G = (V,E) be a graph, without loss
of generality we assume that G is connected, m = |E(G)|, n = |V (G)| is a
multiple of three, and n ≥ 6.
We construct a bipartite graph G1 associated to G which is defined as
follows. The set of vertices is given by V (G1) = V ∪ {E1, . . . , En+2} ∪ {z},
where z is a new vertex, and for 1 ≤ j ≤ n + 2, Ej is a marked copy of E.
Observe that |V (G1)| = n+ (n+ 2)m+ 1. The set of arcs is the following:
E(G′) ={(u, ej) | u ∈ V, e = {u, v} ∈ E and ej ∈ Ej is the marked copy
of e, 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 2} ∪ {(z, a) | a ∈ Ej , 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1}.
G1 is a directed bipartite graph and all the vertices have indegree either 0
or 3. Next we define the labeling function to define an associated influence
graph (G1, f1). We set f1(u) = 1, for u ∈ V , f1(z) = 1, and f1(u) = 2, for
u /∈ V ∪ {z}.
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Now we can define the reduction from #23-VC to Expansion, which
associates to G the input h(G) to Expansion defined as follows
h(G) =
(
(G1, f1), V ∪ {z}, 2
3
n+ (n+ 2)m+ 1
)
Let be X ⊆ V and α = |X|. We analyze the expansion of the sets
X ∪ {z} and X in (G1, f1).
When the initial activation set is X ∪{z}, we have two cases, either X is
a vertex cover or not. When X is a vertex cover all vertices corresponding
to edges get activated, therefore |F (X ∪{z})| = α+ (n+ 2)m+ 1. This last
quantity is equal to the required size only when α = 23n. When X is not a
vertex cover, we know that at least one edge e ∈ E is not covered, therefore
F (X∪{z}) misses—at least—all the marked copies of e. On the other hand,
we assume α ≤ n− 2, because a set with either n− 1 or n vertices is indeed
a vertex cover. Hence, we have |F (X ∪ {z})| ≤ α + (n + 2)(m − 1) + 2 ≤
n− 2 + (n+ 2)m− (n+ 2) + 2 ≤ (n+ 2)m− 2 which is strictly smaller than
the required size.
Now we consider the case when the initial activation set is X. Note that
in G1 only the copies of those edges with both endpoints in X are activated.
In the case that, for every e = (u, v) ∈ E, {u, v} ⊆ X, since G is connected
we have |F (X)| = n + (n + 2)m > k. Otherwise, again, at least the copies
of one edge and at least one vertex are not activated. Therefore we have
|F (X)| ≤ α+ (n+ 2)(m− 1) ≤ n− 1 + (n+ 2)m− (n+ 2) = (n+ 2)m− 3
which is strictly smaller than the required size.
From the previous case analysis, we have that the elements in F k(V ∪
{z}), for (G1, f1), are in a one-to-one correspondence with the vertex covers
of size 23n in G. As the reduction can be computed trivially in polynomial
time the claim holds.
The hardness of the Expansion problem does not rule out the possibility
of having some cases for which computing Rae or Expansion is easy. One
easy case for Expansion is when the value of k is smaller that the minimum
value of the labeling function over the actors not in N . It is easy to see that
for an oblivious influence system, in that case |F k(N)| = (n−|N |k ). For an
OLF system, we know by Lemma 6.6 that Rae(i) = 2n−1, for any follower
i, and thus it can be computed in polynomial time.
6.3. Computing Satisfaction or Rae Index – 179
Observe that in the reduction provided in the proof of Theorem 6.4 we
have constructed a majority influence graph. This leads us to the following
result.
Theorem 6.5. Both the Rae and the Bval problems are hard for directed
bipartite majority influence systems.
Proof. We prove hardness by showing a polynomial time reduction from the
Expansion problem to the Rae problem. Our construction starts with a
directed bipartite influence graph (G, f), a set N ⊆ V (G) and a value k
verifying the conditions required to be an input to sc Expansion. Let be
n = |V (G)|, we consider the influence graph (G′, f ′) which is obtained from
(G, f) by adding an isolated vertex z with label 1. We consider the influence
system associated to the game Γ(G, f) = (G′, f ′, N∪{z}, k+1) and the input
to the Rae problem (Γ(G, f), z).
In order to compute Rae(z) in Γ(G, f), according to the second case in
Lemma 6.6, we have to consider the reduced influence graph R(G′, f ′, z) and
the parameter q = k+ 1. By construction R(G′, f ′, z) = (G, f) and thus we
have Rae(z) = 2n + 2n−|N ||Fk(N, (G, f))|.
Therefore, if we could solve Rae in polynomial time we are also able to
solve Expansion in polynomial time, and the claim follows.
As a consequence of the previous result and the Lemma 6.4 we have the
following.
Corollary 6.2. Both the Rae and the Bval problems are hard for OLF sys-
tems and oblivious and non-oblivious influence systems on bipartite graphs.
Observe that in our reduction, the quota may assume any value. Thus,
the reduction does not show hardness for the Rae problem when it is being
applied to odd-OLF systems, where the quota is different than the required
majority. Therefore, it remains open to show the complexity of the Rae
problem for odd-OLF systems.
6.3.2 Polynomially Results for Bipartite Influence Graphs
In this section we focus our attention on two classes of unweighted influence
graphs, for which we can show that the Expansion and the Rae problems
are polynomial time solvable under the oblivious influence system. Like in
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Section 6.1.3, we consider an additional set of actors called mediators, that
receive their influence from opinion leaders and may influence the followers,
allowing several layers of influence, and hence establishing a more complex
hierarchy among the different actors. Our families of bipartite graphs ex-
tend, in some sense, the OLF systems by allowing an intermediate set of
actors that play the role of mediators between leaders and followers. The
first family, the strong influence graphs, contains layered directed graphs in
which the influence is exerted in an all to all fashion following a hierarchical
structure. In this case the mediators are interposed between the leaders
and the followers. The second family is based in the star influence games of
Definition 6.8, and it contains only one mediator.
The mediators in the influence graph are not players. Thus, according
to Lemma 6.6, for any mediator i, we have Rae(i) = 2n−1.
Strongly mediated influence system
The first class is based on directed bipartite influence graphs. It verifies
the property that any of the subgraphs constructed in Lemma 6.6 belong
to the family. We show that the Expansion problem can also be solved in
polynomial time for those subfamilies.
Our graphs family is defined recursively, by using isolated and complete
bipartite graphs. Recall notation from Definitions 2.5 and 6.3.
Definition 6.16. The family of strong hierarchical digraphs is formed by di-
rected bipartite graphs obtained by applying recursively the following rules:
• The graph Ia, for a > 0, and the graph Ka,b, for a, b > 0 are strong
hierarchical digraphs.
• If H1 and H2 are strong hierarchical digraphs their disjoint union is a
strong hierarchical digraph.
• If H1 and H2 are strong hierarchical digraphs and Ia is a set of a
independent vertices, the graph H with
V (H) = V (H1) ∪ V (H2) ∪ V (Ia) and
E(H) = E(H1) ∪ E(H2) ∪ E(Ia) ∪ {(u, v) | u ∈ F, v ∈ V (Ia)},
where F = F(H1) ∪ F(H2), is a strong hierarchical digraph.
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We use the term strong influence graph to denote an influence graph (G, f)
where G is a strong hierarchical digraph. Finally, a strongly mediated in-
fluence system is an influence system (G, f, q,N) where (G, f) is a strong
influence graph and N = L(G) ∪ I(G).
Observe that, for a strong hierarchical digraph G = (V,E), the set V
can be partitioned into t subsets or layers A1, . . . , At, so that edges occur
only between consecutive layers and are directed from layer i to layer i+ 1,
with i = {1, . . . , t− 1}.
Furthermore, the graph G′ which is obtained from G by removing a node
u ∈ I(G)∪ L(G) is also a strong hierarchical digraph. According to this, we
use for the following result the constructions provided in Lemma 6.6, taking
care of the fact that, by removing a vertex in an influence graph, some of the
labels of its neighbors may become zero. Our algorithm will thus allow for
a more general class of labeling functions in which some nodes might have
associated a label zero and therefore form part of the expansion of any set.
Lemma 6.7. Let (G, f) be a strong influence graph in which for each u ∈ V ,
0 ≤ f(u) ≤ n + 1. Let be N = I(G) ∪ L(G) and an integer k such that
0 ≤ k ≤ n, then |F k(N)| can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. For a given (G, f) our algorithm tabulates the function T (a, b), with
0 ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ |F(V )|, defined as
T (a, b) = |{X ⊆ N | |F (X)| = a and |F (X) ∩ F(G)| = b}|.
Observe that, if we can compute in polynomial time an array holding all the
T (a, b) values, we can obtain |F k(N)| by adding up the values in the row
corresponding to k.
We show by induction how to construct an array storing the desired
values inductively, following the structure of G. The base cases, according
to Definition 6.16, are sets of isolated vertices and the complete bipartite
digraphs.
When G = Iα, all the actor are independent, therefore F (X) = X for
any set of actors X, and thus we have
T (a, 0) =
(
α
a
)
for any 0 ≤ a ≤ α.
Observe that all those values can be computed in polynomial time.
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When G = Kα,β, for a set X ⊆ L(G) we have that F (X) = X ∪ {u ∈
F(G) | |X| ≥ f(u)}. To express the function T we need an auxiliary function
R(c), 0 ≤ c ≤ n, defined as R(c) = |{v ∈ F(G) | f(v) ≤ c}|. Observe that
a vector storing the values of R can be computed by sorting the actors of
F(G) in increasing order of labels and then counting the number of repeated
values. Using this information, we know that a X ⊆ L(G) will expand its
influence to all the followers u for which f(u) ≤ |X|, so therefore we have
T (a, b) =
∑
{c|a=c+R(c),b=R(c)}
(
α
c
)
.
The above values can be computed in polynomial time using a double
scanning as follows:
1: Initialize T (a, b) to 0;
2: for c = 0 to n
3: T (c+R(c), R(c)) = T (c+R(c), R(c)) +
(
α
c
)
.
We split the rest of the proof into two cases. The first case corresponds
to connected strong influence graphs and the second one to disconnected
strong influence graphs.
When G is connected assume that it is obtained from a set of connected
strong influence graphs {G1, . . . , Gk} and a set of isolated vertices Iα that
have to be fully connected to a set of isolated vertices Iβ in the next level.
For the correctness of the proof it is relevant to consider as a unique set all
the independent vertices that appear in the decomposition.
To get an expression for T we proceed inductively by considering the
graphs H1, H2, . . . ,Hk, where Hi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is the strong influence graph
obtained by fully connecting the vertices with outdegree 0 in the graphs
G1, . . . , Gi to the vertices in Iβ. Then we finalize by incorporating Iα and
the connections until Gk to obtain G. We have to consider separately the
first step, H1, the intermediate steps, H2,. . . , Hk, and the last step, G. In
order to avoid confusion we use Ti to denote the values of the function T
when its definition is restricted to the graph Hi, and T
′
i when it is restricted
to Gi. As before, we consider the function R defined over the vertices in Iβ,
R(c) = |{v ∈ V (Iβ) | f(v) ≤ c}|.
For the first step assume that T ′ holds the values of the function T
for the graph G1. The equation for T1 is quite similar to the one for Kα,β
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taking into account that the number of sets with the required expansion and
number of followers is already precomputed in T ′. Thus a set X activating
a1 = |FG1(X)| nodes of which b1 are followers will activate in addition R(b1)
vertices in Iβ. Hence we have
T1(a, b) =
∑
{a1,b1|a1+R(b1)=a,R(b1)=b}
T ′1(a1, b1)
which can be computed in polynomial time using a double scan.
For the intermediate step, 1 < i < k, we want to obtain Ti+1 from Ti
and T ′i+1. The main difference now is that we have to compute the number
of additional vertices in Iα that an expansion set in Gi+1 will activate. For
doing so we introduce some additional notation. For a value b, b ∈ Imf , let
c(b) = c if and only if R(c) = b. For any d, 0 ≤ d ≤ |F(Gi+1)| and 0 ≤ b ≤ β,
define
∆(d, b) =
0 if d ≤ c(b),c(d)− c(b) otherwise.
Observe that if b nodes in Iβ are activated by a set in Hi, a set in V (Gi+1)
activating d followers in Gi+1 will activate a total of ∆(d, b) new followers
in Hi+1. Therefore we have
Ti+1(a, b) =
∑
{a1,b1,a2,b2|a=a1+a2,b=b1+∆(b2,b1)}
Ti(a1, b1) ∗ T ′i+1(a2, b2).
As before, an array holding this set of values can be computed trivially in
polynomial time.
For the last step, we have to join Hk with Iα. This case is similar to
the previous one. We have only to take into account that Iα has a simpler
structure and that F Iα(X) = X. Thus, from Tk we can define T restricted
to G as follows:
T (a, b) =
∑
{a1,b1,a2|a=a1+a2,b=a2+∆(a2,b1)}
Tk(a1, b1) ∗
(
α
a2
)
.
Again, an array storing those values can be computed in polynomial time.
Finally, we have to consider the case in which the graph G is disconnected
an thus it is the disjoint union of k directed and connected strong influence
graphs G1, . . . , Gk, and possibly an independent set with size α. For the case
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of disjoint union, influence in different subgraphs cannot be aggregated. So,
if G is the disjoint union of G1 and G2, for X1 ⊆ V (G1) and X2 ⊆ V (G2) we
have that FG(X1 ∪X2) = FG1(X1) ∪ FG2(X2). We proceed again by steps
showing first how to define the T -values for the graphs H ′2 . . . H ′k, where H
′
i
is the disjoint union of G1, . . . , Gi and finally for G. Assume that Ti holds
the T -values restricted to Hi and that T
′
i+1 correspond to those for Gi+1.
As influence is just added we have that
Ti+1(a, b) =
∑
{a1,b1,a2,b2|a=a1+a2,b=b1+b2}
Ti(a1, b1) ∗ T ′(a2, b2).
Finally, observe that again an array holding the T -values can be computed
from Tk as
T (a, b) =
∑
{a1,b1,a2|a=a1+a2,b=b1+a2}
Tk(a1, b1) ∗
(
α
a2
)
.
Since all those tables can be computed in polynomial time, the result follows.
As we mention before the graphs constructed in Lemma 6.6, since (G, f)
is a strong influence graph and v ∈ L(G) ∪ F(G) are also strong influence
graphs, then the above results gives also the following:
Theorem 6.6. The Rae and Bval problems are polynomial time solvable
in oblivious strongly mediated influence system.
Example 6.6. Consider the strongly mediated influence system given in
Figure 6.5. According to Lemma 6.7, we have to consider first the disjoint
union of the two connected components of G with at least one edge and
finally incorporating to the graph the two independent actors, vertices 15
and 16, together.
For the second level in the graph we have three connected components
G1 = G[1, 2, 4, 5, 6], G2 = G[3, 7, 8] and G3 = G[12, 13, 14]:
1
1
1
2
1
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
3
7
3
8
1
12
1
13
1
14
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1
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1
13
1
14
1
15
1
16
Figure 6.5: A strong influence graph with two layers of mediation.
In the next table we record the T -values for each subgraph.
TG1 0 1 2 3 TG2 0 1 2 TG3 0 1 2
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 1
4 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - -
5 0 0 0 1 - - - - - - - -
The following subgraph to be considered is G4 = G[{x|1 ≤ x ≤ 11}] which is
created by combiningG1 andG2 with an independent set with two vertices in
the next layer. According to the algorithm, we have to compute in according
to the first step rules the T -values for the graph H, so we have the following:
1
1
1
2
2
4
2
5
2
6
3
9
4
10
TH 0 1 2
0 1 0 0
1 2 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
6 0 1 0
7 0 0 0
From H, following the equations of the second step, we can compute the
T -values for the graph G4, which are:
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1
1
1
2
1
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
3
7
3
8
3
9
4
10
TG4 0 1 2
0 1 0 0
1 3 0 0
2 2 0 0
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
6 0 1 0
7 0 1 0
8 0 0 0
9 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
The next step is to incorporate the connections in the last layer to get G1.
For this we have to use the rule of the first step applied to G4 and an
independent set with one vertex. This gives the following:
1
1
1
2
1
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
3
7
3
8
3
9
4
10
2
11
TG1 0 1
0 1 0
1 3 0
2 2 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 0 0
6 1 0
7 1 0
8 0 0
9 0 0
10 0 0
11 0 0
Now the algorithm computes the T -values for the disjoint union of G1 and
G2, obtaining:
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1
1
1
2
1
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
3
7
3
8
3
9
4
10
2
11
1
12
1
13
1
14
TG1∪G2 0 1 2 3
0 1 0 0 0
1 3 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0
4 0 0 3 0
5 0 0 2 0
6 1 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 1 0
10 0 0 1 0
11 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0
From this table we have to incorporate, as a disjoint union, an independent
set of size 2, to get the T -values for G. The following table gives the T -values
as well as the sum for each row, which corresponds to the value |F a(N)|.
TG1∪G2 0 1 2 3 4 5 |F a(N)|
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 3 2 0 0 0 0 5
2 2 6 1 0 0 0 9
3 0 4 4 0 0 0 8
4 0 0 5 2 0 0 7
5 0 0 2 6 1 0 9
6 1 0 0 4 3 0 8
7 1 2 0 0 2 0 5
8 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
9 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
10 0 0 1 2 0 0 3
11 0 0 0 2 1 0 3
12 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Star influence systems
Another way to extend the odd-OLF systems is to allow the possibility
that some actors at the same time could influence and be influenced by
other actor. The next definition is based on the star influence games of
Definition 6.8.
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Definition 6.17. A star influence system is an influence game (G, f, q,N),
where V (G) = L ∪ F ∪ I ∪ R ∪ {c} is formed by a set of opinion leaders
L, a set of followers F, a set of independent actors I, a set of reciprocal
actors R, and a central actor {c}, who acts like a mediator between the
followers and both the opinion leaders and the reciprocal actors. Thus,
E(G) = {(u, c) | u ∈ L ∪ R} ∪ {(c, v) | v ∈ R ∪ F}. For all i ∈ V (G) \ {c},
f(i) = 1, and f(c) ∈ {1, . . . , |L|+ |R|}. Further, q ∈ (0, n] and N = L∪ R∪ I.
Recall that by Theorem 6.4, the Expansion problem is hard for directed
bipartite influence graphs. Now we prove that for oblivious star influence
systems, the problem becomes polynomial time solvable.
Theorem 6.7. The Expansion problem can be solved in polynomial time
on oblivious star influence systems.
Proof. Let (G, f, q,N) be a star influence system, we show how to compute
|F k(N)| for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n in polynomial time. Let c be the central node of
the star influence system. For |F k(N)|, if k < f(c) then there is no initial
activation X ∈ F k(N) such that c ∈ F (X); hence, |F k(N)| corresponds to
the number of initial activations with k actors. On the contrary, if k ≥ f(c)
then |F k(N)| corresponds to the number of initial activations that cannot
influence the central actor, plus the initial activations that can do it; and
for the latter case, it is necessary to take into account that |F (X)| is at least
|R|+ |F|+ 1—where 1 is for the central actor—plus the number of actors in
L ∪ I. Therefore, we have:
|F k(N)| =

(|L|+ |R|+ |I|
k
)
if k < f(c),
f(c)−1∑
i=0
(|L|+ |R|
i
)( |I|
k − i
)
+
|L|+|R|∑
i+j=f(c)
(|L|
i
)(|R|
j
)( |I|
k − i− (|R|+ |F|+ 1)
)
if k ≥ f(c).
Using the above the total amount can be computed in polynomial time.
In Theorem 6.2 we proved that the enumeration of both the MWCs and
the maximal losing coalitions can be done with polynomial-delay. There-
fore, Theorem 6.7 allows to count the number of winning and losing coali-
tions for any star influence system in polynomial time, by computing 2|F|+1 ·∑n
i=q |F i(N)| and 2|F|+1 ·
∑q−1
i=0 |F i(N)|, respectively.
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1 1
1 3 1
1 1 1
Figure 6.6: A star influence system.
Example 6.7. Consider the star influence system (G, f, q,N) of Figure 6.6
with q = 4. Here |I| = |F| = 1, |R| = 2, |L| = 3 and f(c) = 3. Hence,
|W| = 22 ·∑8i=4 |F i(N)| = 4 · (0 + 3 + 12 + 13 + 4) = 128, and |L| =
22 ·∑3i=0 |F i(N)| = 4 · (1 + 6 + 15 + 10) = 128. Note that it holds that
|W|+ |L| = 256 = 28, as expected.
In order to transfer the previous result just observe that for a given star
influence system (G, f, q,N) the graphs required in Lemma 6.6 are obtained
from G by removing a vertex in N , and thus both are star influence systems.
As a consequence we have the following.
Theorem 6.8. The problems Rae and Bval are polynomial solvable on
oblivious star influence systems.
6.4 OLFM systems: Axiomatization of Rae index
For any collective decision making modelM, there exists an alternative def-
inition for the satisfaction measure or Rae index, that facilitates the writing
of some proofs of this section. The definition is as follows [255]:
RaeM(i) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
RaeM(i, x) (6.4)
where
RaeM(i, x) =
1 if CM(x) = xi0 otherwise.
In what follows, we use simply Rae(i, x) and Rae(i) when there is no risk
of confusion about M.
Example 6.8. Let us consider the OLFM system given in Example 6.2. Ac-
cording to our computation, for this case we have Rae(1) = 104, Rae(2) =
Rae(5) = 88, Rae(3) = Rae(7) = 72 and Rae(4) = Rae(6) = 64.
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Note that since OLFM systems are non-oblivious influence systems—see
Definition 6.11—then by Lemma 6.2 it is easy to see that the collective de-
cision function under OLFM systems—like in OLF systems—is monotonic.
Consider the collective decision vector in expression (6.1), Definition 6.4.
When the fraction value q is large enough, the expression becomes in
ci,S(x) =
b if xj = b for all j ∈ PG(i),xi otherwise (6.5)
where b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., such that followers maintain their own initial decisions
unless all their opinion leaders share an opposite inclination. This specific
case was studied by [256], where the authors provided an axiomatization
for the Rae index in OLF systems. For all what follows we shall consider
OLFM systems also restricted to this case, so we dispense of the quota q.
Recall by Lemma 6.6 that in oblivious influence systems, the actors of
the same type have always the same satisfaction score. However, this is not
the case for OLFM systems. Observe that in Example 6.2, for instance, the
satisfaction of a follower may be greater than the satisfaction of a mediator,
and equal than the satisfaction of an independent actor.
For what follows, we denote a score as a function f : V → R that assigns
some real value to each actor of the system. The following properties were
introduced by [255, 256] for OLF systems.
Definition 6.18. Let S and S ′ be OLF systems represented by the graphs
G and G′, respectively, with V (G) = V (G′). Let i, j, h be three different
actors. A measure given by the function f : V → R satisfies the properties:
1. Symmetry: if S(i) = S(j) and P (i) = P (j), then f(i) = f(j).
2. Dictator property: if S(i) = V \ {i}, then f(i) = 2n.
3. Dictated independence: if |PG(i)| = |PG′(i)| = 1, fS(i) = fS′(i).
4. Equal gain property: if i ∈ L∪I, j ∈ F and E(G′) = E(G)∪{(i, j)},
then fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(j)− fS(j).
5. Opposite gain property: if i ∈ L ∪ I, j ∈ I and E(G′) = E(G) ∪
{(i, j)}, then fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(j)− fS′(j).
6. Horizontal neutrality: if i ∈ L ∪ I, j ∈ F, h ∈ L, E(G′) = E(G) ∪
{(i, j)} and h ∈ PG(j), then fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(h)− fS′(h).
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The above are desirable properties for scores. The symmetry property
means that the score for actors with a symmetric position in the system is
the same. A non-symmetrical measure could lead to unconventional results,
e.g., two independent actors with different scores.
In this context, a dictator is an actor that points to all other actors of
the system. Hence, in OLF systems there may be at most one dictator, and
if n > 1, the dictator is always an opinion leader. Furthermore, if there
is a dictator, then all other actors follow this actor, so they adopt as final
decision the initial decision of the dictator. The dictator property states
that the dictators have the highest score as possible. Observe that this
notion corresponds to the dictator players of simple games. Furthermore,
this property is closely related to Lemma 6.5.
The dictated independence states that all the followers with only one
opinion leader have the same score. However, note that a follower who has
only one opinion leader has always to follow this opinion leader. Therefore,
since any actor with only one predecessor is a dummy, for Lemma 6.5 the
dictated independence is equivalent to the following:
if |P (i)| = 1, then f(i) = 2n−1.
The remaining properties involve changes in the structure of the OLF
systems, by assigning to an actor a new opinion leader. These properties
were inspired by similar properties for solution concepts in cooperative game
theory [255, 254]. In particular, the equal gain property is closely related
with the fairness concept by [191].
In a reasonable score, the addition of an influence relationship—a di-
rected edge—from one actor to another should increase the score of the
first actor, because now it is exerting more influence in the system. In this
scenario, we can consider two cases:
On the one hand, if the influenced actor was a follower before the addition
of the edge, then the score of this follower should also increase, because now
it is more difficult to change its initial decision. The equal gain property
states that when a follower gets an additional opinion leader, the changes
in scores of this follower and of its new opinion leader are the same. For a
score that does not meet this property, the addition of a relationship between
these kind of actors could be unfair for one of them.
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On the other hand, if the influenced actor was an independent actor,
then the score of this actor should decrease, because its final decision now
depends of the initial decision of the opinion leader. The opposite gain
property states that when an independent actor gets an opinion leader, the
sum of the scores of these two actors does not change. For a score that does
not meet this property, the addition of a relationship between two actors
could be unfair for the opinion leader, because it is not getting a profit
according to the effort it took to influence the independent actor.
Finally, horizontal neutrality is inspired by the properties considered for
collusion of players in cooperative games with transferable utility [154, 111,
254]. This property states that, if a follower with at least one opinion leader
gets an additional opinion leader, then the sum of scores of the old and new
opinion leaders does not change. This means that the increase in the score
for the new opinion leader comes fully from a decrease in the score for the
other opinion leaders. For a score that does not meet this property, the
new opinion leader could not get a profit according to the effort it took to
influence an additional follower.
It is known that these properties hold for Rae in OLF systems.
Theorem 6.9 ([255, 256]). For OLF systems, the Rae score satisfies the
six properties of Definition 6.18.
To show the axiomatization of satisfaction in OLF systems, in [256] the
authors introduce an additional axiom, which corresponds to the total sum
of the satisfaction scores over all actors, i.e., a satisfaction normalization.
Definition 6.19. Let S be an OLF system represented by a graph G =
(V,E). A score given by the function f : V → R is normalized if it satisfies
the following property:
7. Satisfaction normalization:∑
i∈V f(i) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n |{i ∈ V | C(x) = xi}|.
It is not hard to see that these properties are independent, in the sense
that there is no property that could be implied by other. In fact, note
that the equation of property 4 considers a follower, the one of property
5 considers an independent actor that becomes in a follower, and the one
property 6 does not consider any follower. Moreover, these seven properties
provide an axiomatization of the satisfaction for OLF systems.
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Theorem 6.10 ([256]). For OLF systems, the Rae score is the unique
measure that satisfies the properties 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Definitions 6.18
and 6.19.
In what follows we shall prove that all the properties for satisfaction in
OLF systems also apply for OLFM systems. However, to establish an axiom-
atization in OLFM systems, we need to generalize the equal gain property
and the opposite gain property, in order to consider the mediators in the
layered graphs. Although it is not required for the axiomatization, we also
introduce a generalization of the horizontal neutrality that is fulfilled for
satisfaction in OLFM systems.
Definition 6.20. Let S and S ′ be two OLFM systems represented by the
graphs G and G′, respectively, such that V (G) = V (G′). Let i, j, h be three
different actors, and k ∈ N such that k ≥ 0. We say that a measure given
by the function f : V → R satisfies the properties:
4b Equal absolute change property: if i ∈ Lk−1, j ∈ Lk and E(G′) =
E(G) ∪ {(i, j)}, then either fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(j)− fS(j) or fS′(i)−
fS(i) = fS(j)− fS′(j).
5b Opposite gain property: if i ∈ V , j ∈ I and E(G′) = E(G) ∪
{(i, j)}, then either fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(j)− fS′(j) or fS′(i)− fS(i) =
fS′(j)− fS(j).
6b Power neutrality for two opinion leaders: if h ∈ Lk−1, i ∈ Lk−1,
j ∈ Lk with PG(j) = {h} and E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(i, j)}, then either
fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(h)− fS′(h) or fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(h)− fS(h).
Note that the opposite gain property is a generalization of the prop-
erty 5 of Definition 6.18, because when i ∈ L ∪ I, it only holds fS′(i) −
fS(i) = fS(j) − fS′(j). The equal absolute change property is a gener-
alization of equal gain property, because when i ∈ L ∪ I, it only holds
fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(j)− fS(j). The power neutrality for two opinion lead-
ers is a generalization of horizontal neutrality, because for k = 2, it only
holds fS′(i) − fS(i) = fS(h) − fS′(h). Moreover, the properties 4b and 6b
were introduced by [255] for OLF systems—i.e., OLFM systems with two
layers—not restricted to unanimity, i.e., so that followers can change their
decisions based on a majority proportion of their opinion leaders.
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The following result proves that all the previous properties are fulfilled
by the satisfaction in OLFM systems.
Theorem 6.11. For OLFM systems, the Rae score satisfies the properties
1, 2, 3, 4b, 5b and 6b of Definitions 6.18 and 6.20.
Proof. For symmetry, for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, P (i) = P (j) implies ci(x) = cj(x).
Further, as S(i) = S(j), if xi 6= xj , then c(x) = c(x− i+ j); and if xi = xj ,
the satisfaction score does not change for the actors i and j.
For the dictator property, if S(i) = V \ {i} we have that i ∈ L and
|I| = |M| = 0, which is the same case proved for OLF systems in [255], i.e.,
as C(x) = xi for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, then Rae(i) = 2n.
For the dictated independence, let be P (i) = {j}, then for all x ∈ {0, 1}n
it holds ci(x) = xj , so the collective choice C(x) is independent of the
decision of the actor i. Hence, let be b = {0, 1}, if C(x) = b, there are
exactly 2n−1 initial decision vectors with xi = b, and 2n−1 with xi = 1− b.
For what follows, note that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n such that CS(x) =
CS′(x), it holds RaeS(i, x) = RaeS′(i, x), for all i ∈ V . Therefore, to
determine RaeS(i) and RaeS′(i) we only need to consider the initial decision
vectors x ∈ {0, 1}n where CS(x) 6= CS′(x).
For the equal absolute change property, first consider that i ∈ L ∪ I
and j ∈ M ∪ F. As cj,S(x) 6= xi and cj,S′(x) = xi, then CS(x) 6= xi and
CS′(x) = xi; hence RaeS′(i, x) − RaeS(i, x) = 1. If cj,S(x) = xj , then
xj 6= xi, so CS(x) = xj and CS′(x) 6= xj , which implies RaeS(j, x) −
RaeS′(j, x) = 1; and if cj,S(x) 6= xj , then xj = xi, so CS(x) 6= xj and
CS′(x) = xj , implying RaeS′(j, x) − RaeS(j, x) = 1. The possible change
of inclinations or decisions of successors of j keeps that CS(x) 6= CS′(x),
and this does not contradicts the above. Thus, by expression (6.4) we have
either RaeS′(i)−RaeS(i) = RaeS′(j)−RaeS(j) or RaeS′(i)−RaeS(i) =
RaeS(j)−RaeS′(j).
Second, consider i ∈ M. Note that in this case, the inclination of actor i
also depends of their predecessors. To deal with this, just replace xi in all
the above equations by ci(x), and note that ci(x) = ci,S(x) = ci,S′(x), so if
xi = ci(x), we obtain the same equations, and if xi 6= ci(x), we obtain that
RaeS(i, x)−RaeS′(i, x) = 1, getting the same final equations that above.
For the opposite gain property, first consider i ∈ L ∪ I and j ∈ I. As it
must hold that xi 6= cj , then CS(x) = xj 6= xi and CS′(x) = xi 6= xj ; hence
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RaeS′(i, x) − RaeS(i, x) = 1 and RaeS(j, x) − RaeS′(j, x) = 1. Second,
consider that i ∈ M∪F. For this case, just replace xi in all the above equations
by ci(x), and note that ci(x) = ci,S(x) = ci,S′(x), so it holds ci(x) 6= xj ,
CS(x) = xj and CS′(x) = ci(x); hence, RaeS(j, x) − RaeS′(j, x) = 1 and
either RaeS′(i, x)−RaeS(i, x) = 1 or RaeS(i, x)−RaeS′(i, x) = 1. Thus,
by expression (6.4) we have either RaeS′(i)−RaeS(i) = RaeS(j)−RaeS′(j)
or RaeS′(i)−RaeS(i) = RaeS′(j)−RaeS(j).
For the power neutrality for two opinion leaders, first consider i ∈ L∪ I,
j ∈ M ∪ F and h ∈ L. As |PG(j)| = 1, cj,S(x) = xh, and as |PG′(j)| =
2, cj,S′(x) 6= xj iff xh = xi 6= xj . Let b ∈ {0, 1}, if CS(x) = b and
CS′(x) = 1 − b, then cj,S(x) = b = xh and cj,S′(x) = 1 − b = xi = xj ,
hence RaeS′(i, x)−RaeS(i, x) = 1 = RaeS(h, x)−RaeS′(h, x). The pos-
sible change of inclinations of successors of j keeps that CS(x) 6= CS′(x),
and this does not contradicts the above. Thus, by expression (6.4) we have
RaeS′(i)−RaeS(i) = RaeS(h)−RaeS′(h).
Second, consider h ∈ M. For this case, just replace xh in all the above
equations by ch(x), and note that ch(x) = ch,S(x) = ch,S′(x), so either
RaeS(h, x) − RaeS′(h, x) = 1 or RaeS′(h, x) − RaeS(h, x) = 1. Finally,
consider i ∈ M∪F. Replacing xi by ci(x), where ci(x) = ci,S(x) = ci,S′(x), we
obtain analogous equations. Therefore we have either RaeS′(i)−RaeS(i) =
RaeS(h)−RaeS′(h) or RaeS′(i)−RaeS(i) = RaeS′(h)−RaeS(h).
Note that the satisfaction normalization of Definition 6.19 remains the
same for OLFM systems, because the collective decision function is the
same. From the previous theorem, since for OLFM systems the satisfaction
score satisfies power neutrality for two opinion leaders, then it also satisfies
horizontal neutrality. Moreover, note that both properties 4b and 5b remain
independent with the others. Indeed, in property 5b the actor j ∈ V (G) is
an independent actor, but in property 4b it is not true, because j belongs
to level k > 1. Furthermore, there is no equation in these properties where
both actors are in the same level, as it happens in property 6.
In what follows we prove an axiomatization of satisfaction for OLFM
systems.
Theorem 6.12. For OLFM systems, the Rae score is the unique measure
that satisfies the properties 1, 2, 3, 4b, 5b, 6 and 7 of Definitions 6.18, 6.19
and 6.20.
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Proof. We know by Theorem 6.11 that in OLFM systems the Rae score
satisfies properties 1, 2, 3, 4b, 5b, 6 and 7. To prove uniqueness it remains
to show that, on the assumption that f : V → R satisfies the seven axioms,
then this score must be equal to Rae.
By Theorem 6.10, we know that if there are no mediators—i.e., we have
an OLF system—then property 4b is replaced by property 4, so the score is
equal to Rae. Now we proceed constructively.
First, given an OLFM system S without mediators, we can transform
a follower i in a mediator by connecting it with an independent actor j,
obtaining a new OLFM system S ′. Thus, by property 5b, it holds either
fS′(i) − fS(i) = fS(j) − fS′(j) or fS′(i) − fS(i) = fS′(j) − fS(j). As fS(i)
and fS(j) are uniquely determined by Theorem 6.10, both equations yield
a system of linear equations easy to solve, so that the unknowns, fS′(i) and
fS′(j), can be uniquely determined.
From the above, note that actor j in S ′ becomes in a follower. And
also note that we can transform step by step other independent actors j in
followers, such that PG′(j) = {i}. In each step, satisfaction score can be
uniquely determined by using the same property.
Secondly, suppose that we have an OLFM system S with only one layer
of mediation, like the obtained above, with a follower j ∈ L3 so that PG′(j) =
{i}. Now we can transform a follower h ∈ L2 in a mediator, by connecting it
with follower j, obtaining a new OLFM system S ′. Thus, by property 4b, it
holds either fS′(h)−fS(h) = fS(j)−fS′(j) or fS′(h)−fS(h) = fS′(j)−fS(j).
This is basically the same kind of system of linear equations obtained with
property 5b), and as fS(h) and fS(j) are uniquely determined, then fS′(h)
and fS′(j) can also be uniquely determined. We can also repeat this process
by transforming new followers h ∈ L2 in mediators, obtaining in each step
that satisfaction can be uniquely determined.
Of course, the same kind of transformations can be done to create lower
layers, and therefore to produce any OLFM system.
Finally, note that property 1 implies that there is a constant c ∈ R such
that for all i ∈ I, f(i) = c. Hence, for every OLFM system, we can provide
new independent actors and then using them as opinion leaders, followers
or mediators, in such a way that f can always be uniquely determined.
Chapter 7
Centrality in Social Networks
The aim of this chapter is to propose new centrality measures that can be
used to analyze the relevance of the participants in a social network within
a process related to spread of influence.
In Section 7.1 we define some traditional centrality measures, namely
degree, closeness, betweenness, flow closeness and flow betweenness. After
that, we provide new centrality measures. The first two correspond to the
Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices, which can be bring to this
centrality context through the use of influence games. There is some pre-
vious work where the Shapley-Shubik index is used as centrality measure
for specific game-theoretic networks [193, 173], but as far as we know, the
Banzhaf index has not been used before for this purpose. Other two new
centrality measures are the effort and the satisfaction, that take advantage
directly from the notion of influence games. While effort’s centrality mea-
sures the effort required to make the social network follow the opinion of an
individual, satisfaction’s centrality measures the level of satisfaction of each
individual, so that it is influential if and only if it is taken into account. The
last family of centrality measures consider only influence graphs, so they
dispense of the quota of influence games. This help us to measure centrality
in time polynomial in the size of the network.
In Section 7.2 we perform an experimental comparison between these
new centrality measures and the classic ones. We compare them in some real
social networks on which the computations can be performed in reasonable
time.
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7.1 Centrality Measures
A social network can be represented by a graph, where each vertex is an
actor, individual, agent or player, and each edge connecting two vertices
represents an interpersonal tie among the respective actors. These graphs
may usually be directed, so that the interpersonal ties represent either a
flow of communication or an influence relation from one actor to another.
Furthermore, the graphs may be weighted, in such a way that the weight
of every edge represents the strength of that interpersonal tie. As far we
know, there are no traditional centrality measures defined for labeled graphs,
despite of the fact that a labeling function in a social network may provide
interesting additional information about the actors.
In this section we consider static networks, defined beforehand, so that
the number of vertices remains unchanged and there is no creation, deletion
nor strengthening of interpersonal ties. Recall that undirected graphs can be
treated as symmetric directed graphs, considering that an undirected edge
{i, j} between two actors i and j is the same that two directed edges (i, j)
and (j, i).
The centrality of a vertex refers to its relative importance inside of a
network, and depends of structural aspects at a global level. Centrality is
one of the most studied concepts in network analysis, and since the late 1970s
in social network analysis [85, 86]. There are several centrality measures that
provide different importance criteria to the vertices [143]. Three of the most
well-known and widely applied are defined as follows [261, 150].
Definition 7.1. Let be a social network with a set of vertices V and i ∈ V .
• The degree centrality (CD) corresponds to the indegree or outdegree
of each actor, i.e.,
C−D(i) = δ
−(i) or C+D(i) = δ
+(i).
In normalized version:
C ′−D (i) =
δ−(i)
n− 1 or C
′+
D (i) =
δ+(i)
n− 1 .
For undirected networks, δ(i) = δ−(i) = δ+(i), so CD is without dis-
tinction C−D and C
+
D .
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• The closeness centrality (CC) is the inverse of the sum of shortest paths
from i to the other actors, i.e., let D be the usual distance matrix of
the network,
CC(i) =
1∑
i 6=j(D)ij
.
In normalized version:
C ′C(i) =
n− 1∑
i 6=j(D)ij
.
If there is no path from i to j, we assume that (D)ij = n.
• Let bjk be the number of shortest paths from the vertex j until k, and
bjik the number of these shortest paths that pass through i, with i 6= j,
i 6= k and j 6= k, then the betweenness centrality (CB) is
CB(i) =
∑
j 6=k
bjik
bjk
.
In normalized version:
C ′B(i) =
1
(n− 1)(n− 2)
∑
j 6=k
bjik
bjk
.
If there is no path from j to k, then
bjik
bjk
= 0.
There are many other centrality measures based on the previous ones,
such as the Katz centrality, Bonacich centrality, Hubbell centrality, Newman
betweenness, among others [247]. The differences between these variations
are few, and do not involve a change of paradigm. Additionally, there are
other measures based on other ideas, like Eigenvector and Alpha central-
ity [247]. Some of these measures were initially defined only for undirected
graphs. However, some of them can naturally be generalized to directed
graphs and even to weighted graphs [243, 199].
Note that there are also traditional centrality measures that were defined
exclusively for weighted graphs. That is the case of the flow betweenness [86]
and the flow closeness [104], which are based on flow networks.
Definition 7.2. Let mjk be the maximum flow from the node j to the node
k, and mjik the maximum flow from j to k that passes through the node i,
with i 6= j, i 6= k and j 6= k.
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• The flow betweenness centrality (FB) is given by
FB(i) =
∑
j 6=k
mjik.
In normalized version:
F ′B(i) =
∑
j 6=kmjik∑
j 6=kmjk
.
• The flow closeness centrality (FC) is given by
FC(i) =
∑
i 6=k
mik.
Recently have been defined new centrality measures for flow networks,
based on the previous ones [104].
Henceforth, we represent social networks as influence games (G,w, f, q),
so we assume that N = V . The labeling of the vertices can be conditioned
to the nature of the network. Note that the isolated vertices can not be
convinced in any way. Since a power index is a measure of the importance
of the players in a game, then we can use them as centrality measures,
interpreting that an actor is more central in the network while it is more
necessary to generate successful teams. In this scenario, observe that, like
CB, both the Banzhaf index β—from now on Bz—and the Shapley-Shubik
index Φ—from now on SS—correspond to medial measures, in the sense that
they take as reference the sets of actors which pass through a given vertex.
Other measures like CD or CC are radial measures in the sense that they
take as reference a given vertex which starts or ends some paths through
the network [247].
Influence games can also provide new criteria to determine measures
of centrality. The following centrality measure, for instance, takes advan-
tage of the labeling function. Note that it does not consider explicitly the
weight function, although it is implicitly considered in the spread of influ-
ence. Other measures that consider the weight function could be defined as
well.
Definition 7.3. Let (G,w, f, q) be an influence game representing a social
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1a 1 b
1c 4 d
1
2 3 1
1
Figure 7.1: Influence game representing a small social network.
network, the (minimum) effort required by the network to choose a success-
ful team that contains a required actor is given by
Effort(i) = min{f(S) | |F (S ∪ {i})| ≥ q}.
A normalized version of the effort centrality measure (CE) is
CE(i) =
f(N)− Effort(i)
f(N)
.
Note that while greater is the required effort for a vertex, this vertex
should be less central.
Example 7.1. Let us consider the influence game given by the influence
graph of Figure 7.1 and a quota q = 4. Regarding the Banzhaf index, since
actor b is the unique critical player, we have that η(b) = 8 and Bz(b) = 1,
while η(j) = 0 and Bz(j) = 0 for j ∈ {a, c, d}. Regarding the Shapley-Shubik
index, as |{b}| = 1, |{b, a}| = |{b, c}| = |{b, d}| = 2, |{b, a, c}| = |{b, a, d}| =
|{b, c, d}| = 3 and |{b, a, c, d}| = 4, then κ(b) = 24 and SS(b) = 1, while
SS(j) = 0 for j ∈ {a, c, d}. Furthermore, Effort(b) = 1, Effort(a) =
Effort(c) = 2 and Effort(d) = 5, so CE(b) = 6/7 > CE(a) = CE(c) =
5/7 > CE(d) = 2/7.
The following measure is based on the satisfaction score defined in [255],
which is equivalent to the Rae index as we saw in Section 6.3.
Definition 7.4. Let (G,w, f, q) be an influence game representing a social
network, Wi = {X ⊆ V (G) | i ∈ X, |F (X)| ≥ q} and L−i = {X ⊆ V (G) |
i /∈ X, |F (X)| < q}, the satisfaction centrality measure (CS) is
CS(i) =
|Wi|+ |L−i|
2n
.
Note that we could define other measures based on CE or CS . For
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instance, we can define a simplified version of the effort, based on the pa-
rameter width:
Width(i) = min{|S| | |F (S ∪ {i})| ≥ q}
and to consider
CW (i) =
n− Width(i)
n
.
We have analyzed this measure CW , but it does not provide significant
differences on the results, so it is not considered in this thesis. Note that
the normalizations chosen for both CW and CE require a subtraction in the
numerator, like for CC .
In the next section we shall see that these new centrality measures are
useful for social networks with a relatively small number of actors. How-
ever, it is known by Theorem 5.7 that computing the Banzhaf value and
the Shapley-Shubik value for influence games is #P-complete, as well as by
Section 6.3.1 that computing the satisfaction score is usually a hard prob-
lem. Fortunately, we can define an additional family of centrality measures
that dispense of the quota of influence games, so they only need an influ-
ence graph and thus can be computed in polynomial time in the size of the
network.
Definition 7.5. Let (G,w, f) be an influence graph representing a social
network, the k-influence centrality is given by
Fk(i) =
∑
X⊆V,|X|=k,i∈X
|F (X)|.
In normalized version:
F ′k(i) =
Fk(i)∑
j∈V Fk(j)
.
Thus, for instance, when k = 2 the 2-influence centrality is equals to
F2(i) =
∑
j∈V
|F ({i, j})|.
Observe that flow measures consider networks where there exists infor-
mation that is transported through the edges with an associated cost. In
this case, it has influence exerted by the actors to other actors, and each
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Figure 7.2: Social network of monkeys’ interaction.
actor has an associated label that represents the difficulty to be influenced.
7.2 Cases of Study
In this section we consider three real social networks to compare the new
centrality measures with the traditional ones. The first one, monkeys’ in-
teraction, corresponds to an unlabeled and undirected graph; the second
one, dining-table partners, is a weighted directed graph; and the third one,
student Government discussion, is a weighted and labeled directed graph.
We finish with an additional social network with a high number of actors.
For this weighted directed graph we apply the 2-influence centrality measure,
obtaining a good computational performance.
7.2.1 Monkeys’ Interaction
Everett and Borgatti [77] provided a network that represents the real in-
teractions amongst a group of 20 monkeys observed during three months
alongside a river. It is an undirected graph where an edge {i, j} exists when
monkeys i and j were witnessed together in the river. The graph is formed
by 6 isolated vertices and a connected component of 14 vertices, as shown
in Figure 7.2. The authors considered the centrality measures CD, CC and
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Figure 7.3: Comparisons between Bz, SS and CS measures for every case in
Monkeys’ interaction network.
CB, as well as generalized versions of these measures for groups instead of
individuals. Years later, Latora and Marchiori [150] use the same network to
compare the previous results with the measure called information centrality.
In order to analyze this network we assume that the graph is symmetric,
and that the weight function is defined by w(e) = 1, for all edge e ∈ E.
In the context of our work, this means that a monkey can influence and be
influenced by other monkey if and only if they have interacted before. To
deal with influence games we use a quota q = 14, which corresponds to the
maximum spread of influence that can be obtained from a monkey. This
helps to obtain lower measures in isolated vertices, as it is to be expected
from a centrality measure. Now we consider the following natural labeling
functions for every vertex i ∈ V :
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Figure 7.4: Comparisons between Bz, F2 and F3 measures for every case in
Monkeys’ interaction network.
• Case 1 (C1): Minimum influence required to convince, f(i) = 1.
• Case 2 (C2): Average influence required, f(i) = ddeg(i)/2e.
• Case 3 (C3): Majority influence required, f(i) = bdeg(i)/2c+ 1.
• Case 4 (C4): Maximum influence required, f(i) = deg(i).
The comparison between the rankings for traditional measures and the
new ones are presented on Table 7.1. Note that for minimum influence
required to convince (C1), we have that |F ({i})| = 14 for every non-isolated
vertex i. Thus, for this case the new measures are not good representatives,
because all the non-isolated vertices assume the same score. By the same
reason, F3-C1 produces an extreme case, when isolated actors are more
central than the non-isolated ones, and CE does not provide a good ranking
for any case. However, for the remaining cases the labeling function is
relevant.
For Bz, SS, CS and sometimes for F2 the only pairs of monkeys with
the same ranking are (10, 17) and (13, 15). These measures allow a more
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Figure 7.5: Comparisons between new and traditional centrality measures.
relevant hierarchization than the given by the others. Note that Bz, SS and
CS provide very similar rankings. In Figure 7.3 we can see that Bz and SS
produce not only very similar rankings, but also similar scores. Moreover,
subtracting a value equals 0.5 to the scores of CS we obtain also similar
values than for the power indices. This is due to the definition of the mea-
sures. Furthermore, remember by Lemma 6.5 that the score of satisfaction
or Rae index is always greater or equal than 2n−1, so it is predictable that
the normalization produces scores greater or equal than 0.5. Additionally,
note that for CS the difference between the scores of the actors grows as
the differences among the labels of the vertices—from case C1 until C4—are
higher. Since Bz, SS and CS produce relatively similar results, we compare
the remaining new measures only with Bz.
See Figure 7.4. As we can see, F2 and F3 are very similar, and excluding
case C1, they recognize—in the same way than the previous measures—the
same actors as the most relevant. In contrast to CS , the measures F2 and
F3 are lower from one case to the next one, and the variability of the results
is lower in general.
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Figure 7.6: Original network for dining-table partners.
In Figure 7.5 we compare the traditional measures with Bz and F2-C2.
The results for the remaining measures are not so much different than for
the latter two. Leaving aside the case 1 for the new measures, there are
similarities between traditional measures and new ones. In the same way
than traditional measures, the most central monkey for Bz, SS, CS , F2 and
F3 is 3. The second score is for monkey 12, except for Bz-C3 and SS-C3,
where it is replaced by monkeys 13 and 15. Third score is for monkeys 13
and 15, except for CS-C4, F2-C4 and F3-C4, where they are replaced by
monkey 8. Finally, as expected, for almost every case the less central non-
isolated monkey is monkey 9, except for Bz-C2, SS-C2 and CS-C2, in which
case is monkey 5.
7.2.2 Dining-Table Partners
A second real network is illustrated in Figure 7.6. It was firstly provided by
a sociometric research [185] and, years later, it was also used to be handled
and displayed by a computational application [57].
It represents the companion preferences of 26 girls living in one cottage at
a New York state training school. Each girl was asked about who prefers as
dining-table partner in first and second place. Thus, each girl is represented
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Figure 7.7: Influence graph from the original dining-table partners network.
by a vertex, and there is a directed edge (i, j) per each girl i preferring girl j
as dining-table partner. Every vertex has an outdegree equals 2: edges with
weight 1 denote the first option of the girl, and edges with weight 2 denote
her second option.
We could assume that a girl has some ability to influence over another
one which has chosen her as a partner. Figure 7.7 shows the corresponding
network of this influence game, reversing each arc (i, j) by (j, i), so that
a vertex points to another when the first one has some influence over the
second one. Further, the weights of the edges must be exchanged, so that an
original edge (i, j) with weight 1 now becomes in an edge (j, i) with weight
2, and vice versa. This is due to a girl has more influence over another one
if that other has chosen her in first place rather than in second place. Of
course, now every vertex has an indegree equals 2: one edge with weight 1
and the other with weight 2.
Instead of the Monkeys’ interaction network, here there are no isolated
vertices, but we can still obtaining scores for Bz and SS measures equals
zero. For instance, see the scores for Bz-C1 and SS-C1 on Figure 7.8.
A common voting system is the one of absolute majority, in which an
option wins whether it has more than the half of the votes. According to
this idea, we consider for our experiments a quota q = 14, so that a team is
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Figure 7.8: Comparisons between Bz, SS and CS measures for every case in
Dining-table partners network.
considered successful if and only if through its spread of influence, this team
achieves to convince most of the girls. Moreover, for every vertex i ∈ V we
consider the following reasonable labeling functions:
• Case 1 (C1): Minimum influence required to convince, f(i) = 1.
• Case 2 (C2): Average influence required to convince, f(i) = 2.
• Case 3 (C3): Maximum influence required to convince, f(i) = 3.
The comparison between some traditional measures and the new ones
are shown on Table 7.2. We avoid the indegree centrality C−D because since
the indegree for each vertex is always 2, it does not provide any relevant
information.
Analogously to the previous section, Bz-C1, SS-C1, CS-C1 and CE have
several vertices with the same ranking, but when the required influence to
convince increases, the values of the measures are more diverse for the power
indices and satisfaction centrality. On the other hand, the measures Bz-C3,
SS-C3 and CS-C3 have the same values only for girls 1 and 2. Indeed, in
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Figure 7.9: Comparisons between SS, F2 and F3 measures for every case in
Dining-table partners network.
this sense girls 1 and 2 are equivalent for all the considered measures. Fur-
thermore, as in the previous network the measures Bz, SS and CS produce
very similar rankings and scores. See Figure 7.8. For the remaining com-
parisons we use the measure SS, because for some of the three studied cases
the results of the previous measures are similar to this one.
In Figure 7.9 we can see that the higher variability is obtained for the
Case 2. Note that F2 and F3 are very similar too. Moreover, F2-C1 and
F3-C1 have a similar behavior than SS-C1 and Bz-C1, although they present
important differences on the actors 17, 19 and 21. To compare with the
remaining measures, we consider in Figure 7.10 as representatives the mea-
sures SS and F2. In that figure we can see that for this network different
measures provide different centrality criteria.
The most central girls are highlighted in Table 7.2. Observe that girl 15
has a high centrality in all measures, but the high centrality of girl 9 depends
of the considered case: for Case 1 and 3, girl 9 has a high centrality, but in
Case 2 is far less central. Note that girl 13 is fairly central in C+D and for
the Case 3. For the other two cases, in despite of its high outdegree, only
exist paths from this vertex to another four, which is a severe restriction for
the new measures.
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Figure 7.10: Comparisons between SS, F2 and some traditional measures.
Additionally, unlike traditional measures, girl 10 plays an important role
in our new measures. This is because in despite of neither having a high
outdegree nor having too short paths to more distant vertices, she plays
an essential role in the spread of influence to convince distant sets of girls,
which in turn have no convincing power over her.
7.2.3 Student Government Discussion
Out third case of study considers the social network illustrated at the top of
Figure 7.11. This network represents the communication interactions among
different members of the Student Government at the University of Ljubljana
in Slovenia. Data were collected through personal interviews in 1992 [117],
being used later [57].
Every directed edge is a communication interaction and all of them have
the same weight equals 1. Each vertex is a member of the Student Govern-
ment, and unlike the previous cases, here vertices are labeled beforehand:
There are three advisors labeled 1, seven ministers labeled 2, and one prime
minister labeled 3. Note that these labels are not related with the spread of
influence.
We slightly modified this network to obtain the influence graph at the
bottom of Figure 7.11. We assume that every communication interaction is
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Figure 7.11: Student Government discussion network (up) and the adapta-
tion to influence graph (down).
an attempt to influence over another student, and the capacity to influence
depends on the student’s position. For instance, the advise of a prime min-
ister does not have the same effectiveness—marked with weight 3—than the
advise of an advisor—marked with weight 1. Furthermore, since the labels
of the vertices should represent the difficulty of each student i ∈ N to be
influenced according to their position in the Student Government, they have
been changed by the following values:
• f(i) = 1 if i is an advisor.
• f(i) = ddeg−(i)/2e if i is a minister.
7.2. Cases of Study – 215
Scores
Node C−D C
+
D CC CB Bz SS CE CS F2 F3
1 0.2 0.3 0.357 0.009 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516 0.110 0.100
2 0.5 0.1 0.200 0.004 0.154 0.076 0.45 0.515 0.084 0.086
3 0.2 0.6 0.435 0.023 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516 0.110 0.100
4 0.7 0.2 0.208 0.015 0.005 0.009 0.55 0.500 0.079 0.085
5 0.2 0.5 0.238 0.022 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516 0.094 0.091
6 0.4 0.5 0.238 0.127 0.164 0.176 0.82 0.516 0.094 0.091
7 0.6 0.4 0.227 0.110 0.005 0.009 0.64 0.500 0.079 0.085
8 0.8 0.4 0.227 0.159 0.005 0.009 0.55 0.500 0.079 0.085
9 0.2 0.4 0.227 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.82 0.500 0.076 0.085
10 0.0 0.4 0.556 0.000 0.164 0.176 0.91 0.516 0.119 0.108
11 0.3 0.3 0.227 0.122 0.005 0.009 0.82 0.500 0.076 0.085
Rankings
Node C−D C
+
D CC CB Bz SS CE CS F2 F3
1 7-10 8-9 3 8 6-10 7-11 1-4 1-5 2-3 2-3
2 4 11 11 10 11 6 11 6 6 6
3 7-10 1 2 5 6-10 7-11 1-4 1-5 2-3 2-3
4 2 10 10 7 1-5 1-5 9-10 7-11 7-9 7-11
5 7-10 2-3 4-5 6 6-10 7-11 1-4 1-5 4-5 4-5
6 5 2-3 4-5 3 6-10 7-11 5-7 1-5 4-5 4-5
7 3 4-7 6-9 4 1-5 1-5 8 7-11 7-9 7-11
8 1 4-7 6-9 1 1-5 1-5 9-10 7-11 7-9 7-11
9 7-10 4-7 6-9 9 1-5 1-5 5-7 7-11 10-11 7-11
10 11 4-7 1 11 6-10 7-11 1-4 1-5 1 1
11 6 8-9 6-9 2 1-5 1-5 5-7 7-11 10-11 7-11
Table 7.3: Comparison of centrality measures for the adapted version of the
Student Government discussion network. The more central values of the
measures are highlighted. We consider for influence games a quota q = 6.
• f(i) = deg−(i) if i is the prime minister.
Note that this labeling function provides a finer classification of the types
of actors in the network. Moreover, for this network we consider a majority
influence required to win, i.e., a quota q = 6.
Table 7.3 shows the results of the centrality measures corresponding to
the adapted network of Figure 7.11.
Note that for this network, traditional measures provide different rank-
ings. This can also be seen in Figure 7.12. In fact, none of the most central
actors for CC and CB coincide, and while the most central vertex for CC
is the advisor 10, this is the less central according to CB. This is because
vertex 10 has a high accessibility to all other vertices, but it is not a good
intermediary for connecting distant vertices through paths. In turn, regard-
ing the new centrality measures, as usual Bz and SS are similar, as well as
F2 and F3. Moreover, these last two measures are also similar to CS . For
this network, note also that CB and F2 produce the highest hierarchization
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Figure 7.12: Comparisons between both new and traditional centrality mea-
sures for Student Government discussion network.
of the actors.
In general, note that the prime minister—node 2—does not have a high
centrality. Regarding the power indices and the measures F2 and F3, this
is because this actor has only been reported with minister 8, on which may
exert some influence, but he has received many interactions—which we can
understand as comments, advice, suggestions, etc.—from other ministers
and advisors, exerting a strong influence on him. On the other hand, for
CE the low centrality of the prime minister is explained because he can not
influence any other member by himself, and at the same time his activation
requires the most highest effort.
7.2.4 Facebook interactions
We finish this chapter by considering a bigger social network, formed by
1, 899 students at University of California, Irvine. These students, intercon-
nected by Facebook in the period between April to October 2004, shared
59, 835 online messages in total, represented by 20, 296 directed edges. The
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Figure 7.13: Centrality scores for the Facebook interactions network, by
considering the F2 measure with p = 0.5.
weight of each edge represents the number of messages sent from one student
to another. This network can be downloaded from [197]. It was presented
in [198] and also used in [200, 206] for different purposes than those discussed
in this chapter.
In this case, for the labeling function we consider a parameter p ∈]0, 1]
such that for each vertex i ∈ V ,
f(i) =
⌊
p ·
∑
j∈P (i)
w(j, i)
⌋
where w(j, i) is the weight of the edge (j, i) in the network.
The considered measures were implemented in C++. In Figure 7.13 we
show the score results for the 2-influence centrality measure by considering
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Figure 7.14: Centrality scores for the Facebook interactions network, by
considering the F2 measure with p = 1.
a parameter p = 0.5. For an Intel Core 2 Duo processor clocked at 3.16
GHz, it took 20 minutes and 23.834 seconds of computation. In this case,
the most central vertex is 9 with a score F2(9) = 77, 241; the second one
is vertex 400 with F2(400) = 75, 330, and the third one is vertex 523, with
F2(523) = 65, 810.
Analogously, for p = 1 it took 14 minutes and 30.354 seconds of compu-
tation. The results are shown in Figure 7.14. In this case, the most central
vertex is 523, with F2(523) = 30, 769; the second one is vertex 400 with
F2(400) = 30, 767, and the third one is vertex 42 with F2(42) = 28, 867.
Note that measures based on the quota q for influence games—like Bz,
SS, CE or CS—can not be computed in polynomial time. Indeed, none of
these measures could obtain any result even in several weeks of computation.
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Concluding Remarks
In this thesis we have studied the computational aspects of many problems
of simple games. By introducing the influence games, we have been able
to apply several properties and problems from game theory, voting theory
and decision theory into other fields like social network analysis, multi-agent
systems and social choice.
Chapters 1 and 2 were devoted to explain the main known concepts
related to this thesis.
In Chapter 3 we have summarized the most usual forms of represen-
tation for simple games, regular games and weighted games. We examined
and obtained results about the complexity of the conversion problem related
to these representation forms. In some cases where the conversion problem
cannot be computed in polynomial time, we designed algorithms to solve this
problem with polynomial-delay. Our results show that MWF, PCBF and
FCBF representations are very compatible between them and with their re-
lationship with the others. However, bear in mind that FCBF—introduced
for regular games—will always be the most succinct of these forms of rep-
resentation. On the other hand, BDDF seems to have a similar perfor-
mance than SWF—recall that the second one can only be used to represent
regular games. Indeed, both BDDF and SWF can be useful because of
their succinctness, although the games in SWF and BDDF may also have
an exponential size in terms of n, i.e., the number of players. In turn,
weighted games have a more succinct form of representation, namely WRF,
based on a n + 1-vector of integers. However, it is known that there are
weighted games whose weighted representation requires that maxi∈N{wi}
to be (n+ 1)(n+1)/2/2 [208]. Furthermore, converting a weighted game from
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any of the considered forms of representation to WRF turns out to be poly-
nomial, but converting from WRF to any other representation requires ex-
ponential time and can not be done in polynomial time. We conjecture that
WRF SWF can also be solved with polynomial-delay. Also recall that
WRF is not univocal, in the sense that two weighted representations may
represent the same game. In this vein, another interesting problem that is
currently being studied by several researchers is to find the minimal integer
representations of weighted games, i.e., the weighted representation given
by the vector with the minimum integer numbers [22].
In Chapter 4 we started with a survey of the main computational com-
plexity results regarding many properties, parameters and solution concepts
for simple games. Although the list pretends to cover a wide spectrum of
problems in simple game theory, it is not exhaustive. In particular, there
exist several other power indices that have not been studied in this thesis
and could be considered in the future, such as the Holler index, the Deegan-
Packel index, the Johnston index, among many others. Several comparisons
and open problems between power indices are presented in [21]. Another
possible line of work is to find approximations of the values of power indices,
by using probabilistic techniques [22].
In this chapter we have solved some relevant open problems, such as
the decisive problem for simple games, regular games, and weighted games,
which is equivalent to the duality problem of hypergraphs or monotone
Boolean functions. For simple games in MWF and regular games in SWF, it
remains open to show whether the IsDecisive problem is polynomial-time
solvable or not. This problem remains open since 1996 [84] from the context
of hypergraphs, Boolean functions and propositional logic. Furthermore, we
solved the problem of computing the width parameter for a simple game
in MWF, and we introduced the problem of deciding whether a player is
dummy or not in a regular game in SWF. In general, most of the open prob-
lems are related to regular games in SWF, as for instance the IsDummy
problem. These games have been studied enough in MWF, where many
problems can be solved in polynomial time. However, as we have seen in
this chapter and the previous one, it is also relevant to find out the compu-
tational complexity of the problems for regular games in their most succinct
representation form.
These results, together with the ones in the previous chapter, can be
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useful for having at hand a comparative of the different usual forms of rep-
resentation. When we want to solve some decision problem on simple games,
if we know how the problem behaves for some particular form of represen-
tation, then we can know under which other forms of representation the
problem has similar complexity. For instance, since the IsDecisive prob-
lem belongs to QP for simple games in MWF—see Theorem 4.3—now we
deduce that it is also in QP for simple games in PCBF and for regular games
in FCBF.
At the end of this chapter we proposed a way to explicitly enumerate
decisive regular games. The ordering of the games within a lattice seems
helpful to list without repetition the various elements of a class. The pro-
posed enumeration algorithm is presented as a first line of research that
could be explored in depth in future work. It remains open to prove the
correctness of the algorithm, and attempting to parallelize the proposed
algorithm, in order to improve its performance.
Chapter 5 is perhaps the most innovative contribution of the thesis.
Inspired in the threshold model of spread of influence, the influence games
represent winning coalitions as successful teams that can convince enough
actors to perform a task. This approach reveals the importance of the
influence between some players over others in order to form successful teams.
Influence games are a new line of research that relates cooperative game
theory with other topics like multi-agent systems or social networks.
Influence games have been introduced and extensively studied in the
thesis. For these games we have determined the computational complexity
of the main computational problems considered in Chapter 2. As a succinct
way to represent simple games, several problems are hard in the context of
influence games. However, there are also many properties of players and
coalitions that are polynomial-time solvable. Moreover, there exist hard
problems that for interesting subfamilies of influences games can be solved
in polynomial time. It is interest to analyze influence games under other
spreading models, in particular the linear threshold model with random
thresholds. Another possible area of future research is to study both the
counting problem and enumerating problem for influence games. There
are many works related to count graphs that could help to this purpose.
Furthermore, it would be of interest to determine the complexity of the
conversion problems related to families of simple games defined through
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graphs, such as influence games or other families such as the ones studied
in [44].
The last two chapters of this thesis emerge as applications of influence
games. In Chapter 6 we have provided several collective choice models based
on variations of influence games. For mediation systems, based on influence
games restricted to star influence graphs, we proved that many problems
become polynomial-time solvable, since they can be reduced to the problem
of solving some systems of linear inequalities.
We also studied the satisfaction measure for the opinion leader-follower
systems—OLF systems—and other influence systems inspired in this one.
Interestingly enough, the satisfaction measure coincides with the well es-
tablished Rae index, that is closely related to the Banzhaf value over the
set of monotonic decision functions which can be casted as characteristic
functions of simple games. We proved that even for influence systems on bi-
partite digraphs, the satisfaction measure is hard, in the sense that it cannot
be computed by a sub-exponential time algorithm, unless the #P-complete
#3-Sat problem could be computed in sub-exponential time. Besides this
hardness result, we provided subfamilies of influence systems where the com-
putation of the measure becomes polynomial-time solvable. We have shown
that Rae and Bval can be solved in polynomial time for oblivious strongly
mediated influence system and oblivious star influence systems. It will be of
interest to know if the problems can be solved in polynomial time for those
families of graphs when we use the non-oblivious decision function. In this
vein, it remains open to study the computational complexity of other mea-
sures for OLF systems and their generalizations through mediators. Due
to the relationship between these models and simple games, all the power
indices introduced in the context of simple games can also be studied here.
As the satisfaction measure, power indices generally have a high complexity.
Nevertheless, it is possible that under some restrictions, these measures may
be computed in polynomial time. A first measure that could be studied is
the power measure defined in [255, 256] because it is strongly related with
satisfaction. However, the power measure has additional difficulties, since
it concerns both the set of minimal winning coalitions Wm and the set of
maximal losing coalitions LM of simple games. All in all, for any actor i in a
collective decision making modelM, power measure (POW) can be defined
by the following:
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POW(i) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}n | i has a swing in CM(x)}|
= |Wmi |+ |LM−i|
where Wmi = {X ⊆ V | i ∈ X, (X ∩ N) ∈ Wm, (X \ {i} ∩ N) ∈ LM}
and LM−i = {X ⊆ V | i /∈ X, (X ∩ N) ∈ LM , (X ∪ {i} ∩ N) ∈ Wm}. While
satisfaction is related to the Chow parameters, power measure is related with
the Holler index [119], also studied in the context of simple game theory.
Additionally, in this chapter we provide an axiomatization for the sat-
isfaction measure for OLFM systems, thus generalizing the corresponding
results for OLF systems proposed in [256]. OLFM systems are OLF systems
that incorporate mediators, allowing the presence of several layers of influ-
ence, and hence establishing a more general hierarchy among the different
actors. Equation (6.3) suggests that through small modifications, such as a
change in the normalization of Definition 6.19, it is also possible to define an
axiomatization of the Banzhaf value for OLFM systems. In the same vein,
note that there exist other axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value and other
power indices for simple games [66, 21]. It also remains open to determine
if the POW measure admits an axiomatization for OLF systems.
Our results show that there are many social models whose characteris-
tics can be efficiently addressed from a computational point of view. One
interesting direction for future work is to identify real social systems, whose
behavior could be analyzed with the techniques developed in this thesis. For
instance, by allowing connections among actors that belong to not imme-
diately consecutive layers. A first approach could be dealing with the star
mediation influence games proposed in Section 6.1.3. The interesting fact
of this model is that despite it breaks the layered structure of the graphs, it
is still simple, because the fraction value only affects the mediator.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we define new centrality measures for social net-
works represented by influence games. We have shown that weighted and
labeled social networks can represent influence games, and thus we can define
several measures over the set of actors in order to determine the relevance
of these actors in the network. Our experimental results do not contradict
the relevance criteria provided by traditional centrality measures. In some
cases, the resulting hierarchization of the players between the new central-
ity measures and the traditional ones are almost equal. However, there are
cases where the results are quite different. This is the case of the Student
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Government discussion network studied in Section 7.2.3. Thus, the new
proposed centrality measures provide new approaches and insights for so-
cial network analysis. Moreover, the new centrality measures defined here
can be naturally used for edge-labeled and vertex-labeled directed graphs, a
feature that is not supported by the most usual measures of centrality [31].
Influence games allow us to consider any power index as centrality mea-
sure. However, the biggest problem about some of these measures is their
high computational complexity. To overcome this difficulty, we have pro-
posed some alternative measures that consider influence graphs and they
can be computed very efficiently for social networks with a huge number of
actors. In this line, we proposed in Definition 7.5 the family of k-influence
centrality measures. It could be interesting to study other possibilities. For
instance, let d(i, j) be the size of the shortest path from the vertex i to j,
then a measure could be based on the influence of the set of neighbors at a
distance k, i.e.,
FNk (i) =
∑
{j∈V |d(i,j)=k}
|F ({i, j})|.
Another interesting line for future research is the comparison of the pro-
posed centrality measures with others more related with flow networks, such
as the flow betweenness and the flow closeness of Definition 7.2, or the re-
cently defined flow-cost betweenness centrality measure [104]. An example
of social network used to compare flow measurements is the Iranian Gov-
ernment’s network [104]. In addition, there are several other repositories of
social networks that could be used as cases of study [197, 239].
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Appendix A
List of decisive regular games
The following Table A.1 shows all the decisive regular games in SWF from
n = 1 until n = 7. They were obtained by implementing the ideas of
Section 4.4.2. Consider N = {n, . . . , 1}.
n decisive regular games in SWF
1 1
2 10
3 011 100
4
1001
0111
0110 1000
5 00111
01011
11000
01101
10100
10011
01111
10001
10010
01110
01100 10000
6 001111
100011
001111
011001
001111
100101
011100
001111
101001
100110
011010
010110
001111
110001
001110
100011
010111
110000
011001
010111
110000
010111
100101
011100
110000
100110
011010
010111
110000
101001
010110
110000
100011
011011
101000
101000
100101
011100
011011
100111
101000
011001
011010
101000
100110
100001
011111
100100
100011
011101
011110
100010
100100
011100
011000 100000
7
1000000 0110000
1001000
0111000
1000100
0111100
1010000
0110100
1001100
1100000
0101100
0011100
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1000010
0111110
1010000
0110010
1001110
0111000
1010000
1001010
0110110
1001000
0111010
1000110
0110100
1001100
1100000
1010010
0101110
0101100
1100010
0011110
0110010
1100000
0101110
1010000
0110110
1000110
0111000
1001010
1100000
0101110
0110100
1001100
1010010
0011110
0110010
0011110
1000110
1100000
0101110
0111000
1001010
0011110
1000110
0011110
1000001
0111111
1010000
0110001
1001111
0111000
1010000
1001001
0110111
1001000
0111001
1000111
0111100
1001000
1000101
0111011
1000100
0111101
1000011
0110100
1001100
1100000
1010001
0101111
1010000
1001100
0111000
0110101
1001011
1010000
0110100
1001101
0110011
0101100
1100001
0011111
1100000
1001100
0110100
0101101
1010011
0101100
0011101
1100011
0110010
1001110
1100000
0101111
1010000
1001010
0110110
0111001
1000111
0111000
1001010
0110110
1100000
1010001
0101111
0111010
1000110
1010000
1001001
0110111
1001100
1100000
1010010
0101110
0111000
0110101
1001011
0110100
1100000
1010010
0101110
1001101
0110011
0110100
1001100
1010010
0101110
1100001
0011111
1100010
0011110
1001100
0110100
0101101
1010011
0110010
0101110
1100001
0011111
0110110
1000110
1100000
1010001
0101111
1001010
1100000
0101110
0111001
1000111
0111000
1001010
0101110
1100001
0011111
1001100
1010010
0011110
0111000
0110101
1001011
0110100
1010010
0011110
1001101
0110011
1000110
0101110
1100001
0011111
1001010
0011110
0111001
1000111
0110001
1100000
0101111
1010000
1001001
0110111
0111001
1000111
0111000
1001001
1100000
0101111
1001000
0111011
1000011
0111100
1000101
1010000
0110111
1001100
1100000
1010001
0101111
0111000
0110101
1001011
0110100
1100000
1010001
0101111
1001101
0110011
0110100
1001100
1010001
0011111
1010000
0111000
1001011
0110011
1010000
1001100
0110101
1000111
1100001
0011111
1001100
0110100
0101101
1010011
1100000
0110100
0101101
0110011
1100000
1001100
0101101
0111000
1001011
0011101
1001100
0110100
1010011
– 231
0110010
1001110
1010001
0011111
1001010
0110110
0111001
1000111
1100000
1010001
0101111
0111000
1001010
0110110
1010001
0011111
0111010
1000110
1001001
1100000
0101111
1100000
1010010
0101110
0111000
1001011
0110011
1001100
1010010
0101110
0111000
0110101
1001011
1100001
0011111
1001100
1100000
1010010
0101110
0110101
1000111
0110100
1010010
0101110
1001101
0110011
1100001
0011111
1100010
0011110
0110100
0101101
0110011
1100010
0011110
1001100
0101101
0111000
1001011
0110110
1000110
1010001
0011111
1001010
0101110
0111001
1000111
1100001
0011111
1010010
0011110
0111000
1001011
0110011
1001100
1010010
0011110
0110101
1000111
0110001
0011111
1001001
0111001
1000111
1100000
0101111
0111000
1001001
0011111
1000011
1010000
0110111
0111100
1000101
1100000
0101111
1100000
1010001
0101111
0111000
1001011
0110011
1001100
1010001
0111000
0110101
1001011
0011111
1001100
1100000
1010001
0101111
0110101
1000111
0110100
1010001
1001101
0110011
0011111
1010000
0110011
1000111
1100001
0011111
0110100
0101101
0110011
1100001
0011111
1001100
0101101
0111000
1001011
1100000
0101101
0110011
1010100
0111000
1001011
1100000
1001100
0101101
1000111
0011101
0110100
0110011
0011101
1001100
0111000
1001011
1001010
0110110
0111001
1000111
1010001
0011111
0111010
1000110
1001001
0011111
1010010
0101110
0111000
1001011
0110011
1100001
0011111
1100000
1010010
0101110
0110011
1000111
1001100
1010010
0101110
0110101
1100001
0011111
1000111
1100010
0011110
0101101
0110011
1010100
0111000
1001011
1100010
0011110
1001100
0101101
1000111
1010010
0011110
0110011
1000111
1001001
0111001
1000111
0011111
1000011
1100000
0101111
0111100
1000101
0011111
1010001
0111000
1001011
0110011
0011111
232 – Appendix A. List of decisive regular games
1100000
1010001
0101111
0110011
1000111
1001100
1010001
0110101
0011111
1000111
1100001
0011111
0101101
0110011
1010100
0111000
1001011
1100001
0011111
1001100
0101101
1000111
1100000
0111000
0101011
1100000
0101101
0110011
1010100
1000111
0011101
0110011
1010100
0111000
1001011
0011101
1001100
1000111
1010010
0101110
0110011
1100001
0011111
1000111
1100010
0011110
0111000
0101011
1100010
0011110
0101101
0110011
1010100
1000111
1000011
0011111
1010001
0110011
0011111
1000111
1100001
0011111
0111000
0101011
1100001
0011111
0101101
0110011
1010100
1000111
1100000
0101011
1011000
1000111
0011101
0111000
1100100
0101011
0011101
0110011
1010100
1000111
1100010
0011110
0101011
1011000
1000111
1100001
0011111
0101011
1011000
1000111
1100000
0100111
0011101
1100100
0101011
1011000
1000111
0111000
0011011
1100010
0011110
0100111
1100001
0011111
0100111
1011000
1000111
0011011
0011101
1100100
0100111
0011011
1101000
0100111
1110000
0010111
0001111
Table A.1: List of decisive regular games in SWF from n = 1 until n = 7.
Appendix B
List of Influence Games
In this appendix we enumerate all the minimal unweighted influence games
(G, f, q,N) with N = V , for 3 and 4 players. By “minimal” we refer to
those influence games that are minimal with respect to their edges, labels
and quota. We consider as restrictions that 0 ≤ q ≤ n and for all i ∈ N ,
0 < f(i) ≤ δ−(i); if δ−(i) = 0, we assume f(i) = 1.
Unweighted Influence Games for Three Players
Table B.1 shows the digraphs without loops for 3 nodes [222, 114]. Observe
that there are 3 graphs disconnected and 13 connected. See the sequences
A000273 and A003085 of [238].
1 •
•
• 2 •
•
• 3 •
•
• 4 •
•
•
5 •
•
• 6 •
•
• 7 •
•
• 8 •
•
•
9 •
•
• 10 •
•
• 11 •
•
• 12 •
•
•
13 •
•
• 14 •
•
• 15 •
•
• 16 •
•
•
Table B.1: Digraphs without loops with 3 nodes.
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The following Table B.2 shows all the minimal unweighted influence
games corresponding to the 10 simple games up to isomorphism for n = 3.
Observe that only the trivial games 1 and 5 cannot be represented by con-
nected graphs.
] Wm connected q ] digraph disconnected q ] digraph
1 ∅ – – – 1
1
1 4 1
2 000 1
1
1
any connected graph
with 2 edges
0 4, 5, 6 1
1
1 0 1
3 100 1
1
1 1
1
1 3 4, 5 – – –
4 110 1
1
1 3 6 1
1
1 3 2
5 111 – – – 1
1
1 3 1
6
010
100
1
1
1 1
1
1 2 5, 6 1
1
1 2 3
7
100
011
1
1
1 2 4 1
1
1 2 2
8
101
110
1
2
2 3 13 1
1
1 3 3
9
001
010
100
1
1
1
any connected graph
with 2 edges
1 4, 5, 6 1
1
1 1 1
10
110
101
011
1
2
1 2 6 1
1
1 2 1
Table B.2: The minimal unweighted influence games corresponding to the
10 simple games up to isomorphism for n = 3.
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Unweighted Influence Games for Four Players
For n = 4 there are 218 directed graphs—including 19 disconnected graphs—
and 30 simple games up to isomorphism; 29 of them are listed in [42], and
here we add also (N, {∅}). The number of the digraphs correspond to the
codes given in [222].
The following Table B.3 shows all the minimal unweighted influence
games corresponding to the 30 simple games up to isomorphism for n = 4.
] Wm connected q ] digraph disconnected q ] digraph
1 ∅ – – – 1 1
1 1
5 D21
2 0000 1 1
1 1
any connected graph
with 3 edges
0
D28, D31
D32, D33
D36, D38
D39, D40
1 1
1 1
0 D21
3 1000
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
4
D28, D31
D32, D38
– – –
4 1100
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
4
D33, D36
D39
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
4
D23, D25
D27
5 1110 1 1
1 1
4 D40 1 1
1 1
4 D22
6 1111 – – – 1 1
1 1
4 D21
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7
1000
0100
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
3
D31, D36
D38
1 1
1 1
3 D29
8
1000
0110
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
3
D32, D33
D39
1 1
1 1
3 D25
9
1000
0111
1 1
1 1
3 D28 1 1
1 1
3 D23
10
1100
0011
1 2
2 1
3 D63 – – –
11
1100
1010
1 1
1 2
1 1
1 1
3
4
D39
D56
1 1
1 1
4 D37
12
1100
1011
1 3
1 1
1 2
2 1
4 D91, D92 1 2
1 1
4 D47
13
1110
1101
1 1
1 3
1 1
2 2
4 D62, D63 1 1
1 1
4 D24
14
1000
0100
0010
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
D36, D38
D39, D40
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
D34, D35
D37
– 237
15
1000
0100
0011
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
D31, D32
D33
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
D24, D25
D26, D27
16
1000
0110
0101
1 1
1 1
3 D54 1 1
1 1
3 D34
17
1100
1010
0110
1 1
1 1
3 D40 1 1
1 1
3 D26
18
1100
1010
0101
2 1
1 1
3 D54 1 1
1 1
3 D27
19
1100
1010
1001
1 1
2 1
1 2
1 1
1 2
1 1
4
D92, D93
D94
1 1
1 1
4 D35
20
1100
1010
0111
1 1
3 1
3 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
3
D61, D62
D72
1 1
1 1
3 D22
21
1100
1011
0111
1 1
2 1
3 D36 1 1
1 2
3 D26
22
1110
1101
1011
1 1
1 3
4 D88 1 2
2 2
4 D116
238 – Appendix B. List of Influence Games
23
1000
0100
0010
0001
1 1
1 1
any connected graph
with 3 edges
1
D28, D31
D32, D33
D36, D38
D39, D40
1 1
1 1
1 D21
24
1000
0110
0101
0011
1 1
1 1
2 D28 1 1
1 1
2 D22
25
1100
1010
1001
0110
1 1
1 2
1 1
2 1
3 D61, D63 – – –
26
1100
1010
0101
0011
1 1
1 2
1 1
1 2
3 D56, D64 1 1
1 1
3 D24
27
1100
1010
1001
0111
1 2
2 2
3 D129 – – –
28
1110
1101
1011
0111
1 1
1 3
3 D40 1 1
1 1
3 D21
29
1100
1010
1001
0110
0101
1 1
1 2
3 D62 – – –
30
1100
1010
1001
0110
0101
0011
1 1
1 2
2 D40 1 1
1 1
2 D21
Table B.3: The minimal unweighted influence games corresponding to the
30 simple games up to isomorphism for n = 4.
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Banzhaf-Coleman index, see Banzhaf in-
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binary decision diagram form, 66
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bipartite graph, 20
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blocking coalition
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definition, 30
history, 30
boring game, 116
branching program, see binary decision
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characteristic function
of a cooperative game, 28
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definition, 33
history, 33
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closeness centrality, 198
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co-vector-weighted game, 46
coalition, 28
coalitional skill game, 89
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coherent, see proper game
Coleman’s power
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definition, 33
history, 33
collective decision function, 159, 160
of a simple game, 159
collective decision making model, 159
collective decision vector, 160
complement
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definition, 20
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ear game
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constant-sum game, see decisive game
contract curve, see core
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convex game, 89
cooperative game
definition, 28
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complexity, 90
definition, 39
history, 39
counting problem, 11, 26
history, 49
results, 111
critical player, 30, 36
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history, 30, 32
cycle, 20
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decision theory, 7
decision vector, 159
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history, 31
of a dual game, 32
decisive problem
applications, 31
Dedekind number, 49
Dedekind’s problem
history, 49
results, 111
Deegan-Packel index, 37, 82
deficit vector, 35
degree centrality, 198
degree sequence, see Chow parameters
desirability order, see desirability rela-
tion
desirability relation
definition, 45
history, 45
dictator, 32, 174
complexity, 86, 138
definition, 32
dimension, 47
directed game, see regular game
directed graph, 19
dominance relation, see desirability rela-
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domination of imputations, 38
dual-comparable, 31
duality
of CNF, 31
of hypergraphs, 23
of simple games, 29, 98
dummy player, 37, 43, 174
complexity, 86, 108, 138
definition, 32
history, 32
efficient payoff, 35
effort, 200
enumeration problem, 11, 26
history, 49
equivalence
of influence games, 138, 148
of simple games, 34
excess vector, 35
EXP class, 24
EXPSPACE, 26
extensive minimal winning form, 57
extensive winning form, 57
external node, see terminal node
fairness, 36
false vector, see losing coalition
flow betweenness, 199
flow closeness, 199
flow game, 55, 89
follower, 159
definition, 160
form of representation, 53
fraction value, 160
fully condensed binary tree, 72
fully condensed binary tree form, 72
game theory, 7
grand coalition, 28
graph, 19
ground set, 22
Holler index, 37, 224
homogeneous game, 172
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definition, 47
history, 47
homogeneous payoff, 35
hyperedge, 22
hypergraph, 22
immediate successor, 116
improper game, 31, 32
imputation, 36
definition, 35
incidence in graphs, 19
increasing-shift, 45
history, 45
incremental polynomial time, 26
independent actor, 159
definition, 160
independent set, 20
individual rationality, 35
induced subgraph, see subgraph
induced subgraph game, 89
influence game, 128
influence graph, 128
inner node, 20
intersection of simple games, 30
irredundant hypergraph, 22
isolated graph, 180
definition, 20
isomorphism
of influence games, 138, 148
of simple games, 34
k-influence centrality, 202
kernel, 42, 43, 96
complexity, 90
definition, 41
history, 41
Knapsack problem, 27
labeled graph, 20
labeling function, 20
layer, 162
layer of mediation, 162
layered digraph, 162
leaf node, see terminal node
least core, 40, 42, 43, 92
complexity, 90
definition, 40
history, 40
left-shift, see increasing-shift
length, 40, 109
complexity, 86, 138, 149
definition, 33
history, 33
of a dual game, 34
linear game, 45
linearly separable switching function, see
weighted game
linearly separated truth function, see
weighted game
losing coalition, 7
definition, 28
majority game
complexity, 101
definition, 47
majority influence graph, 168
matching game, 89
maximal losing coalition
definition, 30
min-cost spanning tree game, 89
minimal hypergraph, see irredundant hy-
pergraph
minimal kernel, see irredundant hyper-
graph
minimal winning coalition, 37, 38, 40
definition, 30
monotone Boolean function, 54
multiple weighted game, see vector-weighted
game
Nakamura number
definition, 33
history, 33
neighbor game, 89
non-cooperative game, 7
non-oblivious influence system, 166
NP class, 24
NP-complete, 25
NP-hard, 25
nucleolus, 43, 93
complexity, 90
definition, 43
history, 42
oblivious influence system, 166
odd-OLF system, 168
OLF system, 160
opinion leader, 159
definition, 160
ordered game, see linear game
Index – 261
outer node, see terminal node
P class, 24
passer, 32, 36, 38, 42
complexity, 86, 138
definition, 32
path, 20
Patricia trie, see fully condensed binary
tree
payoff, 35
Penrose index, see Banzhaf index
Penrose-Banzhaf index, see Banzhaf in-
dex
pivotal, 37
polynomial-delay, 26
polynomial-time reduction, 25
positive Boolean function, see monotone
Boolean function
power index, 36, 37
predecessor, 19
preimputation, 40, 42, 43
definition, 35
prekernel, 96
complexity, 90
definition, 42
history, 42
prenucleolus, 93
complexity, 90
definition, 43
history, 43
probabilistic Banzhaf index, 36
proper game, 32, 104
complexity, 86, 97, 100, 138, 149
definition, 31, 99
history, 31
of a dual game, 32
pseudo-polynomial time, 25
pseudogame, see simple game
PSPACE, 26
QP class, 24
quasi-reduced binary decision diagram,
67
radix tree, see fully condensed binary
tree
Rae index
definition, 173, 189
reasonable representation, 57
regular function, see regular game
regular game
definition, 45
history, 45
right-shift, see increasing-shift
root node, 20
satisfaction, see Rae index
satisfaction centrality, 201
self-dual game, see decisive game
set cover, 27
set packing, 27
sEXP class, 24
Shapley value
history, 36
Shapley-Shubik index, 37, 92
complexity, 90, 138
history, 36
Shapley-Shubik value, 37
shift-maximal losing coalition, 45
shift-minimal winning coalition, 45
shift-minimal winning form, 71
shortest path game, 56, 89
simple coalitional game, see simple game
simple game
definition, 28, 29
history, 7
utility, 7
simple voting game, see simple game
size
of a graph, 19
of a hypergraph, 22
of a simple game, 33
slice, 22
social choice theory, 7
social network, 198
space complexity, see computational com-
plexity
spanning connectivity game, 56, 89
spread of influence, 128
complexity, 128
stability, 36
stable set, 38–40
complexity, 90
definition, 38
history, 38
standard tree game, 89
star graph, 20
star influence game, 164
star influence graph, 163
star mediation influence game, 164
262 – Index
strict length, 109
complexity, 109
definition, 108
strict width, 109
complexity, 109
definition, 108
strong game, 8, 32, 104, 116
complexity, 86, 97, 100, 138, 149
definition, 31, 99
history, 31
of a dual game, 32
strong hierarchical digraph, 180
strong influence graph, 180
strongly mediated influence system, 180
sub-majority game, see majority game
subgraph, 20
successful team, see winning coalition
successor, 19
supperaditive, see proper game
swap-robust game, see linear game
swing coalition, 44
complexity, 86, 138
definition, 30
history, 30
swing player, see critical player
symmetric players, 37, 42
complexity, 86, 138
definition, 32
history, 32
terminal node, 20
threshold Boolean function, see weighted
game
threshold criteria, see weight function of
a weighted game
threshold game, see simple game
threshold hypergraph, see weighted game
threshold intersection dimension, see vector-
weighted game
threshold network flow game, 89
time complexity, see computational com-
plexity
transversal, 22
tree, 20
triangle, 20
true vector, see winning coalition
undirected graph, 19
union of simple games, 30
unsuccessful team, see losing coalition
unweighted influence game, 129
unweighted influence graph, 128
valuation function, see characteristic func-
tion
vector-weighted game, see vector-weighted
game
definition, 46
vector-weighted representation form, 79
vector-weighted system, see vector-weighted
game
vertex connectivity game, 55, 89
vertex cover, 27
vetoer, 32, 39
complexity, 86, 138
definition, 32
von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, see
stable set
voting theory, 7
weak game, 31, 32
weight function
of a graph, 20
of a weighted game, 46
of an influence game, 128
weighted game
complexity, 101
definition, 46
history, 46
weighted graph, 20
weighted majority game, see weighted
game
weighted multiple majority game, see vector-
weighted game
weighted representation form, 78
weighted voting game, see weighted game
width, 108, 109
complexity, 86, 108, 109, 138, 149
definition, 33
history, 33
of a dual game, 34
Winder order, see desirability relation
winning coalition, 7
definition, 28
zero-sum game, see decisive game
